University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1983

Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study
in Federal Remedies
George W. Dent Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dent, George W. Jr., "Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies" (1983). Minnesota Law Review. 1373.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1373

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law:
A Study in Federal Remedies
George W. Dent, Jr.*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT PRACTICE OF
ANCILLARY RELIEF IN FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW ....................................................

III. FEDERAL JUDICIAL REMEDIES AND
ANCILLARY RELIEF .................................
A.

ANCILLARY

866

869

877

RELIEF IN OTHER AREAS OF

ADMNIsTRATrIvE LAw

..............................

B.

FEDERAL EQUITY, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION,
AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW .......................

C.

IMPLIED STATUTORY REMEDIES ....................

877
882
889

IV. THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW S ..................................................

899

A. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAws ........................

899

1. Express Enforcement Powers..................
2. Implied Remedies-The Legislative History
and Purposes of the FederalSecurities Laws

B. RECENT JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS ...................
C. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ......................................

1. Federalismand Santa Fe .....................
2. The Purposes of the Securities Laws, the
Scope of Disclosure,and Corporate
Governance ....................................
V. ANCILLARY RELIEF IN SECURITIES LAW ........
A. A GENERAL APPROACH TO ANCILLARY RELIEF ....
1. A Blanket Prohibitionon Ancillary Relief?...

899
903
910

913
913

916
922
923
923

* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law SchooL The author thanks
Hillel Tendler, Esq., who rendered invaluable aid as a student research assistant during the preparation of this Article.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:865

2. A Blanket Approval Subject to Judicial
Discretion? .....................................
3. Toward a GeneralApproach to Ancillary
Relief ...........................................
B.

ANCILLARY REUEF IN CONTESTED CASES .........

1. Remedies to Rectify Past ViolationsDisgorgement,Restitution, Rescission,
Sterilization of Voting Rights, Etc.............
2. Relief Pendente Lite ...........................
3. Remedies to Prevent Future ViolationsRemoval and Appointment of Directors,
Appointment of Special Agents and Special
Counsel, Etc....................................
4. Receiverships ..................................

924
927

930
930
933

933
941

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSENT

946

VI. THE ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND A
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE APPROACH ...........
VII. CONCLUSION .........................................

950
960

C.

I. INTRODUCTION
The power of federal courts to fashion remedies not expressly provided by federal law has been widely debated. Although the Supreme Court has spoken often in recent years on
equitable remedies for constitutional violations' and implied
damage actions for violations of the federal Constitution 2 and
statutes, 3 the Court has not recently dealt with implied equitable remedies under federal statutes. The latter area has attracted much attention,4 however, especially regarding the
1. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969); Nagel, Separation
of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. I REV. 661
(1978).
2. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L REV. 1 (1968).
3. See infra notes 107-48 and accompanying text.
4. See Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by
the SEC, 1977 DuKE L.J. 641; Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1779 (1976); Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative
Remedies Available to the SECfor Breaches of Rule 10b-5, 53 ST. JoHN's L REV.
397 (1979); Malley, Far-ReachingEquitable Remedies Under the Securities Acts
and the Growth of Federal Corporate Law, 17 WM. & MARY L, REv. 47 (1975);
Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAw. 1323 (1976); Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAw. 121 (March 1974); Treadway,
SEC Enforcement Techniques: Expanding and Exotic Forms of Ancillary Re-
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Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission"). Over the last fifteen years the SEC has obtained,
with increasing frequency and on a scale unprecedented in administrative law, a broad range of equitable remedies-generally known as "ancillary remedies" or "ancillary relief' 5-not
expressly authorized by federal statutes.
6
Remedies the SEC has obtained against general issuers
without express statutory authority include disgorgement of
profits, restitution, rescission of transactions, appointment of
receivers, sterilization of voting rights, orders to do (or to forbear from doing) acts not otherwise required (or prohibited)
by law, and the restructuring of corporate managements by ap7
pointing persons to or removing persons from corporate office.
Neither the language nor the legislative history of the securities laws expressly empowers the SEC to seek, or the courts to
grant, such remedies. The SEC and some commentators have
found justification for ancillary relief in the need to effectuate
the purposes of the securities laws and in the general equity
powers of the federal courts, particularly as reflected in precedents involving other administrative agencies. Nevertheless,
lief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637 (1975); Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction
Suitsfor Violation of Rule 10b-5, 79 HARv. L. REV. 656 (1966); Comment, Court
Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement
Actions, 64 GEo. L.J. 737 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Court Appointed Directors];Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule 10b-5 Duty to Disclose Material Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65
MICH. L. REv. 944 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Texas Gulf Sulphur];
Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L REV.
1188 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Equitable Remedies]; Comment,
The SEC and Court-Appointed Directors: Time to Tailor the Directorto Fit the
Suit; 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 507 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Tailor the
Director].
5. The terms "ancillary relief" and "ancillary remedies" are themselves
somewhat vague. The word "ancillary" derives from the Latin ancilla, meaning
a female servant, a handmaiden, WEBSTER'S TmD NEW INTERNATioNAL DicTIONARY (1961), as in the Virgin's response to the angel Gabriel at the Annunciation, "Ecce ancilla domini"--"Behold I am the handmaiden of the Lord." Luke
1:38. Ancillary relief thus once connoted relief aiding or subsidiary and supplemental to some principal relief to make the principal relief effective. See 1 J.
POmEROY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 171(1) (5th ed. 1941). The term has come to
be used more broadly to mean any equitable relief not authorized by statute
(note that the titles of many articles cited supra note 4 refer to ancillary relief
or ancillary remedies), and will be so used in this Article.
6. This Article discusses ancillary remedies against issuers generally and
not, except for purposes of comparison, against members of the professional securities industry (such as broker-dealers, securities exchanges, associations of
securities dealers, investment companies, and investment advisors). See infra
notes 161-64 and accompanying text. Treatment of the latter area would raise
very different questions.
7. See infra notes 10-58 and accompanying text.
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close examination of the legislative history raises questions
whether certain ancillary remedies promote or hinder the purposes of the securities laws, and recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the federal securities laws and limiting the
power of federal courts to imply remedies cast doubts on the
courts' power to grant many ancillary remedies.
The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities
Code attempts to eliminate these uncertainties by authorizing
the federal courts "to grant appropriate ancillary or other relief."8 Although this provision would resolve certain questions,
it would also create many new problems of interpretation.
More important, the proposed Code offers an opportunity to
write a new law of ancillary relief in the securities area and
thereby raises the question what that law should be.
The issues raised by ancillary relief in securities law have
important implications for administrative law generally. The
securities laws typify federal administrative legislation in that
they expressly approve certain remedies but neither approve
nor deny others. By pursuing novel remedies, the SEC has
raised the broader question of when a federal agency and the
federal courts may utilize implied remedies. Thus, ancillary relief in securities law offers an interesting study in federal remedies. The Burger Court has begun to redefine the relationship
among Congress, federal administrative agencies, and the federal courts.9 Ancillary relief raises many new questions about
these relationships.
After describing the history and current practice of ancillary relief in federal securities law, this Article analyzes the
general law of federal remedies and ancillary relief, including
ancillary relief in other areas of administrative law, recent developments in federal equity, statutory interpretation, and federal common law, and implied statutory remedies. The Article
then examines pertinent aspects of the federal securities laws,
including their legislative history and recent judicial interpretations. On this basis the Article recommends both a general approach to ancillary relief in federal securities law and
responses to problems of specific remedies. Finally, the Article
discusses ancillary relief under the proposed ALI Federal Securities Code and recommends some amendments.
8. See infra text accompanying note 380.
9. See infra notes 103-04.
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H. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT PRACTICE OF
ANCILLARY RELIEF IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW
The most persuasive argument for ancillary relief in federal
securities law is that the Supreme Court and many lower
courts have approved such relief and that almost no judicial
precedent has questioned it.10 These precedents must be carefully scrutinized, however, to gauge the depth of their support
of ancillary relief.
The ancillary remedies that courts have granted in securities law fall roughly into three categories. The first category includes remedies designed to rectify past violations. The most
common of these are the equitable monetary remedies of disgorgement and restitution," sometimes accompanied by an ac10. But see SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va.
1977), rev'd, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978), in which the district court questioned
whether it had power to appoint new board members and held that, even if it
did, the power should be reserved for egregious cases because such relief
would "infringe on activities traditionally controlled by the states." 429 F.
Supp. at 1177-78. The court of appeals reversed the denial of an injunction and,
without discussing the issue, instructed the district court to reconsider ancillary relief. 586 F.2d at 1007. See also SEC v. National Secs., Inc., 252 F. Supp.
623, 626 (D. Ariz. 1966) (holding disgorgement not authorized by 1934 Act), affd
on othergrounds, 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 453 (1969). Cf. SEC
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH)
96,583, at 94,473 (D.D.C. 1978) ("the Court should not, without considerable
justification, impose a remedy which would in effect regulate areas traditionally
left to internal corporate management"), aff'd on other grounds, 629 F.2d 62

(D.C. Cir. 1980).
11. Contested cases include SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs. Corp., 574
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Galaxy Foodsy Inc., 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103-06 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC V. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); SEC v.
Penn Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (ED. Pa. 1976) (motion to dismiss claim
for disgorgement denied); SEC v. Jet Travel Serv. Inc., [1975-76 Transfer
95,317, at 98,609 (M.D. Fla. 1975); SEC v.
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Blatt, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,281, at 98,444 (S.D.
Fla. 1975); SEC v. Weisberger, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 195,108, at 97,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. RJ. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257,
260 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608, 613 (D.P.R. 1966). See generally Ellsworth, supra note 4 (discussing the role of disgorgement in the SEC's
enforcement program).
The first contested case in which the SEC sought disgorgement was SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified, 401 F.2d 883

(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 3B IL

BLOOMENTHAL, SECUmrrS

AND FEDERAL COROpRATE LAW § 11.25, at 11-132 (1980); Comment, Texas Gulf
Sulphur, supra note 4, at 945. Prior to Texas Gulf Sulphur the SEC had obtained such relief only by consent and in contested cases had sought no ancillary relief other than the appointment of a receiver. Ellsworth, supra note 4, at
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counting.12 If an illegal transaction remains unconsummated, a
court may order a defendant to rescind or to offer to rescind the
transaction.13 Some provisions of the securities laws clearly
contemplate such relief.14 Courts have also granted these remedies to deter future violations by depriving defendants of their
wrongful profits.15 To prevent defendants from profiting from
their violations, courts may enjoin them from voting, or order
them to divest themselves of, stock they illegally acquired.16
Defendants may be ordered to perform properly any required
7
act which they performed improperly or failed to perform.'
A second category comprises remedies designed "to preserve the status quo pending final determination of the questions raised." 8 These include a freeze on assets,19 certain
641 & n.1, 643-47. There have also been many consent decrees ordering such relief. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 413-17, 437-39, 445-46 (citing cases).
12. Contested cases include SEC v. Westen. Pacific Gold & Silver Exch.
Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,064, at 97,734 (D.
Nev. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla.
1974); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608, 614 (D. P.R. 1966); SEC v. Gulf Intercont.
Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 996 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
13. Contested cases include Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 252 (7th
Cir. 1977); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1972); SEC v. Weisberger,[1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,108, at 97,944
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970)
(remedies could include "setting aside" a merger). As in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940), discussed infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text, in most private suits disgorgement, restitution, or rescission will
not be ancillary to an injunction but will be the principal relief sought. There
have also been many consent decrees ordering such relief. See Mathews, supra
note 4, at 1336 (citing cases).
14. See infra text following note 46.
15. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
modified, 401 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
16. Contested cases include Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
480 F.2d 341, 380 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,117, at 92,023
(D.D.C. 1977); SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (D.D.C.
1975); SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
94,501, at 95,759 (D. Ariz. 1974). There have also been many consent
decrees ordering such relief. See cases cited in Jacobs, supra note 4, at 447-48;
Mathews, supra note 4, at 1337.
17. For example, a defendant may be ordered to le a corrected document
with the SEC or to resolicit proxies. See SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F.
Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a~fd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 421 F. Supp. 691, 696 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1977).
18. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (discussed infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text).
19. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940);
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972); Los An-
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types of injunctions pendente lite, 20 and the appointment of a
receiver to preserve property during litigation and to distribute
the property pursuant to a final judgment.2 1
The third category encompasses remedies designed to discourage future violations through regulation of the defendant's
future behavior that goes beyond merely enjoining violations of
the securities laws. Such regulation may take either of two
forms. First, the defendant may be ordered to perform (or to
refrain from performing) specified acts not otherwise required
(or forbidden) by law. 22 Second, the court may change corporate management by appointing persons to, or removing incumbents from, managerial positions. Judicial support in contested
cases for this second type of remedy is extremely tenuous;
geles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199, 213 (9th Cir. 1959);
SEC v. National Farmers Org., Inc., 7 S.E.C. Doc. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1975). Cf. SEC
v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP.
(CCH) $ 95,388, at 98,963 (D.D.C. 1975) (Investment Company Act case).
20. See SEC v. Western Pacific Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 95,064, at 97,734 (D. Nev. 1975) (injunction
against altering, destroying, or concealing various corporate documents and assets); SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
affd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970) (injunction pending trial against entering into
certain transactions (by consent) or making certain withdrawals (contested)).
21. SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v.
Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage
Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961);
SEC v. Gulf Intercont. Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 996 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
For decisions reversing the denial of a receivership and remanding, see
Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); SEC v. Bowler, 427
F.2d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 1970). There have been many appointments of receivers
over broker-dealers. See SEC v. Investors Sec. Corp., 560 F.2d 561, 563 (3d Cir.
1977); SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1970); Lankenau v.
Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs.,
Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 879 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F.
Supp. 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see SEC v. Buongiorno, [1964-66 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (denial of receiver).
22. Such orders have ranged from commanding a corporation to keep additional records to prohibiting a corporation from acquiring other companies or
entering any new line of business without court approval. Contested cases include Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 256 (7th Cir. 1977) (order to make
additional disclosure, modify loan agreements, and forbid corporate securities
transactions unless approved by shareholders or court); SEC v. Heritage Trust
Co., 402 F. Supp. 744, 752 (D. Ariz. 1975) (order to give SEC access to corporate
books to monitor compliance with law); SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F.
Supp. 1248, 1262 (D.D.C. 1975) (injunction against buying or selling stock of a
company); SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,501, at 95,759 (D. Ariz. 1974) (order to surrender certain stock
and to report stock holdings and any changes therein to court). A case involving a consent decree is SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., Civil No. C-73-1095 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 2, 1974) (prohibiting corporation from selling securities in certain circumstances or "expand[ing] their operations to a new product line or business" without approval of special counsel). See also Mathews, supra note 4, at
1337 (citing cases).
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nearly all such relief has been granted in consent decrees.2 3 Indeed, until recently the Commission rarely even requested this
type of remedy.24 Only in the last few years has the SEC begun arguing in many cases that an injunction against violations
cannot by itself ensure compliance. 25 The Commission has professed concern, however, that a receivership might damage
creditors and investors-the very persons the SEC is supposed
to protect.2 6 The Commission, therefore, has begun seeking
changes in corporate management without the appointment of
a receiver. These changes include appointing a special agent to
conduct an investigation 27 or to oversee disclosure, 2 8 and ousting several directors and court appointment of a majority of directors with the approval of the SEC.29
23. Although some courts have appointed special agents or special counsel
in contested cases, see infra note 27, none has restructured a corporate board
in a contested case. See infra note 29.
24. See Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on CorporateGovernance, 41 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 128 (Summer 1977) ("At one time the Commission typically sought only conventional injunctive relief."). For example, in In re
Franchard Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,113, at
82,046 (1964), the Commission conceded its lack of power "to define federal
standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary operations of business enterprises." See infra text accompanying notes 246-47.
25. See Sommer, supra note 24, at 128 ("[Iln recent years [the Commission] has increasingly tried to expand the.., relief resulting from civil court
proceedings, a response perhaps to the criticism that the typical result of its
civil proceedings has been only a slap on the wrist."); Sporkin, supra note 4, at
122 ("[W]e [the SEC] have been trying more and more to structure our remedies to fit the particular fact pattern presented."); Comment, Texas Gulf
Sulphur, supra note 4; at 963 ("the SEC believes that an injunction without
more is not a sufficient remedy"). See also Hazen, Administrative Enforcement.An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of Injunctions
and Other Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 445 (1979) ("the simple
injunction has little deterrent effect").
26. See Sporkin, supra n6te 4, at 123. Cf. infra note 341 and accompanying
text (SEC has argued that since it can obtain a receiver and since other remedies affecting corporate governance are not as drastic as the receivership, a fortiori it can obtain such other remedies, and with a lesser showing).
27. SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1977), affg 421 F.
Supp. 691 (D. Mass. 1976) (special agent appointed to bring corporation into
compliance with securities laws, with district court specifying several tasks);
SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972) (limited receiver appointed to
conduct an investigation, file reports, and hold a shareholders' meeting); SEC
v. Western Geothermal & Power Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) [ 96,920 (D. Ariz. 1979) (special officer appointed to insure compliance
with securities laws). But see SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (court denied request for appointment of special counsel).
28. See generally supra note 27.
29. No court has removed or appointed directors or officers in a contested
case, although the issue has arisen indirectly in a few cases. See Handler v.
SEC, 610 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting collateral attack on consent decree
in Matte4 discussed infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text); SEC v. Lincoln
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The most publicized decision involving such corporate gov-

ernance reforms, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 30 typifies such cases. In
its initial complaint, the SEC alleged that in 1973 Mattel made
filings and press releases that were false and misleading. 31 Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint, Mattel consented
to, and the court entered, a judgment that permanently enjoined Mattel from violating the 1934 Act. The judgment also
required Mattel to appoint two new unaffiliated directors 32 and
to establish an audit committee 33 and a "Litigation and Claims
Committee,"3 4 each with specified powers. The Commission
obtained the relief "to avoid repetition of the alleged violations."35 When Mattel informed the SEC a few months later of
further securities law violations, the Commission obtained Mattel's consent to additional relief, including the appointment and
maintenance for five years of a majority of unaffiiated directors
on a new executive committee and on the whole board, the correction of false filings, and the selection by the unaffiliated directors of a special counsel to investigate and bring suits for
securities law violations and to select a special auditor to audit
certain financial statements.3 6 Despite initial reluctance, the
district judge granted the requested relief with certain modifications.3 7 The company and the SEC enforcement staff chose
Thrift Ass'n, 557 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1977) (court of appeals notes that district
court had appointed a board of trustees to replace a receiver); International
Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974)
(rejecting collateral attack on consent decree providing for court-appointed
special counsel and board of directors). For other consent decrees, see cases
cited in Mathews, supra note 4, at 1334-35, 1340-42, 1345-52.
30. 4 S.E.C. Doc. 724, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 94,754 (D.D.C. 1974).
31. Id. The complaint alleged that in 1973 Mattel made false and misleading filings and press releases by overstating its profits, understating its costs,
and using deceptive accounting procedures.
32. To accomplish this the SEC also forced an increase in the number of
directors provided in Mattel's by-laws. See Malley, supra note 4, at 56.
33. 4 S.E.C. Doc. 724, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,754 (D.D.C. 1974). The Financial Controls and Audit Committee was to
oversee accounting procedures and controls, review financial reports and press
releases, determine the corporate position in any disagreement with the corporation's auditors, and review any proposed change of independent auditors.
34. Id. The committee was to control litigation against insiders, and review
conflicts of interest and establish corporate policies with regard to such matters. The two new directors and the members of the two new committees were
to be acceptable to the court and the Commission.
35. 4 S.E.C. Doc. 724, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH)

1 94,754, at 96,486.
36. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 5 S.E.C. Doc. 241, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L REP. (CCH) 94,807 (D.D.C. 1974). The unaffiliated directors were to be
appointed with court approval.
37. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 1328.
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new directors from a list of persons cleared by the Commission.3 8 Shareholders played no role in this selection and were
denied their usual right to fill these directorships during the
five-year period of the decree. 39 The judgment involved substantial, continuing court involvement in the corporation's

affairs.40
Most ancillary remedies have been obtained ancillary to an
injunction in an SEC enforcement proceeding. On occasion,
however, the SEC has secured ancillary relief in an administrative proceeding 4' or in a civil suit in which no injunction was
granted. 42 Private plaintiffs also have occasionally obtained an3

cillary relief.4

The only Supreme Court case dealing with ancillary relief
38. See Loo, The SEC's Role in DirectorSelection, in DuTEs AND RESPONSIBILnTES OF OUTSmE DIRECTORS 77, 98 (A. Cohen & R. Loeb eds. 1978).
39. There is no mention of shareholders in the decree, and presumably the
decree supersedes state laws providing for shareholder election of directors.
See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974).
40. In addition to the usual judicial functions in supervising an injunction,
the decree contemplated court approval of new directors, receipt of reports of
the special counsel and special auditor, determination of special auditor's compensation, resolution of disputes between the special counsel and the board of
directors, and receipt of requests for instructions from the special auditor. 5
94,807
S.E.C. Doc. 241, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH)
(D.D.C. 1974).
41. Since the SEC can generally bring administrative proceedings only
against securities professionals (e.g., broker-dealers and investment companies) and other professionals (principally lawyers and accountants), ancillary
relief in administrative proceedings has been obtained primarily against such
persons, and by consent. See Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CAT. U. L. REV. 215, 230-31 & n.62
(1980). Ancillary relief has been obtained in rule 2(e) proceedings. See Treadway, supra note 4, at 667-76. Sometimes ancillary relief is obtained indirectly,
as when the SEC orders that a broker's registration be revoked unless the principal individual offender (who could not be subjected to administrative proceedings) is disassociated from the broker. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 425.
42. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082, 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972).
43. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (discussed
infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236,
252-58 (7th Cir. 1976) (special injunction entered); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (defendant ordered to make
registered public offering); Braasch v. Muscat, [1967-69" Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,148 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded on other grounds, 398 F.2d
1022 (2d Cir. 1968) (special fiscal agent appointed); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (accounting ordered). Receivers have
recovered ancillary relief in some cases. See, e.g., Lankenau v. Coggeshall &
Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 63-67 (2d Cir. 1965); Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile
Corp., 335 F.2d 141, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1964).
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in securities law is Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.44 The
plaintiffs there sued under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
193345 and sought rescission and restitution, a receiver to settle
claims against the issuer and to wind up its business, and an
injunction restraining a trustee from disposing of assets of the
trust.4 6 The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals,
held that a suit could be maintained and an injunction entered
against the trustee.4 7 Although the issue on appeal was the
susceptibility of the trustee to suit rather than the availability
of ancillary relief, the Court stated in dictum that further equitable relief could be granted on two grounds. First, section
12(2) states that the purchaser "may sue either in law or in equity ... to recover the consideration paid." The statute could
hardly be clearer in authorizing rescission or restitution, "at
least where there are circumstances making the legal remedy
inadequate."4 8 Piling dictum on dictum, the Court also cited
section 22(a), which grants courts jurisdiction "of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by" the 1933 Act, and stated:
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of
recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or
to the litigant according to the exigencies of
actions normally available
49
the particular case.

In Deckert restitution and rescission were the principle relief sought rather than ancillary relief,50 and these remedies
were not implied, but were within the language of the statute.
The Court's holding is not necessarily relevant to the SEC
which, because it is never a purchaser, cannot sue under section 12(2). The Court's other basis-section 22(a)-is not only
dictum but is also ambiguous. In Deckert the plaintiffs sought
44. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). Section 12(2) permits a private action by a
buyer of securities against one who "offers or sells" by means of false or misleading statements or omissions of material facts.
46. 311 U.S. at 285.
47. The opinion's reasoning is surprisingly opaque. The Court stated that
"the injunction was a reasonable measure to preserve the status quo pending
final determination of the questions raised by the bill," id. at 290, that "the complicated arrangement between [the trustee and the issuer] might make it extremely difficult to obtain satisfaction of any claim established against" the
issuer, id. at 289, and that part of the consideration paid by plaintiffs was held
by the trustee, id. The Court did not, however, state which of these facts was
essential to maintenance of the suit.
48. Id. at 289.
49. Id. at 288 (emphasis in original).
50. See supra note 5 as to the meaning of "ancillary relief."
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an injunction and a receiver solely to maintain the status quo
pending final disposition of the case so as to prevent a dissipation of assets that could have made a final judgment in their
favor meaningless. The Court may have intended to approve
only this limited ancillary relief, or it may have intended a
much broader approval of ancillary remedies. Most important,
recent Supreme Court decisions have rejected reliance on jurisdictional provisions like section 22(a) as a source of remedial
power.5 1 It may have been relevant to the decision, though it
was not mentioned as such, that the defendant was an invest52
ment company.

Thus Deckert, the Supreme Court's only encounter with ancillary relief in securities law, provides only shaky authority for
most ancillary relief. Nonetheless, lower federal courts have
often approved this type of remedy. In addition to citing Deckert5 3 and following its reliance on provisions granting jurisdiction,5 4 these lower courts have grounded their decisions
principally on the general equity powers of federal tribunals.55
The courts have also stressed other factors, including the need
to effectuate the purposes and improve the enforcement of the
securities laws,5 6 and have cited cases granting ancillary relief
51. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
52. Although the facts of the case arose before enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Act had been enacted when the Court decided
Deckert. The abuses of investment companies and their need for regulation
were widely acknowledged at the time and may have led the Court to use
broader language than it would have for a company not in the securities
industry.
53. See SEC v. Investors Sec. Corp., 560 F.2d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 1977); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); Los Angeles
Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir.
1947); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
54. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir.
1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 US. 1005 (1972); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285
F.2d 162, 181 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. R.J. Allen &
Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (SD. Fla. 1974).
55. See infra note 78.
56. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1972); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); SEC v.
Beisinger Indus. Corp., 421 F. Supp. 691 (D. Mass. 1976), afd, 552 F.2d 15, 18-19
(1st Cir. 1977); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., [1975-76 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,495 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), modified on other
grounds, 574 F.2d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Weisberger, [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen &
Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp.
46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Wong, 252 F.
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in other areas of administrative law,57 and Supreme Court
cases implying private damage actions. 58 The next two Parts of
this Article describe and analyze these justifications.
IIL

FEDERAL JUDICIAL REMEDIES
AND ANCILLARY RELIEF

Cases approving ancillary relief in securities law have relied on the general equitable power of federal courts to fashion
remedies to enforce federal statutes, citing many federal administrative cases granting ancillary relief and cases implying
private rights of action. This Part reviews the remedial powers
of federal courts, the law of ancillary relief, and some recent
trends in these areas.
A.

ANCILLARY RELIEF IN OTHER AREAS OF ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW
There is no general statutory authority for federal courts to
grant ancillary relief.59 In the oft-cited case of Porterv. Warner
Holding Co.,60 however, the Supreme Court stated that
Supp. 608, 611-14 (D.P.R. 1966). Similarly, several courts have stressed the deterrent function of ancillary relief. See SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d
Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 391 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F.
Supp. 1225, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afld, 556 F2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977).
57. See Handler v. SEC, 610 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1979); Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973); SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1972);
Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 180-81 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608, 611-14
(D.P.R. 1966); SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y.

1961). See 3 L Loss, SEcuRrriEs REGULATION 1827-29 (2d Ed. 1961).
58. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
59. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976), which permits federal
courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law," authorizes writs
"to preserve the status quo while administrative proceedings are in progress
and prevent the impairment of the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction."
FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1966) (approving a preliminary injunction against consummation of a merger pending determination of its legality).
A court may not use the act to enjoin action that is not detrimental to its jurisdiction. Calloway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 149-51 (1949). The Act is a means of
avoiding inflexible application of the final judgment rule. See 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.26, at 276 (1983). Moreover, even for the purpose of protecting court jurisdiction the Act is limited to writs "agreeable to the usages
and principles of law," and therefore has been held not to authorize an interlocutory injunction for which there was no precedent. De Beers ConsoL Mines v.
United States, 325 U.S. 212, 219, 222-23 (1945).
60. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
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"[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equiMoretable powers of the District Court are available ....
over, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is
not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid
legislative command." 61 The relevant statute in Porter authorized a court to issue "a permanent or temporary injunction, or
other order," 62 however. Looking at this language and its legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress intended to
authorize the district court to grant all equitable remedies.
Thus the holding can be limited to the statute in question, and
63
the Court's broader pronouncement is clearly dictum.
In the antitrust field the federal courts have often granted
ancillary relief. In Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States,64 the Supreme Court approved a divestiture order
under section 4 of the Sherman Act, which authorizes the district courts "to prevent and restrain" violations of the Act and
permits the government to request that a violation "be enjoined
or otherwise prohibited."65 Like the statutory language "or
other order" in Porter,66 the language "or otherwise prohibited"
in the Sherman Act indicates Congress envisioned equitable
remedies beyond a simple injunction. Furthermore, the evils of
illegal mergers which the Sherman Act is supposed to remedy,
principally reduced competition, 67 continue after consummation of the merger; thus, one may view the continuing combina61. Id. at 398. The Court affirmed an order requiring a landlord to refund
rents collected in excess of war time rent controls. Accord Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982) (dictum that the court may decline to enjoin violation of federal statute).
62. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205(e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 925(a)
(1976). Moreover, the legislative history clearly supported the holding by stating- "Such courts are given jurisdiction to issue whatever order to enforce compliance is proper under the circumstances of each particular case." 328 U.S. at
401 (quoting S. REP. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942)). Cf. United States
v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1956) (denying restitution where statute
did not contain such language).
63. Similarly, in United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619-20 (1951), the relevant statute permitted the court to issue an injunction "or other order." The
Court upheld an order that a landlord refund rents charged in excess of war
time rent controls even though no injunction was appropriate because the
rental area had been decontrolled after the violations but before suit was
brought.
64. 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948). The Court affirmed an injunction and divestiture order against defendants found to have violated sections 1 and 2 of the

Sherman Act.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
66. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
67.

L. SULLiVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANIUST 14 (1977) ("The pur-

pose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition and to inhibit monopoly
).
and restraints upon freedom of trade ....
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tion of two illegally merged firms as a continuing violation of
the Sherman Act. Divestiture, then, only prevents a continuing
violation of the Act.68 Divestiture is intended not to impose on
defendants any demand not already imposed by law, but only
to deprive them of the fruit of their illegal behavior. "It is...
designed... to undo what could have been prevented had the
defendants not outdistanced the government in their unlawful
project."69

In short, divestiture merely discontinues an illegal

arrangement and restores the status quo ante. One can similarly explain most other ancillary remedies under the antitrust
laws7 O and the FTC's remedy of corrective advertising. 71
68. The Supreme Court has stated, "Dissolution of the combination will be
ordered where the creation of the combination is itself the violation." United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189-90 (1944). The divestiture
decree required certain persons to resign from offices with corporations affiliated with the defendant exhibitors and enjoined them from occupying such offices. Interlocking managements were part of the combination which was
"itself the violation," however. Thus, unlike the restructuring of corporate
boards in securities cases, this relief imposed no burden not already required
by law.
69. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948).
Accord United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 171 (1948) (in
remanding for reconsideration of divestiture, the Court said the district court's
"function includes undoing what the conspiracy achieved"). As early as 1911,
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911), the Court stated that
relief under the antitrust laws should simply "dissolve the combination ...
which the possession of the power unlawfully obtained has brought and will
continue to bring about." The Court in Standard Oil overturned parts of the
lower court's decree that went beyond this principle. Id. at 80-81. Accord Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972) ("Divestiture is a start toward restoring the pre-acquisition situation.").
70. The distribution of technology was ordered in United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 352-58 (1947), to deprive the defendant of monopoly
power acquired in violation of the Sherman Act by the pooling of patents and
the allocation of markets.
71. Corrective advertising is designed, as the name implies, to deny offenders the benefits of past illegality by requiring them to correct prior deceptive
advertising. Some lower court opinions approving corrective advertising have
employed very broad language. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d
749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978) ("the Commission has
the power to shape remedies which go beyond the simple cease and desist order"). See also Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946) ("the courts
will not interfere [with the Commission's selection of a remedy] except where
the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found
to exist.") In Jacob Siegel however, the question was whether the Commission properly ordered excision of a trade name it deemed inherently deceptive.
Assuming the trade name was deceptive, forbidding its continued use would be
simply to forbid a continued violation of the law.
Commentators have recognized that depriving defendants of the fruits of
past illegality is the purpose of corrective advertising. See, e.g., Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protectionand the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 661, 696 (1977) ("the Commission must have the authority to deprive il-
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In Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 72 the Supreme Court
approved reimbursement of wages lost by an employee wrongfully discharged, even though the relevant statute denied the
courts jurisdiction to order payment to employees of "unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation." While the
statute in Mitchell authorized the Secretary of Labor only to
seek an injunction, 73 and thus the case cannot be distinguished
on the same grounds as Porter and Schine,74 the ancillary relief
granted there only required compensation for past violations of
the law and imposed no burden on the defendant's future behavior. Thus, even if Mitchell supports ancillary relief to rectify
past violations of the law, it hardly supports remedies affecting
future behavior.
A few lower court cases have held that certain administrative agencies were not authorized by statute to obtain certain
remedies.7 5 Furthermore, courts have limited the powers of administrative agencies in ways significant to ancillary relief. An
agency may not issue an order which is a "patent attempt to
achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of" the enabling statute.76 While these cases
legal advertisers of the unlawful fruits of their violations in order to reestablish
the market situation as it existed prior to the wrongdoing").
72. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
73. Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act authorized courts only "to
restrain violations" of the Act. 361 U.S. at 289.
74. See supra notes 62, 65 and accompanying text.
75. In United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956), the court
held that the FDA was not entitled to restitution after a violation of the Federal
Drug and Cosmetic Act. Several cases have held that a court may not order a
product recall as an ancillary remedy under the same Act. See United States v.
Superpharm Corp., 530 F. Supp. 408, 410-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. XOtag Plus Tablets, 441 F. Supp. 105, 115 (D. Colo. 1977); United States v. C.E.B.
Prods., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 664, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Cf. National Confectioners
Ass'n v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1978> (dictum that the FDA does
not have authority to mandate recalls). But see United States v. K-N Enterprises, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (factors allowing preliminary injunction pendente lite to issue requiring recall).
In a few administrative law cases the Supreme Court has ruled that federal
statutes barred certain ancillary equitable remedies. All these cases have involved suits against administrative agencies and might be distinguished from
other ancillary relief cases on that ground, though the Court has sometimes
discussed these cases as if they were indistinguishable. See Renegotiation Bd.
v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1974) (discussing Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970)). But these cases differ from the ancillary relief cases
in other ways. See Renegotiation Bd., 415 U.S. at 20 (holding respondent had to
exhaust administrative remedies before challenging Board's action in court);
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1943) (petition to the Board held to be the exclusive remedy, precluding judicial relief).
76. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943) (dictum;
Court upheld an NLRB order because there was no showing of any such at-
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do not involve ancillary relief of the kind obtained by the SEC,
they do delimit the permissible scope of administrative action
and at least suggest that ancillary remedies, if permitted at all,
must be carefully designed so as not to exceed the purposes of
the relevant statute.
The imposition of restitution and other conditions to probation in a criminal sentence is superficially similar to ancillary
equitable remedies. This use of probation provides little support for ancillary equitable relief, however, because of the procedural protections available to criminal defendants and
because the federal probation statute expressly authorizes imposition of "such terms and conditions as the court deems
best."

77

In sum, Supreme Court cases approving ancillary relief in
tempt in the ease). Thus, the NLRB may not order an employer to grant a
union a particular concession in a collective bargaining agreement, Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106-07 (1970); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
395, 404 (1952), and the FPC may not prohibit employment discrimination by its
regulatees, NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669-71 (1976). The Court denied that
the statutory criterion of the public interest is "a broad license to promote the
general public welfare. Rather, the words take meaning from the purposes of
the regulatory legislation." Id. at 669. Arguably, an administrative agency cannot obtain by judicial relief that which it cannot demand by rule or order.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976). The statute expressly permits a court to grant
probation "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best," including
"restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties." Thus conditions to probation
are not judicially implied, as are ancillary equitable remedies in securities law.
For support of creative use of conditions to probation in criminal sentences
against corporations, see Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick' An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishmen 79 MicH. L.
REv.386, 448-57 (1981); Note, Structural Crime and InstitutionalRehabilitation
A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE LJ.353 (1979). Among the
many protections afforded criminal but not civil defendants are the necessity of
the prosecution's obtaining a grand jury indictment, the right to a jury trial, the
requirement that the prosecution prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and
limitations on the prosecution's ability to discover evidence from defendants.
FED. R. Cnn . P. 11(f) also demands that before accepting a guilty plea the
court must satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea. This contrasts
with the procedure in consent cases involving ancillary relief where judicial
scrutiny is usually minimal. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
These procedural protections reduce the likelihood that the court will impose a
sanction on an innocent defendant.
Moreover, although the trial court's power to fashion conditions to probation is broad, it is not unlimited, and there is little or no precedent for restructuring corporate managements as a condition to probation. See Higdon v.
United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) (conditions to probation must be
narrowly drawn to achieve rehabilitation and protection of the public without
unnecessarily restricting lawful activities); United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d
675, 683 (2d Cir. 1976) (condition that defendant resign from the bar held invalid in sentence of probation); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58,
61 (7th Cir. 1972) (order requiring corporation to institute pollution control program was unreasonable and exceeded district court's authority).
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administrative law are limited to a few holdings under specific
statutes and some broader dicta. Many cases strongly suggest,
even if they do not clearly hold, that ancillary relief may be
granted only to terminate a continuing violation of law or to deprive a wrongdoer of the fruits of past transgressions. The
precedents do not establish that an administrative agency is
entitled to whatever relief it or the court thinks beneficial. At
the least, the law of ancillary relief is sufficiently amorphous to
leave the Supreme Court much leeway when it tackles the issue. Moreover, even the limited authority for ancillary relief
may be undermined by recent Supreme Court decisions concerning statutory interpretation, federal common law, and implied statutory remedies.
B.

FEDERAL EQUITY, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND

FEDERAL COMMON LAw

Perhaps the principal justification for ancillary relief in administrative law has been the equitable power of federal courts
to fashion remedies to enforce federal statutes. 78 Courts and
commentators have often trumpeted the powers of equity:
"The power of equity knows no limit... , there is no limit to
the various forms and kinds of specific remedy which [the
chancellor] may grant."79 The Supreme Court has also stated
78. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940);
Handler v. SEC, 610 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Secs. Corp., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Investors Sec. Corp., 560 F.2d 561,
567 (3d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass'n, 557 F.2d 1274, 1276 (9th Cir. 1977);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 379 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4 6 (2d Cir.
1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1972); SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 1970); SEC v.
S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 747 (2d Cir. 1966); Lankenau v. Coggeshall &
Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch.
v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181-82 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC
v. Western Geothermal & Power Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 96,920, at 95,860 (D. Ariz. 1979); SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., [1977-78
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,117, at 92,020 (D.D.C. 1977); SEC
v. Weisberger, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,108, at
97,943 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975-76 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,388, at 98,962 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. PT. Allen &
Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 875 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp.
46, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aOd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Wong, 252 F.
Supp. 608, 613 (D.P.R. 1966); SEC v. Gulf Intercont. Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987,
996 (S.D. Fla. 1963); SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432, 432-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (E.D.
Pa. 1947).
79. 1 J.Po MERoY, supra note 5, § 109.
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that in fashioning remedies, courts of equity have flexibility to
afford complete relief. 80 Although the powers of equity are
broad, they are not boundless. Equity is regulated by the rules
of pleading and procedure. 81 In fashioning equitable remedies,
the federal courts must adhere to the traditional practices of
equity: "When Congress leaves to the federal courts the formulation of remedial details, it can hardly expect them to break
with historic principles of equity in the enforcement of federally-created equitable rights." 82 Rather, the Court has insisted
on following "the requirements of equity practice with a background of several hundred years of history."8 3 It has referred
to using traditional or familiar remedies 84 and has refused to
approve a remedy for which there was no precedent "in the
long history of equity jurisprudence."85 The Court has also im80. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). See
also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803 (1982); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
81. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, § 115.
82. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). See also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416, 417 (1975) (the chancellor's "judgment is
to be guided by sound legal principles" and not vary "like the chancellor's
foot"); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1975) (referring to
"traditional prerequisites" to equitable relief); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 160-61 (1971) (lower court overstepped equity power and usurped legislative power by fixing voting districts); Board of Commissioners v. United States,
308 U.S. 343, 349-50, 351-52 (1939) (considerations of fairness precluded payment
of interest for use of money); P. BATOR, P. MIsHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1311 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] ("a statutory jurisdiction to grant injunctions is to be administered in the light of general equitable principles").
83. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). Accord Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803 (1982) ("we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles").
84. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct.
1825, 1838 (1982) (quoting Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Montana-Dakota Util.
Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261 (1951)) ("Courts ... do not
require explicit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to enforce statu[O]ur function is to decide what remedies are appropriate
tory obligation ....
in the light of the statutory language and purpose and of the traditional modes
by which courts compel performance."); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 61-62 (1975) ("traditional remedies"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402-03 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (referring to "a
choice among traditionally available judicial remedies") (emphasis in

original).
85. In De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 223
(1945), an antitrust case, the Supreme Court overturned the district court's
grant of an interlocutory injunction which amounted to a sequestration of assets. The Court concluded that the antitrust laws did not authorize such relief
and then considered "the general principles which govern the granting of equitable relief" Id. at 218-19. The Court paid little attention to the lower court's
conclusion on the facts that such relief was desirable. Finding no precedent for
such relief, the Court rejected it as "not authorized ... by statute or by the
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posed many specific restrictions on federal equity, particularly
on when a court may grant an injunction 86 or appoint a receiver.87 In addition, equitable relief must be appropriate 88 and,
in determining this propriety, courts may have to weigh factors
other than the plaintilf's need for complete relief. In particular,
relief must effectuate the purposes of the law under which relief is afforded.89
usages of equity . . . ." Id. at 223. See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 176 (1948) (district court has no power to require parties to
submit to arbitration); Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 290
U.S. 264, 271-73 (1933) (there are limits on conditions court can attach to an injunction; injunction may not be conditioned so that court in effect sets utility
rates).
86. For the issuance of an injunction the Court has required: (1) "a definite factual showing of illegality," Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S.
163, 179 (1931); accord Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 377
(1933); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); (2) a
threat of irreparable harm, at least in certain cases, Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803 (1982); Kleppe v. Sierra Club 427 U.S. 390, 407-08
(1976) (concerning the National Environmental Policy Act); Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975) (concerning § 13(d) of the Exchange
Act); (3) a reasonable likelihood that future violations will occur if the injunction does not issue, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980); Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975); and (4) proof of the inadequacies of remedies at law, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974). Any injunction must
relate closely to the defendant's past or threatened infractions. May Stores Co.
v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 392 (1945); NLRB v. Express Publ. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 437
(1941). See also FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 392 (1959) (order enforced
because activity enjoined was closely related to the illegal conduct); De Beers
Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217, 222 (1945) (injunction dissolved where it dealt with "a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the
case," and was "unrelated to any supposed violations of the Anti-Trust Laws").
The Court has stressed the need to limit the remedy to the violation in many
recent cases. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977)
(remand due to disparity between violations and "sweeping remedy"); Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 744-45 (1974) (instance of segregation did not justify "broad metropolitan
remedy"). But cf. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ("the
court may go beyond the matters immediately underlying its equitable jurisdiction"). An injunction must be designed to deter violations rather than to punish them. Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388 (8th
Cir. 1976); Electronic Specialty Corp. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937 (2d Cir. 1969).
87. See infra notes 344-65 and accompanying text.
88. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (court must determine
whether a damage action is "an appropriate form of relief"). See also Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (federal courts will adjust
their remedies to grant "necessary relief") (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946)).
89. Equitable discretion "must be exercised in light of the large objectives
of the [applicable] Act." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944). See also
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (quoting Hecht); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62 (1975) (court will fashion remedies
"consistent with the legislative scheme"). Thus, in A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur
D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43 (1941), the Supreme Court reversed the in-
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More important than specific dicta or holdings regarding
equity, though, are the Supreme Court's new attitudes toward
statutory interpretation and federal common law that will undoubtedly affect equitable remedies in a profound, but as yet
undetermined way. In interpreting statutes the Court has
edged away from a purposive approach, which often relied on
broad inferences from general statements in statutes or legislative history, toward a more literalist approach that follows the
plain meaning of a statute absent a clear statement of a contrary congressional intent in the legislative history. 90 Policy
and equitable considerations, therefore, play a much smaller
role in the current approach. 91
The Court has also taken a more restrictive attitude toward
federal common law-the law made by judges to decide issues
committed to federal law but not covered by the Constitution
or federal legislation.92 In the nonconstitutional realm federal
common law "shades into" statutory interpretation. 93 In several recent cases the Court has stressed that "federal courts,
unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking
powers."9 4 The Court has grown hesitant to fashion federal
common law except where Congress clearly intended it to do
validation of a contract that violated the 1933 Act because under the facts of the
case this remedy "would probably seriously hinder rather than aid the real purpose of the statute."
90. See Note, Intent Clear Statemen and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Cour 95 HARv. L. REV. 892 (1982). But see Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (court must look to
"whole law, and to its object and policy") (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421
U.S. 707, 713 (1975)). The "purposive" approach looked to broad legislative purpose and equitable considerations. Note, supra, at 893.
91. See Note, supra note 90, at 896-97, 901. The position taken there is
somewhat overstated, however. Although some recent statements by members
of the Court, usually in minority opinions, have suggested that policy and equitable considerations are irrelevant to statutory interpretation, the Court continues to weigh these factors in many majority opinions. This is not surprising,
even given an approach that purportedly looks solely to congressional intent,
because judges properly hesitate to assume that Congress intended to create
inequity or an undesirable policy.-'Ji most opinions purporting to reject policy
or equitable considerations, the author of the opinion does not reject compelling policy or equitable considerations in favor of a literal statutory reading. Instead, the writer finds such considerations conflicting and, rather than choosing
between the conflicting considerations, resorts to the literal statutory language.
92. HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 82, at 770.
93. Id.: "Statutory interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative advertence to the issue at hand attenuates." See also Note, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory
Construction or the FederalCommon Law Power?, 51 U. CoLO.I. REV. 355, 393
(1980).
94. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451
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so or where necessary to decide questions committed to federal
law. 95 Thus, legislation that appears comprehensive on its face
is deemed to preempt federal common law on the subject, even
where Congress has not expressed any intent to preempt.9 6
The Court is especially reluctant to fashion remedies for violations of a federal statute for which Congress has provided express remedies. 9 7 Federalism demands further hesitation to
create federal common law where important state interests are
at stake. 9 8
There are several reasons for the Court's changed attitudes
toward statutory interpretation and federal common law. First,
the Court now believes itself incompetent to make the difficult
policy decisions necessary in fashioning a broad common law
or in using a purposive approach to statutory construction. 99
Second, the Court has become more concerned about states'
rights.100 Third, the Court has adopted a different vision of the
U.S. 77, 95 (1981). Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947).
95. In Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union Local 1285, 102 S. Ct. 2202,
2210 (1982), for example, the Court held that the question whether federal law
governed the enforcement of contracts mandated by federal law was to be decided by reference to congressional intent. Finding no congressional intent to
federalize the law of these contracts, the Court relegated the plaintiff to state
courts and state contract law. See also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1981) (Congress intended federal courts to create common law in applying the Sherman Act); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (federal common law is subject to congressional control).
96. Thus, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Court
held that federal legislation concerning interstate water pollution preempted
federal common law on the subject. The Court stated that the question of preemption of federal common law differs markedly from the question of preemption of state law. Respect for state sovereignty demands a clear, unambiguous
statement by Congress to preempt state law. As to federal common law, however, the federal lawmaking power is vested in Congress, and it is assumed
that, absent special circumstances, Congress, and not the courts, is to make
federal law. Id. at 316-17. Accord Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981) (FWPCA preempts federal
common law of water nuisance). See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (federal courts have not been
vested with open-ended lawmaking powers).
97. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 644-46
(1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451
U.S. 77, 94-95 (1981).
98. See United States v. Yazell, 482 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); Note, supra note 93,
at 375.
99. See Note, supra note 90, at 901-02. See also Goldstein, A Swann Song
for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court 13 H Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 43-44 (1978) (Court has limited remedies in several recent constitutional
cases because it could not acquire and use sufficient technical data, develop
standards, and provide continuing supervision).
100. In one sphere of federal common law, the fashioning of constitutional
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legislative process, a vision more sensitive to the compromises
entailed in legislation and correspondingly more skeptical of
construing complex, technical statutes by reference to a vague,
poorly articulated congressional purpose.' 0 1 Thus, the Court
assumes that where Congress has enacted a comprehensive
statute, it did not intend to leave the federal judiciary free to
fashion common law in the same area.l0 2 Fourth, and most important, the Court wants to restore what it considers the appropriate constitutional balance between the legislative and
judicial branches.1 03 Underlying these attitudes is a more conremedies, this growing concern has resulted in the Court's breathing new life
into the doctrine of federalism. See Goldstein, supra note 99, at 8-26 (growing
consideration of federalism in fashioning constitutional remedies). The Court
is increasingly willing to declare unconstitutional federal legislation that infringes upon state interests. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)). In the legislative
sphere, the Court has insisted on a clear statement by Congress to sustain a
statutory interpretation that would infringe upon state interests, see Employees of Dept. of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health &Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973), or to support an implied private right of action, see
infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text. Especially in the securities field the
Court has hesitated to interpret federal law so as to overlap or to interfere with
state law. See infra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
101. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (legislation "involves the balancing of competing values and interests"). Accord Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981). See also Mohasco Corp.
v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818-19 (1980); ('The present language was clearly the result of a compromise."); Note, supra note 90, at 900-02 ("In the pluralistic society, the only shared values are those that emerge ... from the legislative
battleground."). Although the broad congressional purpose may be apparent, it
may be too vague to determine the consistency of a particular interpretation
with the congressional intent, e.g., a right to contribution among joint antitrust
violators, Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); or a
particular construction of a statute of limitations, Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447
U.S. 807 (1980).
102. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 14-15, 20 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 645 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of
America, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). The Court has cited the increasing complexity
of federal legislation as justification for refusing to supplement such legislation
with federal common law or to stray far from the statutory language in construing such legislation. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
102 S.Ct. 1825, 1838-39 (1982).
103. "[W]e consistently have emphasized that federal lawmaking power is
vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government; ...

."

North-

west Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 95
(1981). The Court has not made clear to what extent its new attitudes are constitutionally mandated or are discretionary judicial policies. On occasion the
Court has cited the separation of powers principle to justify its holdings. See,
e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981). On other occasions
the Court has denied that its decisions were constitutionally mandated. See,
e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 183739 (1982). See infra note 146. The Court's attitudes reflect dissatisfaction with
the activist, "imperial" judiciary, a dissatisfaction undoubtedly due substan-
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servative political philosophy that includes hostility to government regulation of business. l0 4
The Court's current attitudes create a new context within
which federal equity must be viewed. A federal court's equitable remedial powers differ considerably in constitutional and
nonconstitutional cases. Even though the Burger Court has
also narrowed constitutional remedies, the courts' remedial
power is much broader in constitutional cases, where the
power of Congress is not absolute, or even preeminent, than it
is elsewhere.105 In nonconstitutional cases the limits of statutory interpretation and federal common law and the Court's
new attitudes in these areas constrict a federal court's equitable powers. Of course, Congress may grant certain equitable
powers to the federal courts under a statute, but the Court will
not automatically assume or readily infer such a grant. Neither
will the Court fashion equitable remedies under the federal
06
common law as readily as it has before.1
Since the Supreme Court has not recently discussed ancillary relief in administrative law, the relevance of these trends
in statutory interpretation and federal common law cannot yet
tially to politically conservative dissatisfaction with the liberal agenda advanced by judicial activists. See infra note 104.
104. The Supreme Court justices appointed by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and
Reagan were intended to create a more conservative Court. See Note, supra
note 90, at 900 n.66, 910-11, and authorities cited therein. The Court's more literal approach to statutory construction has produced some liberal decisions,
however. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982) (literal language of antidiscrimination provisions of Education Amendments of
1972 applies to employees as well as to students).
105. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) ("the question of who
may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of
who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution," because the judiciary is "the primary means through which [constitutional] rights may be enforced") (emphasis in original). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (distinguishing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647 (1963), as involving "merely" a statutory violation). Thus, the equitable jurisdiction of American courts is fixed "by the extent and limitations of statutory
authority." 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, § 282. The distinction between statutory and constitutional cases has been clearest in the Court's treatment of implied private damage actions. See infra note 144.
Even in constitutional cases, the Burger Court has restricted the scope of
remedies. In particular, the Court has insisted that remedies be tailored to the
scope of the constitutional violation. See Goldstein, supra note 99, at 61-62. See
also supra note 92.
106. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981), where the
Court denied that Congress had "left the formulation of appropriate federal
standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate
nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence" and refused to fashion
federal common law in an area where Congress had established "a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency."
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be determined. Many recent decisions, however, have dealt
with implied remedies under federal statutes, and these cases
provide some framework for analyzing the propriety of ancillary relief.
C.

IMPLIED STATUTORY REMEDIES

Courts and commentators approving ancillary relief in securities law have often relied on cases implying the existence
of private rights of action.10 7 They have reasoned that if a
court, under its equitable powers, can imply the remedy of a
private damage action, it should also be able to imply equitable
remedies ancillary to an injunction. Moreover, courts finding
implied rights of action have often used reasoning very like
that used to approve ancillary relief.108 It is therefore appropriate to review the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements concerning implied private rights of action and other implied
remedies.
The leading authority for broad implication of private
rights of action and other remedies is J.. Case Co. v. Borak,1O 9
which upheld a private action for rescission or damages under
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. As in Deckert,110 the Court
relied on the statute granting the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits "to enforce any liability or duty created" by
107. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1972); SEC v. Western Geothermal & Power Corp., [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,920 (D. Ariz. 1979); SEC v. Penn
Central Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1978); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs.,
Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
108. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), the
first case to imply a private civil damage action under rule lob-5. The court relied in large part on "well known and well established equitable principles."
Id. at 802-03. See also infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
109. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Prior to Borak the Supreme Court had decided several implied private action cases, but had never enunciated a clear, consistent
doctrine to cover such cases. See Hazen, Implied Private Remedies under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium--CivilRights, Securities
Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333, 1346-52 (1980).
See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In Mills the
Court reaffirmed the broad discretion of district courts to fashion relief for violations of the proxy rules and approved awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in
securities law cases where they have conferred a benefit on a class. On the latter point the Court relied on "the original authority of the chancellor to do equity." 396 U.S. at 393 (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)).
The Court has recently limited the power of federal courts to award attorneys'
fees to a prevailing party. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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the Act.i"' Treating implication as a matter of federal common
law 1 2 rather than statutory construction, the Borak Court'
stated that the federal courts should "be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose." 113 The Court cited the administrative law cases upholding ancillary relief.114
In the 1970's, beginning with Cort v. Ash, 115 the Court began to change its position on implied private actions, and in two
securities cases decided in 1979 the Court clarified its new position. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,116 the Court stated
that "[t] he question of the existence of a statutory cause of action, is, of course, one of statutory construction ....
[O]ur
task is limited solely to determining whether Congress in117
tended to create the private right of action asserted .... "
111. 377 U.S. at 433-34. The Court also looked to the purpose of section 14(a)
to protect investors and the importance of private enforcement as "a necessary
supplement to Commission action." Id. at 432-33. Although the Court did not
mention the equitable powers of federal courts, it cited several cases relying on
those powers. Id. at 433-34.
112. See Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 557-58 (1981).
113. 377 U.S. at 433.
114. Id. at 434. For a description and discussion of these cases, see supra
notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
115. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), listed four factors relevant to
implication:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted' . . . -that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?...
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78.
116. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
117. Id. at 568 (denying an implied damage action under section 17(a) of the
1934 Act). Similarly, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 16 (1979), the Court stated that 'The question whether a statute creates a
cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction ....
[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether
Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted." See also California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (no private cause of action under § 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 because general ban did not
indicate congressional intent to benefit a particular class of persons).
The third and fourth Cort factors-the consistency of the implied remedy
with the underlying legislative scheme and with state law-cannot tip the balance in favor of implying a remedy if the first two factors weigh strongly
against implication: "IT] he Court did not decide that each of these factors is
entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575. Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982); Middlesex County Sewer-
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Silence in the legislative history tends to militate against implication of a remedy: "[I] mplying a private right of action on the
basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at
best."nl8 The existence of express remedies also tends to militate against the implication of other remedies. "Where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court
must be chary of reading others into it."119 If refusal to infer a
private action "sanctions injustice," Congress must remedy the
problem, for the courts "are not at liberty to legislate." 2 0 The
Court rejected the reasoning in Borak that section 27 of the Exchange Act justifies the implication of remedies.
Section 27 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts and provides for
venue and service of process. It creates no cause of action of its own
force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. The source of plaintiffs' rights
must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act

age Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981).
118. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 571. The Court said further
that
[wihere ... the plain language of the provision weighs against implication of a private remedy, the fact that there is no suggestion whatsoever in the legislative history that § 17(a) may give rise to suits for
damages reinforces our decision not to find such a right of action implicit within the section.
Id. "[L] egislative silence is not always the result of a lack of prescience; it may
instead be token permission, or perhaps, considered abstention from regulation
....
Accordingly, caution must temper judicial creativity in the face of legislative or regulatory silence." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565
(1980). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.
Ct. 1815 (1982); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 296 (1981); Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 82-84 (1975). Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 18 (1979) ("while the absence of anything in the legislative history that
indicates an intention to confer any private right of action is hardly helpful to
the respondent, it does not automatically undermine his position"); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1971) (Court found implied private
right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 largely because of clear evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to create such a remedy).
119. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
Accord Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 14 (1981). The Court in Transamericanoted that Congress had provided
several means for enforcing compliance and found it "highly unlikely that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action."' 444 U.S.
at 20. To make this point the Court has revived the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974). In Transamericathe Court held that the express provision for injunctions tended to negate any implied private damage action. 444 U.S. at 20.
That the express remedy also negates ancillary relief would seem to follow a
fortiori.
120. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979). See also
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979) (citing
Touche Ross); infra note 286.
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121

12 2
Finally, the Court limited Borak to its special facts.
While denying a private damage action, Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 123 upheld a private action for
the equitable remedies of rescission or restitution. The Court
relied solely on the statutory language, however, and approved
only the equitable remedies expressly indicated. 124 In several
actions for injunctions the Court has applied the same analysis
as in the private damage suits without noting any distinction
based on the nature of the relief sought.125 Thus implication of

121. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 577. Section 27 and its
counterpart in the 1933 Act, section 22(a), have been called the primary authority for ancillary relief. Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 52
(1979). Even the brief for Touche Ross had not taken the position adopted by
the Court. Reply Brief for Petitioner Touche Ross & Co. at 19-20, Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1977). Indeed, in Transamerica,because the relevant legislative history showed that Congress had deleted reference to "actions at law" from the jurisdictional provision, leaving only actions "in equity,"
the Court found that the section affirmatively supported the conclusion that
Congress did not intend any private damage actions. Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 22 (1979). See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981) ('"The vesting of jurisdiction in the
federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal common law. . . ."); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 82, at 786 ("in the legal
system generally a jurisdictional grant does not in and of itself necessarily-or
even ordinarily-imply a power to make substantive rules of decision"). See
also United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 393, 398 (1976) (grant of jurisdiction to
Court of Claims "does not create any substantive right"). But see Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The Separation
of Powers Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469 (1980) (courts have power to determine
whether to allow remedy to statutory violation).
122. To the extent that our analysis in today's decision differs from that
of the Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases since
Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard today.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 578. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote
the majority opinion, expressed the same idea even more strongly dissenting in
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 39-40 n.5 (1980), in which he stated that after
Touche Ross and Transamerica "it is clear that there is nothing left of the rationale of Borak."
123. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
124. Section 215 declared void contracts made in violation of the Investment
Advisers Act. The Court concluded that Congress "intended that the customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit
for rescission ... and for restitution." Id. at 19. The Court expressly ruled out
other equitable relief id. at 24, and carefully limited the scope of the right to
restitution, id. at 24 n.14. See generally Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 121
(similar language under § 29(b) of Exchange Act).
125. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). But cf. Piper v. ChrisCraft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40 n.26, 42 (1977) (denying disappointed tender of-
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equitable remedies will be handled in the same way as implication of damages.
In recent years the Supreme Court has also curbed the implied ancillary remedy of an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. In 1970, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., the
Court relied on its inherent equitable powers to authorize such
awards. 126 In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society 127 in 1975, however, the Court denied attorneys' fees to a
successful plaintiff who claimed to be acting as a private attorney general in an environmental suit. Noting that Congress
had provided in specific cases for such awards, the Court held
that "courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees."12 8 Similarly, the
Court has refused to infer a right to contribution among antitrust defendants129 or other implied remedies.130
Do the cases on implied damage actions and other implied
remedies bode drastic restrictions on ancillary relief in administrative law? Implied damage actions are arguably distinguishable from ancillary remedies. Commentators have suggested
many policy justifications for limiting implied damage actions.
Implied damage actions, which are suits that could not otherferor a damage action under the Williams Act, but hinting that an injunction
might be available at an early stage). Several pre-Cort cases had followed the
rationale of Borak in awarding injunctive relief. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
It has been suggested that "[diamages remedies, especially when created
after the fact, often involve harsher results than simple equitable relief, thus
indicating a complex balancing of interests best left to the legislature." Note,
supra note 93, at 393. As the same article concedes, however, this is not invariably true. Id. at 393 n.176. Certainly the restructuring of corporate boards
through ancillary relief involves harsh results and "a complex balancing of
interests."
126. 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970). See supra note 109.
127. 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975).
128. Id. at 269. The Court distinguished cases like Mills on the ground that
they involve the creation of a benefit by the plaintiff for a class and that it
would be inequitable for the class to share the benefit without sharing the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees. Id. at 257-58.
129. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-47 (1981).
Although actions for contribution arguably differ from private damage actions,
the Court relied on the implied private action cases.
130. Cf. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 102 S.Ct.
1815 (1982) (consigner of freight may not assert carrier's violation of ICC credit
regulations as defense in suit to recover unpaid freight charges); T.I.M.E. Inc. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1959) (shipper of freight not only may not
assert unreasonableness of rates in a damage action but also may not assert it
as a defense in action by carrier for past charges).
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wise be brought in federal court, contribute to the burgeoning
volume of federal litigation that has so concerned the Court recently.13 1 Implied damage actions can encourage vexatious
nuisance suits brought largely for their settlement value.132
Such suits may produce "error costs," such as the hindrance of
capital formation, and these costs may ultimately be borne by
shareholders, whom the securities laws are supposed to protect, without necessarily compensating the victims of the violation of the law.13 3 Furthermore, implied damage actions, cause
confusion by clashing with express remedies and interfering
with agency enforcement of regulatory statutes.134
To some extent these criticisms do not apply to ancillary
relief and, therefore, may justify distinguishing ancillary remedies from other implied remedies. Ancillary remedies create
131. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct.
1825, 1838-39 (1982) ("the increased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent" in implied private action cases).
132. Some claim that the breadth and vagueness of rule lOb-5 threaten sizable but unmeasurable damages and, therefore, impel defendants to settle,
which, in turn encourages the filing of suits brought solely for their settlement
value. See Frankel, supra note 112, at 573-75. See also Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-43 (1975) (purchaser-seller requirement
necessary in lob-5 damage actions to avoid hindrance of defendant's business
flowing from the very pendency of such suits and because of the possible abuse
of liberal discovery). See also K. ELZrNGA & W. BRErr, THE ANTITRUST PENALTInES: A STuDY rN LAw AND ECONOMICS 90-95 (1976) (private damage actions
under the antitrust laws facilitate nuisance suits brought for settlement value
because defendants are risk averse, damages are trebled and juries are
irrational).
133. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975)
(costs of 10b-5 damage judgments may fall on innocent shareholders); Frankel,
supra note 112, at 578 (threat of liability hinders capital formation), 580-81 (in
class action damages suits many members of the plaintiff class do not actually
recover any part of the damage award). Professor Frankel says these "error
costs" result in overdeterrence and sees the Supreme Court's restrictions on
implication as a response to this overdeterrence. Id. at 582.
134. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-23
(1975), and National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 462-64 (1974), both denying implied private actions in part because
they would interfere with discretion vested in a regulatory body. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) ("Statutory rights and obligations are
established by Congress, and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating
these rights and obligations, to determine in addition who may enforce them
and in what manner."); Frankel, supra note 112, at 568-81. Cf. Southern Pacific
Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 102 S.Ct. 1815 (1982) (judicially created
remedy unnecessary because regulations in question could be enforced by regulatory agency).
Even when private damage actions do not hinder agency regulation, they
may do no more than "hang on the coattails" of agency actions. Frankel, supra
note 112, at 579. The primary goal of agency actions, including enforcement actions, is deterrence, but this is not true of private actions. Id. at 571.
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no new causes of action and do not generally clash with express remedies. 135 More important, most ancillary relief cases
are brought by the SEC and therefore do not hamper agency
enforcement 36 or have other shortcomings of private damage
actions. 37 But to the extent that the criticisms of implied damage actions are well-founded,38 many of them can also be lev135. The Court has noted a distinction between having a cause of action and
being entitled to relief. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40 n.18 (1979). The
danger of clashing with express remedies depends in part on what express
remedies have been provided in the relevant statute and in part on what one
means by a "clash." Since the 1933 and 1934 Acts do not expressly forbid the
ancillary remedies courts have created as to general issuers, there is in one
sense no clash between the express and implied remedies. Congress, however,
did provide for certain ancillary remedies in other securities laws and, as to securities professionals, in the 1934 Act, as well. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. Thus, it is at least anomalous to create remedies by
implication in areas where Congress has not expressly authorized them if Congress has expressly authorized those remedies in related statutes and in other
parts of the same statute.
136. Of course, this might not be true in private actions for ancillary relief.
See supra note 43. It is not clear whether the Court will treat SEC suits differently from private actions. In general, the Court has not distinguished between
the two except to the extent indicated by the statutory language. See Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (applying the same standard of culpability to SEC actions as to private actions). Since the securities laws expressly authorize only
the SEC to seek an injunction, however, the Court might treat the two differently with respect to ancillary relief.
137. Vesting an administrative agency with enforcement powers may not
only conserve judicial resources but also promote enforcement policies that are
consistent and informed by expert discretion and concern for the public interest. Private plaintiffs sue not when enforcement is most needed but when the
probability of recovery is greatest.
138. Charges that private damage actions encourage nuisance suits have
usually been leveled at specific types of claims, and not at private damage actions generally. Thus, Blue Chip Stamps concerned only the purchaser-seller
requirement under rule lOb-5, and private damage actions under the antitrust
laws (which are express, not implied) are unusual because damages are trebled. See supra note 132. Although implied private actions undoubtedly do permit some groundless nuisance suits, it is not clear that this problem is vastly
greater than it is for express private actions. Nor is it clear that implied private
actions produce greater error costs than express actions. See supra note 133.
Although the threat of lob-5 liability, for example, may thwart some marginal
legitimate transactions, its principal effect should be deterrence of dubious
transactions. In so doing, it should facilitate capital formation by promoting investor confidence. Any clash of implied damage actions with express actions,
see supra note 134, can be avoided by judicially limiting the implied action, as
the Supreme Court has done with rule 10b-5. See infra notes 206-07. Although
implied damage actions may occasionally hinder agency enforcement, the SEC
has invariably supported implication in securities law on the ground, accepted
by the Court in J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), that private enforcement is "a necessary supplement to Commission action." This view, never
criticized by commentators until the Supreme Court changed directions, makes
it difficult to argue that the Court is reacting to overdeterrence.
In sum, these criticisms of implied damage actions, though not without
merit, do not adequately explain the Court's drastic restrictions. Indeed, Pro-
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eled at ancillary relief. Although ancillary relief creates no new
claims, it often complicates cases procedurally.139 An SEC action for an injunction and ancillary relief pressures a defendant
to settle, regardless of the merits, even more than does a private damage action.140 SEC actions for ancillary relief can also
produce error costs, including hindrance of capital formation,
and it is the shareholder-investors who will often have-to bear
these costs.141
Although the Supreme Court has not recently discussed
ancillary relief in administrative law, some of its holdings and
broad dicta suggest that it does not consider implied damage
fessor Frankel, who offers many of these criticisms, also criticizes the Court's
current attitude as much too restrictive. Frankel; supra note 112, at 584.
139. In cases involving the appointment of receivers or special counsel or
substantial corporate governance changes, see supra notes 21, 26-31 and accompanying text, substantial judicial administration is often necessary. See supra
note 40; infra text following note 312; infra note 350 and accompanying text
Moreover, although ancillary relief creates no new claims, it may encourage the
SEC to sue when, believing an injunction alone unnecessary, it would otherwise not bother to sue.
140. See infra notes 372-76 and accompanying text. Although the SEC does
not bring meritless suits in pursuit of pecuniary gain, various bureaucratic imperatives may impel it to bring questionable suits. The Commission has been
criticized for bringing too many such suits. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPoRATE DiSCLOsURE 22-23, 47-51, 283-84 (1979). See also I. KARmEvL, REGULATION
BY PROSECUTION 221, 226 (1982) (SEC lacks standards for initiation and prosecution of suits and too often settles hard cases).
Professor Frankel attempts to distinguish actions for equitable relief on the
grounds that the courts' discretion prevents overdeterrence in equitable actions. Frankel, supra note 112, at 571-72. Aside from the Supreme Court's treatment of private actions for implied equitable remedies the same as implied
damage actions, see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text, and the Court's
ability to limit implied damage actions, as it has done with 10b-5 cases, see infra notes 206-07, judicial discretion in SEC ancillary relief cases is insignificant
because most such cases are settled by consent, with the court having little opportunity to exercise discretion as to remedies, see supra note 23. See generally
inffra notes 366-79 and accompanying text.
141. Ancillary remedies involving pecuniary relief-restitution, rescission,
and disgorgement--are identical to damage actions in their impact on shareholders and in their tendency to deter legitimate transactions. Ancillary remedies affecting corporate governance pose an even greater threat to corporate
managements-the loss of corporate control and even removal from corporate
office-and therefore produce even more overdeterrence. Such remedies may
also come at the expense of shareholders when directors are appointed without
shareholder vote, see infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text, or when the
corporation owned by the shareholders must pay pecuniary relief, see Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-68 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring)
(courts should hesitate to impose large damage judgments on corporations to
detriment of shareholders), 889 (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); Frankel, supra note 112, at 577-78. Ancillary relief also sometimes limits
shareholders' rights by immunizing court-appointed directors from liability for
negligence. See infra note 322 and accompanying text
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actions unique. It has applied the same standards to private
actions for equitable relief, for attorneys' fees, and for contribution among defendants, as it has applied to implied damage actions. 142 Many statements by the Court seem to encompass
43
implied ancillary relief as well as other implied remedies.1
Moreover, the Court has restricted implied remedies not
because of their merits or demerits, but because of the deference due to Congress as to statutory remedies. 14 4 The Court
has stressed that Congress, and not the judiciary, should determine statutory remedies: "The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that
Congress did not intend to provide.' 45 Even if this principle is
not constitutionally mandated by the separation of powers doc142. See s-upra notes 127-33 and accompanying text. Of course, these cases,
too, may be distinguishable from ancillary relief cases. Alyeska Pipeline reverted to the long tradition in American law that parties pay their own attorneys. Implied private actions for equitable relief or for contribution could
facilitate new lawsuits, thereby increasing the burden on the federal courts.
Such implied remedies might also produce error costs without necessarily aiding the purposes of the statute.
143. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974) ("when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy
or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume
other remedies"). See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981) ("In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary
congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate."); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 n.30 (1981). See also supra notes 11920, infra note 145 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20. Thus, cases dealing with
constitutional remedies are largely irrelevant. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Indeed, with respect to implied damage actions the Court in recent years has traveled in opposite directions in constitutional and statutory
cases, essentially reversing itself in both areas. In statutory cases the Court
has gone from a willingness, even eagerness, to infer private damage actions, to
a strong reluctance to infer such actions. In constitutional cases, however, the
Court had never recognized a private right of action for damages until Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14 (1980), the Court held that, absent special factors, it will always infer a private damage action for constitutional violations unless Congress has expressly
conferred immunity from such action. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 733 n.3 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he implication of
remedies to enforce constitutional provisions does not interfere with the legislative process in the way that implication of remedies from statutes can.").
Within the statutory realm the Court may also. distinguish between civil rights
and economic regulation. See Frankel, supra note 112, at 563 n.59; Hazen, supra
note 109, at 1343-44, 1355; Note, supra note 93, at 378. The Court's tradition of
protecting minorities may make it less deferential to congressional intent and
less demanding that Congress spell out that intent in the civil rights area.
145. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981). See Texas Indus., Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643 (1981), where the Court held that,
although it should "give shape to the [Sherman Act's] broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition," it did not have "as wide discretion in formulat-
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trine, as Justice Powell believes, 146 the Court sees Congress as
better suited and, under our constitutional system, the preferable body to make the policy decisions entailed in fixing statutory remedies.147 Congress deserves no less deference as to
ancillary remedies in agency actions than it deserves as to
other implied remedies. Indeed, the awesome power of government should make judges even more cautious in implying remedies for an administrative agency. It is, therefore, difficult to
distinguish ancillary remedies from other implied remedies.
To treat ancillary remedies like other implied remedies
would not end ancillary relief, however. Despite its more restrictive attitude, the Court still infers remedies where Congress clearly intended to create them.'4 Consistent with this
ing remedies." See also id. at 646; Frankel, supra note 112, at 563-64, supra text
accompanying notes 119-20; supra note 143.
146. Justice Powell believes that Congress has the "constitutional obligation" to specify what actions may be brought under federal statutes and that
when this determination is left to the courts "the legislative process with its
public scrutiny and participation has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice
to everyone concerned." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1848 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(separation of powers dictates that the Court not infer private damage action
for violation of Constitution). Former SEC Commissioner Roberta S. Karmel
has echoed these sentiments and opined that the implication of ancillary remedies produces the same evils as implication of private rights of action. See R.
KARMEL, supra note 140, at 200-01. Some commentators believe that judicial
creation of remedies does not violate the separation of powers if Congress has
delegated to the courts the power to do so. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 121, at
491, 494. The Supreme Court has rejected the view that such power has been
delegated in statutes conferring jurisdiction. Id. at 472-73, 477, 487-88, 504. See
supra note 121 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the majority of the justices reject Justice Powell's separation of powers argument. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1837-39 (1982).
147. "Congress has superior capacity to develop the necessary information
and to strike the necessary compromises among competing interests." Frankel,
supra note 112, at 584. Outside the realm of constitutional rights, it is entirely
appropriate in a democratic society that remedies be established by the legislature, which can weigh these "competing interests" in the political arena, rather
than by the courts, which, in theory at least, ignore political considerations.
See Note, supra note 93, at 395-96. Legislation also has the merit of operating
prospectively, so that persons affected thereby are warned in advance. Legislation can deal with a problem comprehensively while courts are largely limited
to dealing with problems one case at a time.
148. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct.
1825 (1982) (inferring private damage action under the Commodity Exchange
Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (inferring action for rescission and restitution only); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (inferring private damage action under Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972); supra note 124 and accompanying text. See
also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (not involving any administrative or other statute; the Court approved, as a matter of federal common law,
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approach the Court could approve ancillary remedies that Congress intended. Such remedies must arise from statutory construction, however, not from judicial policy-making under the
federal common law.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
A.

THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAws

1. Express Enforcement Powers
The securities laws expressly grant the SEC many enforcement powers applicable to general issuers. The 1933 and the
1934 Acts both authorize the SEC to seek an injunction against
any actual or threatened violation of the respective Act or its
rules. 149 Under the 1934 Act, the Commission may also obtain
"writs of mandamus, injunctions, and orders commanding...
5 0
any person to comply with" the securities laws and rules.
51
These provisions do not authorize ancillary relief, however.1
the imposition of a constructive trust on the profits earned by a former CIA
agent in publishing a book not cleared by the CIA in accordance with the employment agreement between the CIA and the agent).
149. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
150. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976). Section 20(c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(c) (1976), is generally to the same effect. Unlike section 21(e) of the 1934 Act, section 20(c) mentions only writs of
mandamus, not injunctions and orders. The latter phrase was added to section
21(e) by the Securities Reform Act of 1975. The legislative history does not explain the addition, but it was probably a technical change to reflect the abolition of the writ of mandamus in federal practice. See 3 I Loss, supra note 57,
at 1982. Unlike section 20(c), section 21(e) also permits the SEC to seek an order compelling compliance with the rules of certain self-regulatory organizations or compelling certain such organizations to enforce their own rules.
151. See Farrand, supra note 4, at 1780 n.3; Comment, Texas Gulf Sulphur,
supra note 4, at 947 n.21. The language of the statutes themselves suggests
this; they provide only for relief commanding "any person to comply" with the
law and not for any ancillary remedies. The scant legislative history supports
this view. It talks of "commanding any person to comply," HLR. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934), and "compel[ling] obedience to the act," S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934). The cases have limited the provisions to
this purpose. See Union Corp. of America v. SEC, 309 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1962)
(mandatory injunction compelling defendant to fie proper reports); SEC v.
IMC Int'l, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 889, 894 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (injunction issued "only to
require observance... of the federal securities laws"); SEC v. Transamerica
Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326, 334 (D. DeL 1946), modified on other grounds, 163 F.2d 511
(3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948) (order to comply with Act by including shareholder proposal in proxy statement); SEC v. Nevada Oil Co., 5
SEC Jud. Dec. 5 (N.D. Tex. 1946) (mandatory injunction directing defendant
corporation to make corporate books and records available to plaintiff for reasonable inspection); SEC v. Sharkey, 4 SEC Jud. Dec. 574 (W.D. Wash. 1945)
(order compelling defendant to make books available to the SEC). Congress
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Nor do the securities laws' provisions conferring jurisdiction152
create any remedy. 5 3 Section 16 of the 1933 Act and section

28(a) of the 1934 Act,'54 which provide that the rights and remedies in these Acts are "in addition to any and all other rights

and remedies that may exist at law or in equity," merely negate
any implied preemption of state law; they provide no basis for
ancillary relief.155
Other remedies available against general issuers include

stop orders and orders to suspend trading or to suspend a registration statement. 5 6 Of late the SEC has used its power to
publicize findings from an investigationl 7 with the aim, accord-

ing to some critics,' 5 8 of punishing persons who engage in conduct the Commission does not like. The Commission may
subpoena witnesses, compel preparation of documents, and

conduct investigations,.59 and may also refer a case to the Atmay have added these provisions to the injunctive provisions for fear that the
latter might be construed to permit the courts only to forbid certain acts and
not to command the performance of an act.
152. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1976).
153. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 49, 111.
154. Securities Act of 1933, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
155. Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1939),
rev'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 282 (1940). The author is not aware of any case
that has used either of these provisions to justify any additional remedy except
pursuant to state law. The Supreme Court has found it unlikely that similar
statutory language was intended to include other remedies under the same
statute. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1981).
156. Securities Act of 1933, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 12(j)-12(k), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78/(j)-(k) (1976) (suspension of trading
and temporary, summary suspension of trading). Securities Act of 1933, § 8(d),
15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1976) (suspension of 1933 Act registration statement); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(j), 15 U.S.C. § 781(j) (1976) (suspension of
1934 Act registration statement).
157. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§15(c)(4), 21(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o(c) (4), 78u(a) (1976).
158. Professor Kripke has spoken of "the punishment of publicity" and
noted that by use of this power the SEC avoids questions of its jurisdiction to
intervene in particular matters and even avoids having to find or to charge a
violation of law. See Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173 (1981). Professor Davis has also called adverse publicity
an SEC sanction. See K. DAviS, AMIniSTRAIrVE LAw 446 (3d ed. 1972).
159. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 8(e), 19(b), 20(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(e),
77s(b), 77t(a)-(b) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 17(a), 21(a)-(b), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78q(a), 78u(a)-(b) (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, §§ 14(b),
31(a)-(b), 42(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-14(b), 80a-31(a)-(b), 80a-42(a)-(b) (1976);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(a), (e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a), (e) (1976).
It has been suggested that the SEC assist private enforcement by procuring judgments which private plaintiffs can use as a basis for offensive collateral
estoppel. See Hazen, supra note 25, at 451-60.
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torney General for criminal prosecution.160 Nothing in either
act expressly permits, or strongly implies permission to pursue,
the ancillary remedies that the SEC has often obtained against

general issuers.
Even in the area of securities law Congress has not always
been so reticent about ancillary relief. The Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act161 both permit court
appointment of a trustee to control the defendant's business.
The Investment Company Act also permits a court to bar from
any office in an investment company, and to "award ... injunctive or other relieP' against, any person guilty of "a breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct."162 These remedies reflect the function of the Investment Company Act as a
federal corporation law for investment companies,163 which
contrasts sharply with the more limited regulation of the securities acts. Even in the 1934 Act, as amended, Congress authorized the SEC to regulate the internal affairs of firms in the
securities industry, including broker-dealers and securities exchanges. 64 Elsewhere, Congress has authorized administrative
65
agencies to request similar relief.
These broader statutes suggest that when Congress wanted
160. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976); Investment Company Act
of 1940, § 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43(e) (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
§ 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1976).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976) (emphasis added). See Bailey v. Proctor,
160 F.2d 78 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 834 (1947); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp.
608 (D.P.R. 1966).
163. "In certain major respects, the 1940 Act operates as a corporation law
for investment companies. In sharp contrast, the 1934 Act ... regulates one
phase,-the purchase and sale of corporate securities." Brown v. Bullock, 194
F. Supp. 207, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd without considerationof this point, 294 F.2d
415 (2d Cir. 1961). The 1940 Act regulates investment companies on many matters of internal governance that are left to state law with respect to industrial
companies. See Fleischer, "Federal CorporationLaw" An Assessmen4 78
HARv. L. REV. 1146, 1153 n.38 (1965).
164. The SEC is empowered to suspend or revoke the registration, or to
censure or impose limitations upon the activities, functions, and operations of
national stock exchanges, registered securities associations, broker-dealers and
other regulated entities, and may similarly discipline members or officials
thereof and persons associated therewith. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b) (4), (6), 78s(h)
(1976). The Commission has similar powers as to investment companies and
investment advisors. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(b), 80b-3(e)-(f) (1976). In case of the
suspension or revocation of the registration of a clearing agency, a court may
be petitioned for the appointment of a trustee. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(i) (1976). The
Commission also has power to disapprove, abrogate, or amend the rules of
stock exchanges, securities associations, etc. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (1976).
165. See supra notes 62, 63, 65 and accompanying text.
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to authorize ancillary remedies, it knew how to do so and,
therefore, that when Congress omitted such remedies, it intended not to authorize them. In the last few years the
Supreme Court has often followed this rationale in refusing to
imply or to expand private damage actions or other remedies.166 This principle is especially compelling as to relief affecting corporate governance. Congress expressly empowered
the SEC to regulate the governance of firms in the securities
industry, but in the same and related statutes withheld such
powers with respect to general issuers. The reasonable inference, especially since both securities acts were drafted with extreme care,16 7 is that Congress intended not to confer such
powers with respect to general issuers.
On occasion the SEC has argued, and could be expected to
argue as to ancillary relief, that knowing congressional acquiescence legitimates agency practices which might otherwise be
questioned. The Supreme Court has rejected that argument recently,168 and would probably do so with respect to ancillary relief as well, especially remedies affecting corporate governance,
166. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979), the
Supreme Court declined to infer a private right of action under section 17(a) of
the 1934 Act, in part because "it is flanked by provisions . . . that explicitly
grant private causes of action ....
Obviously, then, when Congress wished to
provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."
See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 n.11 (1981)
(express provision in several federal statutes for contribution among defendants suggests lack of congressional intent to require contribution where not expressly provided); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
21 (1979) (quoting the same passage from Touche Ross); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 404 (1976) (court would not judicially create right to back pay
for federal employee improperly classified because to do so would render
"carefully limited" statutory scheme "superfluous"); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975) ("When Congress wished to provide
a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble
in doing so expressly."); supra notes 119, 128, 143, 145 and accompanying text.
167. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 647-48 (1963).
168. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980) (where congressional
consideration was addressed principally to other matters, "the failure of Congress to overturn the Commission's interpretation [fell] far short of providing a
basis to support a construction of § 10(b) so clearly at odds with its plain meaning and legislative history"); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-21 (1978) (even approval of Commission's practice in Committee Report and a few statements in
legislative history did not suffice where practice "not only is at odds with the
language of the section in question and the pattern of the statute taken as a
whole, but also is extremely far reaching in terms of the virtually untrammeled
and unreviewable power it would vest in a regulatory agency"). But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (10b-5 action not precluded
merely because alleged violation might give rise to claim under § 11). Congress's failure to forbid the SEC's practice is not conclusive where, as here,
there has been no affirmative congressional support for the practice, the prac-
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because such remedies are a recent phenomenon in which
Congress cannot yet be deemed to have acquiesced.
2. Implied Remedies-The Legislative History and Purposes of
the FederalSecurities Laws
The securities laws grew out of a national economic crisis.
Inquiry into the stock market crash of 1929 uncovered many objectionable practices in the sale of securities and governance of
public corporations. 169 Congress intended the securities laws
to ameliorate these problems substantially.17o The House Report stated that the 1933 Act's civil liabilities "would alter cor7
porate organization and corporate practices in this country."' '
The 1934 Act provided substantial substantive regulation of the
internal affairs of some segments of the securities industry. 172
Outside the securities industry, however, Congress focused primarily on manipulation in the sale of securities and abuse of
the proxy mechanism. 7 3 Following an approach advocated by
such corporate critics as Louis Brandeis,17 4 Congress tackled
tice contradicts the language and legislative history of the securities laws, and
the practice would confer awesome power on the Commission.
169. See Anderson, The DisclosureProcess in FederalSecurities Regulation:
A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 316-18 (1974); Sommer, supra note 24, at
116-20; infra note 193 and accompanying text.
170. See Fleischer, supra note 163, at 1174-75. Courts have often noted the
broad remedial purposes of the securities laws. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that
general remedial purposes do not warrant reading the securities laws "more
broadly than [their] language and the statutory scheme permit." SEC v. Sloan,
436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978). See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) (quoting
Touche Ross &Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
171. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1933). The Report also stated
that "all those responsible for statements upon the face of which the public is
solicited to invest its money shall be held to standards like those imposed upon
a fiduciary." Id.
172. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6 (conditions for registration of securities exchanges), 7
(margin requirements), 8 (restrictions on borrowing by broker-dealers, the "net
capital" requirements), 11 (prohibitions on certain trading activities of brokerdealers), 19 (regulation of self-regulatory organizations), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f-h, k, s
(1976).
173. The basic policy of the 1933 Act was "of informing the investor of the
facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation." S. REP.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
174. "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman." L BRANDEIS,OTHER PEoPLE's MoNEY 92 (1913). Following
enactment of the 1934 Act, both Felix Frankfurter and William 0. Douglas
lauded disclosure as a technique for improving corporate governance. See
Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors,41 LAw &
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both problems by "implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure,'"175 intending that the securities laws' impact on corporate governance be indirect, a result of disclosure rather than
of direct federal regulation of corporate managements. As to
proxy solicitations, this philosophy required disclosure by managements of "their interest and ... of the management policies
they intend to pursue" so as to achieve the goal of "[flair corporate suffrage." 7 6 Congress rejected suggestions that the federal government judge the fairness of securities transactions,
the suitability of securities offerings, or the merits of proxy
contests:

77

The principal objection directed against the provisions for corporate reporting is that they constitute a veiled attempt to invest a governmental commission with the power to interfere in the management of
corporations. The committee has no such intention, and feels that the
178
bill furnishes no justification for such an interpretation.

To stress this point the Senate bill in 1933 expressly forbade
"the Commission to interfere with the management of the afCONrEmP. PROBS. 63, 66-67 (Summer 1977). All three deeply influenced the federal securities laws. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 57, at 123-26.
175. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977), discussed in
greater detail infra at notes 228-40 and accompanying text. See 1933 Act, preamble ("To provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities ...
and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."); Anderson,
supra note 169, at 318; Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62
MICH. L. REV.607, 607-10 (1964).
176. "Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to
every equity security .... " H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
The goal was to "prevent ... the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated
the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders." Id. at 14. See Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970); J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 431 (1964); S.REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 74-77 (1934).
177. Congress designed the disclosure requirements of the securities laws
so that neither action nor inaction by the Commission could be construed as
approval of any security. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1933). The
House Report stated that "the grant of control to the Federal Trade Commission [the agency responsible for the securities laws before establishment of the
SEC by the 1934 Act] conveys with it no right to pass upon the merits of any
security, but simply to insist that whatever its merits, facts essential to its character are to be disclosed." Id. at 4. Accord S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1933). President Roosevelt stated that "[o]f course, the Federal Government
cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as approving
or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound .... There is, however, an obligation on us to insist that every issue of new securities ... shall be
accompanied by full publicity and information." S. REP. No. 47 at 6-7, -L.R REP.
No. 85 at 1-2, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). See 1 L. Loss, supra note 57, at 121-29;
Landis, The Legislative History of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 29, 30-31, 34 (1959). See also H. KRwPKE, supra note 140, at 37-39; Anderson,
supra note 169, at 318-20; Gadsby, HistoricalDevelopment of the SEC-The Government View, 28 GEO.WASH. L. REv.6, 9 (1959).
178. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934).
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fairs of an issuer."7 9 The House-Senate conference omitted
this clause "as unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill
is open to misconstruction in this respect."180 This is consistent with President Roosevelt's statement that "[ti he purpose
of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least

possible interference to honest business."181
There are some exceptions to the disclosure approach. 182
The original exceptions, however, were narrow, specific, and
clearly contemplated by the Act and its legislative history.
Amendments to the securities laws have not changed their fundamental purpose. In particular the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA),183 goes a step beyond the original 1934 Act in that
it not only requires corporate disclosure but also mandates certain steps to generate information for disclosure. The FCPA,
however, does not authorize the SEC to regulate internal corporate affairs, except to require compliance with the specific
provisions of the Act. 84 Indeed, the FCPA underscores in two
179. Id. at 10, 20.
180. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934) (Conference Report).
See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933): "It is the conviction of the
committee that [the aims of the 1933 Act] may be largely achieved upon the
basis of fidelity to truth." See also Sommer, supra note 24, at 118 ("Congress
appeared to eschew the use of disclosure as a regulatory mechanism, that is,
the use of disclosure to modify corporate conduct."); Disclosure Policy Study
(Wheat Report) 10 (1969) ("[T]he draftsmen of the '33 and '34 Acts viewed
[the] responsibility [of the Federal government in investment matters] as being primarily one of seeing to it that investors and speculators had access to
enough information to enable them to arrive at their own rational decisions.").
181. S. REP. No. 47 at 7, H.R. REP. No. 85 at 2, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
The President's statement refers to "full publicity and information" and "the
whole truth." Statements from several Congressmen and others reflect similar
concepts. See Ruder, supra note 167, at 648 &n.112.
182. Controlling persons are forbidden to profit from short-swing trading.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). The SEC's
power to regulate proxies goes beyond requiring full disclosure. See Loomis &
Rubman, Corporate Governance in HistoricalPerspective, 8 HoFsTRA L REV.
141, 171 & n.115 (1979).
183. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981). The Act requires
public issuers to maintain adequate internal accounting controls and to keep
adequate records.
184. Of course, the usual remedies available to the Commission, including
whatever ancillary remedies are generally appropriate, are available for violations of the FCPA, but the FCPA does not warrant any broader intrusion by
the Commission into corporate governance. In hearings on the proposed Act
Senator Proxmire stated it "would merely codify the requirement that a corporation keep honest records. . . " ProhibitingBribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S.3133, S.3379 and S.3418 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976). Senator Tower stated that the
Act "would not expand the authority of the SEC nor distort the existing system
of corporate self-regulation." SENATE COMM. ON BANKIG, HousING AND URBAN

AFFAIRs, CoRnur PRACTICES BY U.S. ENTERPRISES, S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong.,
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ways Congress's intent to avoid direct intrusion into corporate
governance. First, it suggests that the SEC previously lacked
power to require what the Act demands; otherwise the Act
would be redundant.185 Further, by this limited extension of

the disclosure philosophy of the 1934 Act into corporate governance, Congress implicitly eschewed any more general extension.18 6 Although some legislative history of the FCPA
suggests support for ancillary relief, it does not demonstrate
87
broad congressional approval.
2d Sess. 11 (1976). These statements were not challenged during the congressional hearings or debates. Siedel, InternalAccounting Controls Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: A FederalLaw of Corporations? 18 AM. Bus. LJ.
443, 458 (1981). See id. at 461, 474. See also Baker & Cheramy, Accounting Practices Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 36 Bus. LAw. 733, 736 (1981)
(comments of Joseph Hinsey IV, Esq.) ("in my view, the legislation was clearly
geared, in terms of what the Congress thought it was doing, to fixing the foreign
bribery problem"); id. at 742-43. But cf.Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977
and the Regulation of Questionable Payments, 34 Bus. LAw. 623, 625 (1979)
(comments of Kenneth J. Bialkin, Esq.) (FCPA may be "the jurisdictional hook
which may be employed for a more direct involvement by the Commission in
the internal operations of issuer corporations."); SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 15,570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L, REP. (CCH) 81,959, at
81,395 (Feb. 15, 1979) (the accounting provisions of the FCPA concern more
than just financial statements; "[a]n equally important objective... is the goal
of corporate accountability").
185. Legislatures do not generally enact redundant legislation. Moreover,
the SEC eagerly sought enactment of the FCPA. See ABA Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b) (2) Accounting
Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAw. 307, 328-31
(1978). This suggests that the Commission was at least uneasy about its own
powers prior to the FCPA. The Commission has recognized that the FCPA imposes new obligations. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,478, [Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L, REP. (CCH) 72,264, at
62,701 (Feb. 16, 1978). The legislative history of the FCPA contains some evidence that Congress did not consider its accounting provisions to be a major
departure from existing law. See S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976)
(the accounting provisions of the FCPA are "implicit in the existing securities
laws"). The SEC has often expressed similar views. See Foreign CorruptPractices Act and the Regulation of Questionable Payments, 34 Bus. LAw. 623, 657
(1979) (comments of Ralph C. Ferrara, Esq., then Executive Assistant to the
Chairman of the SEC) ("I do not think that the accounting provisions of the
[FCPA] are materially different from the authority that the Commission has
under the other provisions of the Exchange Act."). Cf. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,959, at 81,395 (Feb. 15, 1979) (SEC says certain rules are being adopted not
in reliance on its power under FCPA alone); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,185, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,896, at
87,378 (Jan. 19, 1977) (same concerning certain rule proposals).
186. This follows not only from the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (which the Supreme Court has often followed recently, see Note, supra
note 90, at 895 n.28), but also from statements in the legislative history that the
FCPA would merely require "honest records" and "would not expand the authority of the SEC." See supra note 184.
187. The House Report states: "The Commission, of course, will retain the
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Congress's express retention of a broad role for state law
underscores its intent to avoid direct regulation of corporate
governance. Congress did not confront a regulatory vacuum in
1933-34. There was a long history of state regulation of securities and an even longer history of regulation of corporations.
Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts preserve the jurisdiction of state
securities commissions, 88 and the legislative history recognizes that the federal securities laws "supplement and
strengthen State laws."18 9 Under this dual regulation state law

prevails unless it clearly conflicts with the manifest intent of
Congress. 190 As Professor Loss has noted, "If Congress had intended to give the Commission power to reallocate functions
between [directors and shareholders], so revolutionary a federal intervention would presumably have been more clearly
expressed." 91
Finally, congressional rejection of federal incorporation
laws before, during, and after 1933-34 evidences Congress's desire to avoid direct regulation of corporate governance. Proposals for federal incorporation of public companies date to the
1880's and reappeared often before 1933.192 In 1933-34 Congress
well understood the concept of federal incorporation. The congressional hearings during that session referred repeatedly to
power to seek all of the existing equitable remedies that have been recognized
by the courts under the securities laws, and the Committee anticipates that the
Commission will continue to tailor remedies to fit the circumstances of specific
cases." H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). The Senate Report
states that "The Commission, of course, will retain all of its existing remedies
under the securities laws, and the committee anticipates that the Commission
will continue to tailor remedies to fit the circumstances of specific cases." S.
REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977). Both statements, and especially
the statement in the Senate Report, are somewhat ambiguous because the SEC
does have other express remedies apart from implied, ancillary equitable remedies. Also, the Senate Report says that "the only remedy [the SEC] can bring
on its own is an injunctive action." Id. at 11. This is especially significant because the Senate bill was passed in lieu of the House bill. See 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. &AD.NEws 4098. Moreover, even the House Report speaks of "existing
equitable remedies" (emphasis added). Whether certain remedies, especially
those affecting governance, existed then was unclear.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). See 1 L Loss, supra
note 57, at 155.58.
189. A Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed FederalSecuritiesAc4 in Federal SecuritiesAct7 Hearings on H.R.'4314 Before the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1933).
See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1933). See 1 L Loss, supra
note 57, at 155-58; 6 id. at 2291-94.

190. See infra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
191. 2 L. Loss, supra note 57, at 902-03.
192. See 1 id.at 107-11; Loomis & Rubman, supra note 182, at 158-64.
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the failures of corporate directors,193 and some witnesses argued that disclosure alone was inadequate and that federal incorporation was necessary.194 Nevertheless, Congress
deliberately rejected federal incorporation, with its direct regulation of corporate governance, "and opted instead for a more
After 1934 members of Congress and
limited approach."'19
96
commentators continued to advocate federal incorporation.
Their proposals indicate the limitations that contemporaries
Although Congress never
saw in the securities laws. 9 7
adopted federal incorporation, it did subsequently decide to
regulate directly the governance of companies in certain industries, such as the mutual fund industry. 98 When Congress
wanted to preempt state law as to corporate governance, it ex193. See Sommer, supra note 24, at 120-21; authorities cited supra note 169.
194. These witnesses included Richard Whitney, president of the New York
Stock Exchange, Frank Altschul, chairman of the Exchange's Stock List Committee, and Alfred L. Bernheim of the Twentieth Century Fund. See Stock
Exchange Practices: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6709, 6715-16 (Whitney), 6677-78 (Altschul), 6936,
6939-40 (Bernheim) (1933) (cited in Loomis & Rubman, supra note 182, at 166
n.94).
195. Loomis & Rubman, supra note 182, at 161.
196. For articles proposing federal incorporation or discussing other proposals see Berlack, Federal Incorporationand Securities Regulation, 49 HAV. L.
REV. 396 (1936); Brown, The Federal IncorporationLicensing Bill: Corporate
Regulation, 27 GEo. L.J. 1092 (1939); Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct 47
HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1314-15 (1934); Jennings, FederalIncorporationor Licensing
of Interstate CorporateBusiness, 23 MNN.L. REV. 710 (1939); Reuschlein, Federalization-Designfor Corporate Reform in a National Economy, 91 U. PA. L.
REV. 91 (1942); Watkins, Federalization of Corporations, 13 TENN.L REV. 89
(1935). See also 1 L. Loss, supra note 57, at 109-11. Efforts to enact a federal
corporations law continue to this day. See 126 CONG. REC. S3751-52 (daily ed.
Apr. 16, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
197. Some commentators criticized the securities laws as inadequate to deal
with the problems of corporate governance. See Reuschlein, supra note 196, at
107-08; TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1941). Some recommended a statutory requirement that corporate boards have a majority of
outside directors. See Douglas, supra note 196, at 1314-15; M. DIMOCK & H.
HYDE, BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPORATIONS 134-35 (TNEC
Monograph No. 11, 1940). It is significant that they thought such legislation necessary since in recent years the SEC has often obtained court orders imposing
such a requirement as ancillary relief. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text. As one commentator said, "Congress has not, as yet, made an effort to exercise any substantial degree of control over the internal affairs of corporations
engaged in interstate commerce." Berlack, supra note 196, at 410.
198. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. See also Fleischer,
supra note 163, at 1153 n.38; Sommer, supra note 24, at 119-20 (contrasting the
Investment Company Act's regulation of internal corporate affairs with the absence of such regulation in the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
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pressed its intent clearly. 99
Although the foregoing discussion of legislative history
concerns the scope of SEC regulation, the principles developed
there apply equally to remedies. Congress does not always intend the broadest possible remedies; in the securities laws
Congress deliberately limited certain remedies so as to avoid
injury to "honest business. 200 Interference with "fair corporate
suffrage" and corporate governance and state regulation
thereof can arise as much from court-ordered remedies as from
direct SEC regulation. 2 01 Nor did Congress intend to permit
federal intrusion into corporate governance once a coriporation
has violated the securities laws. If Congress had intended such
a major exception to the general rule of noninterference in corporate governance, presumably it would have said so, as it did
202
Most
in other securities laws and statutes in other areas.

reasons for Congress's renunciation of direct regulation of corporate governance are as valid for judicial remedies as for SEC
203
rule-making.
In sum, although the legislative history of the securities
laws does not discuss ancillary relief, it does evince a clear congressional intent not to regulate corporate governance unless
an express statutory provision applies, 20 4 or unless disclosure
requirements are implicated.
199. See supra text accompanying note 191. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct.
2629 (1982), is not to the contrary. See infra note 231.
200. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933) (restricting plaintiffs under §§ 11-12 of the 1933 Act to recovery of the offering price). See also
§ 206(d) of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 907-08 (amending § 11 of the 1933 Act to limit
damages recoverable).
201. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (ancillary relief has involved
removing and appointing directors without any shareholder vote); infra notes
312-20 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 323-24 and accompanying text. If the prohibition on direct regulation of corporate governance is due solely to the assumption that
most businesses are honest and do not need such regulation, arguably the prohibition should not apply in any case in which the assumption is proved wrong
by a violation of the securities laws. As the preceding discussion shows, however, Congress avoided such regulation because it wanted to leave that task to
state law and to shareholder suffrage. Interference with corporate governance
by ancillary relief, therefore, violates congressional intent as much as would an
SEC rule to the same effect. In fact, ancillary relief may be an even greater violation because shareholders and state governmental representatives ordinarily
cannot participate as easily in a judicial proceeding as in a rule-making
proceeding.
204. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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B. RECENT JUDICIAL RESTICTIONS

Implication of private rights of action 2 5 is not the only area
in which the Supreme Court has limited the federal securities
20 7
laws.20 6 The Court has also restricted enforcement actions,
2
08
section 16(b) of the 1934
the tender offer laws and rules,
Act,209 the definition of the term "security,"2 10 and other provi21
sions of securities laws. '
SEC enforcement cases are especially instructive. In
Aaron v. SEC2 12 the Supreme Court upheld a negligence standard for injunctions under sections 17(a) (2) and 17(a) (3) of the
1933 Act but also imposed on the SEC the same scienter stan205. See supra notes 107-48 and accompanying text.
206. Although the Court still recognizes private causes of action under rule
lOb-5, it has stressed that, because they are judicially implied, it may limit 10b-5
claims as policy considerations require, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975), and has often done just that, see Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (10b-5 imposes no affirmative duty to disclose
absent some fiduciary relationship); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) (discussed infra notes 228-40 and accompanying text); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required for lOb-5 civil damage action);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (10b-5 plaintiff
must be a purchaser or seller).
207. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (discussed infra notes 212-13 and
accompanying text). But see Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (discussed
infra note 224).
208. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (no private damage action for disappointed tender offeror); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,
422 U.S. 49, 60-65 (1975) (no injunction for violation of Williams Act absent proof
of irreparable harm).
209. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Secs. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976)
(one need account for profit on sale of shares only if one was a 10% owner
before purchasing); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582 (1973) (exchange of shares through tender offer which defendant could
not prevent not deemed a § 16(b) sale).
210. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S.Ct. 1220 (1982) (certificate of deposit
and a contractual arrangement are not securities); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (interest in an involuntary, noncontributory
pension plan is not a security); United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975) (shares in a housing cooperative are not securities). But cf. Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (discussed infra note 224).
211. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (power of directors of investment company to terminate derivative suit is to be decided by state law unless
it clearly conflicts with federal law); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (discussed infra notes 214-22 and accompanying text); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (narrowing definition of term "materiality"). But
cf.United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (discussed infra note 224).
212. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The holding was based primarily on the express
language of the relevant statutes. Moreover, the Court took pains to note that
the holding that sections 17(a) (2) and (a) (3) do not require scienter might not
be very important because scienter would still be important to the trial court's
decision whether to issue an injunction. Id. at 701. In subsequent cases lower
courts have declined to issue injunctions for want of scienter under sections
17(a) (2) and (a) (3). See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981).
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dard in injunctive proceedings under section 17(a) (1) and rule
10b-5 that applies to a private plaintiff in a civil damage action.
The Court also indicated that to obtain an injunction the SEC
must show a reasonable likelihood of future violations if the injunction is not issued.213
In SEC v. Sloan2 14 the Court held that the SEC's power
"summarily to suspend trading in any security... for a period
not exceeding ten days" under section 12(k) of the Exchange
Act did not permit the SEC to tack suspension periods so as to
suspend trading indefinitely. The Commission relied on the absence of contrary statutory language or legislative history, the
necessity for tacking "to maintain orderly and fair capital markets,"2 15 the Commission's long-standing interpretation of the
statute being "entitled to great deference," 2 16 and implied subsequent congressional approval of tacking.2 1 7 These arguments, all of which could be made for ancillary relief, were
rejected. The Court concluded that "the Commission has not
made a very persuasive showing that other remedies are ineffective," 2 18 that Congress intended, by limiting summary suspensions to ten days, to balance the public interest against "the
burden imposed on private parties," 219 and even long-standing
administrative interpretation cannot "overcome the clear con2
trary indications of the statute itself"1
20 or the absence of clear
221
congressional approval of tacking.
Finally, the Court noted
that the power to suspend trading was "awesome" and that a
"clear mandate from Congress ... is necessary to confer this
power."222
213.

446 U.S. at 701.

214. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
215. Id. at 115 (quoting from the Brief for the SEC at 37). The Commission
argued that its other powers were "simply insufficient to accomplish its purposes" because injunctions and temporary restraining orders "take time and
evidence to obtain and because they can be obtained only against wrongdoers
and not necessarily as a stopgap measure in order to suspend trading simply
until more information can be disseminated into the marketplace." Id. The
SEC's tacking of 10-day suspension periods in the stock of Canadian Javelin,
Ltd. had resulted in suspension of trading for over a year. Id. at 106.
216. Id. at 117.
217. Id. at 119-20.
218. Id. at 115. The Court noted that the Commission can move, and indeed
in the case of CJL had moved, quickly to obtain a temporary restraining order
or injunction and that the SEC can "simply reveal to the investing public...
the reasons which it thought justified the initial summary suspension and then
let the investors make their own judgments." Id. at 115-16.
219. Id. at 115.
220. Id. at 117.
221. Id. at 120-22.
222. Id. at 112.
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These cases do not involve ancillary relief. Indeed, a principal objection in Sloan was to the SEC's failure to seek relief
in court, an objection inapplicable to ancillary relief. But
Aaron and Sloan do show the Court's reluctance to expand the
SEC's enforcement power, especially when the power asserted
is "awesome." At least some ancillary relief, such as the restructuring of corporate boards, is arguably more awesome
than the actions of the SEC rejected in Sloan. Sloan and
Aaron also show the Court's reluctance to infer congressional
approval of past agency action and demonstrate some broader
trends in the Supreme Court that were previously noted: statutory interpretation stressing literal statutory language rather
than public policy or deference to agency interpretation, and a
general hostility toward government regulation. 23 Those recent decisions in which the Court has not narrowed the scope
of the securities laws offer no support for ancillary relief.224
Rather, recent securities cases as a whole exemplify the judi223. See supra notes 92-93, 98, 100, 104 and accompanying text.
224. In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the Court held that section 17(a) (1) of the 1933 Act prohibits fraud against brokers as well as investors. The case demonstrates that just as the Court will not disregard statutory
language and legislative history in order to expand the scope of the securities
laws, neither will it disregard them in order to contract that scope. In
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981), the Court held that the SEC properly used
the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof rather than the clear and
convincing standard, in an administrative proceeding to determine whether the
defendant had violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. The
Court relied primarily on the language and legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981), merely confirmed the holding of several lower courts on a minor point-a pledge of a
security constitutes a sale for purposes of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), did confirm in dictum that
rule lob-5 bars insider trading on material nonpublic information. On that
point it merely followed a rule well established in the lower courts. The case is
more notable for restricting lob-5 by ruling that it imposes no duty to disclose
absent "a relationship of trust and confidence." Id. at 230.
In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), the Court held
that a lob-5 action is not precluded merely because the alleged violation might
under other circumstances give rise to an action under section 11 of the 1933
Act. To some extent the decision undercuts the expressio unius reasoning the
Court has used elsewhere. Huddleston is distinguishable from ancillary relief
cases, though, in that it involved not the existence of an implied remedy but
the scope of a well recognized remedy. Also, the arguments against certain ancillary remedies involve much more than the expressio unius reasoning rejected in Huddleston.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), held that a party found
at trial in an SEC injunctive action to have violated the securities laws may be
collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues of fact in subsequent action by a different plaintiff. The Court's entire discussion concerned the wisdom and constitutionality of permitting the offensive use of collateral estoppeL
Nothing in the opinion is relevant to ancillary relief in the securities laws.
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cial trend which favors deregulation by narrowing the scope of
regulatory statutes.2 = While this trend does not necessarily
dispose of the issue of ancillary relief, it does suggest an attitude potentially hostile to broad implied relief.
C.

THE FEDERAL SECURrIES LAWS AND CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE
1.

Federalismand Santa Fe

In addition to weighing the role of state law in deciding
whether to infer a private damage action,22 6 the Supreme Court
has recognized that Congress intended the federal securities
laws to occupy only a small part of the law governing corporations; the rest of the field was deliberately left to state control.227 Thus federal courts must consider the relationship
between federal and state law not only in molding federal common law but in determining congressional intent as to the relative scope of the federal securities laws and state corporation
laws.
In Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green228 the Court held that
a rule lOb-5 claim must allege deception or manipulation. The
Court stressed that the plaintiff had alleged unfairness, not
non-disclosure, and that the securities laws are concerned primarily with disclosure.2 2 9 In deciding whether Congress intended to create a federal cause of action, the Court also
considered whether the cause of action is traditionally governed by state law:
[T]his extension of the federal securities laws would overlap and quite
possibly interfere with state corporate law .... Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in
securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden. As the Court stated in Cort v. Ash,
supra: 'Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit
their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
225. See Note, supra note 90, at 910-12.
226. The fourth factor listed in Cort v. Ash for deciding whether to imply a
remedy is whether the cause of action is "one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States." 422 U.S. at 78.
227. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
228. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
229. [A] private cause of action... should not be implied where it is
"unnecessary to ensure the fulffilment of Congress' purposes." ...
[T]he Court repeatedly has described the "fundamental purpose" of
the [Exchange] Act as implementing a "philosophy of full disclosure;"
once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of
the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute ....
Id. at 477-78.
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where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal af2 30
fairs of the corporation.'

In other cases, too, the Court has relegated plaintiffs to
state law rather than stretch federal law to cover the defendant's behavior. 231 Burks v. Lasker 232 held that whether direc-

tors of an investment company could terminate a derivative
suit depended initially on state rather than federal law. The issues in Burks are very different from those in Santa Fe and
230. Id. at 479 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Accord Kaminsky v.
Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1968):
Federal securities legislation supersedes state corporate law remedies
only to the extent of any direct conflict between the two, ... and unless a matter is clearly covered exclusively by federal statute, it is
deemed to be subject to state law. If Congress had intended to preempt the entire field, "so revolutionary a federal intervention," Loss
says, "would presumably have been clearly expressed."
Id. (citing 2 L. Loss, supra note 57, at 903). But cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85
(1975) (distinguishing J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)) ("In Borak,
the statute involved [§ 14(a) of the Exchange Act] was clearly an intrusion of
federal law into the internal affairs of corporations; to the extent that state law
differed or impeded suit, the congressional intent could be compromised in
state-created causes of action.").
Does either rationale for Santa Fe apply to SEC suits? Although the Court
refers to implication of private actions in connection with the requirement of
manipulation or deception, see supra note 229, the remainder of the discussion
there and of federalism seems to apply equally to SEC suits. Application of
Santa Fe is consistent with the intent of Congress as to the continuing role of
state law. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. Although no federal
court has directly addressed the issue, Santa Fe has been cited with approval
in SEC suits. See SEC v. Park Lane Hosiery, 558 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Penn Central Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (criminal case). Accordingly, there
is good reason to believe that Santa Fe does apply to SEC suits, and very little
reason to believe otherwise.
231. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982), is not to the contrary. In Edgar
the Court struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act as violating the
Commerce Clause. In so doing, the Court rejected the claim that the Illinois
Act merely regulated internal corporate affairs because "tender offers ...
do
not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company." Id. at
2643. The state's power to regulate internal affairs was not challenged. Even
the part of Justice White's opinion on preemption of the Illinois Act by the Williams Act, which was joined by only a minority of the Court, addresses an issue
very different from Santa Fe. In Edgar the question was whether the Illinois
Act frustrated the purposes of the federal securities laws; in Santa Fe the question was whether to interpret the federal securities laws so as to overlap or interfere with state law. Moreover, the Williams Act, in addition to requiring
disclosure, reflects even-handed congressional intent regarding tender offers
between bidders and target managements. In Santa Fe, by contrast, the Court
noted that with respect to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, disclosure was Congress's primary concern. 430 U.S. at 477-78.
232. 441 U.S. 471, 477-80 (1979).
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from the question of ancillary relief, but the case further demonstrates the Court's regard for federalism in the securities
laws. 23 3 Indeed, Santa Fe is but part of a growing concern for
federalism that has affected both the Court's decisions in many
areas, including the scope of federal common law,234 and the
23 5
programs of the political branches of the federal government.
Concern for federalism should be especially keen in the securities field because it arises not only from a general solicitude for
state interests in our federal system but also from clear statements by Congress assigning certain areas of corporation law
23 6
to the states.

Clearly Santa Fe does not bar all interpretations of the federal securities laws that would differ from state law. Otherwise, the federal securities laws would merely replicate state
law. Congress clearly intended that the federal securities laws
correct many shortcomings in the state regulation of securities. 237 Nevertheless, Santa Fe is not limited to direct conflicts
233. In Santa Fe the issue was the scope of federal law, rule lOb-5; state law
became an issue only for the purpose of determining whether lOb-5 should be
interpreted so as not to interfere with state law. In Burks the question was
whether federal or state law should decide whether directors can terminate a
derivative suit The Court held that state law would govern "to the extent such
law is consistent with the policies of" the Investment Company and Advisers
Acts. 441 U.S. at 486. Although the contexts of the two cases are very different,
Burks "is certainly consistent with the teaching of Santa Fe . . . and Cort v.
Ash to the effect that the federal securities laws cannot be used as a backdoor
approach to the federal chartering of corporations." Hazen, The Supreme Court
and the Securities Laws: Has the Pendulum Slowed?, 30 EMORY I.J. 5, 29-30
(1981).
234. See supra note 100.
235. In his inaugural address President Reagan announced that turning
back more functions to the states would be part of his legislative program.
Smith, Reversing the Liberality of the New Deal N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at B2.
The "new federalism" phenomenon antedates the inauguration of President
Reagan, however. See M. REAGAN & J. SAzoNE, THE NEW FEDERA SM (2d ed.
1981).
236. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
237. For example, an injunction against violations of the securities laws
could not be attacked for interfering with state law even in the rare case of
clear conflict. The supremacy clause of the Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, makes
federal law the supreme law of the land. The question addressed by Burks and
Santa Fe, however, is whether Congress has chosen to exercise its legislative
power, or whether the federal courts should exercise their common-law-making
power, to override state law. Not every difference between state and federal
law makes the former inconsistent with the latter. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at
479-80.
Since the Court's concern for federalism springs largely from Congress's
intent, it does not contradict the principle that federal law determines the remedies for violations of federal law. It is conceded that federal law determines
the availability of ancillary relief. J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34
(1964); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). Rather the
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with state law. In Santa Fe itself, the Court feared that interpreting rule lOb-5 to prohibit breaches of fiduciary duty or unfair transactions would "quite possibly interfere with state
corporate law" although no state law even implicitly sanctioned
such actions. 238 The Court has yet to draw lines here, but
Santa Fe and Burks show that the Court is especially sensitive
to intrusion on state control of corporate governance insofar as
both cases involved questions of the duties of directors. 239 This
sensitivity may be significant to ancillary relief affecting corpo2
rate governance. 40
2. The Purposesof the Securities Laws, the Scope of
Disclosure, and CorporateGovernance
The SEC defends ancillary relief as necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the securities laws by deterring violations and
insuring future compliance. 241 This argument raises many
questions about the purposes of the securities laws, especially
as to ancillary remedies affecting corporate governance. Similar questions have arisen elsewhere in the securities laws.
These questions may illuminate the issue of the propriety of
ancillary relief.
One set of debates concerns the role of disclosure. The
SEC and critics have disagreed on whether the Commission
may compel disclosures reflecting on the integrity of manageissue is, as in Santa Fe, whether in fashioning federal common law the courts
should avoid interfering with state law.
238. Indeed, shortly after the decision in Santa Fe, the Delaware Supreme
Court condemned the same kind of corporate freezeout of minority shareholders that the plaintiff had attacked in Santa Fe. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (DeL 1977).
239. Santa Fe refers to the "responsibilities of directors" and "the internal
affairs of the corporation." 430 U.S. at 479.
240. See infra notes 313-22 and accompanying text.
241. Brief for SEC, Amicus Curiae, General Steel Indus., Inc. v. Walco
Corp., No. 81-2345 (8th Cir. 1981), reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, Jan.
4, 1982, at 18 ("deter violations," "afford shareholders adequate protection," and
"effectuate Congress' purpose"); Brief for Appellee at 31, SEC v. Western Geothermal & Power Corp., No. 79-3422 (1st Cir. 1979) ("preventing future violations"); Brief for Appellee at 25, SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1977) ("to effectuate the purposes ... and to provide effective enforcement"); 42 SEC ANN.REP. 108 (1976) ("to protect the public by deterring such
conduct by others"). See Levine & Herlihy, SEC Enforcement Actions, 10 REV.
SEC. REG. 951, 953 (1977) ("to restore accountability for wrongful conduct, to enhance the independent character of boards of directors, and to assure that recordkeeping and disclosure systems are adequate;" the authors were officers in
the SEC's Division of Enforcement); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 4 S.E.C. Doc. 724
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,754 (D.D.C. 1974) ("to
avoid a repetition of the alleged violations").
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ment, especially disclosure of illegal activities, where the disclosures do not meet the financial materiality test.242 Another
question concerns disclosure intended to enable investors to
assert rights under state law.243 Some courts have required
disclosure to shareholders about a transaction, even though the
transaction is not submitted to shareholder vote but is approved by an interested board, if disclosure would have enabled shareholders to enjoin the transaction in state court. 244 A
related controversy concerns the Commission's efforts under
rule 13e-3 to require disclosure of management's opinion of the
fairness of going private transactions to minority shareholders. 245 The Commission long ago conceded that disclosure
242. The Commission argues that the integrity of management is always
material to investors. See authorities cited in Branch & Rubright, Integrity of
Management Disclosures Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 1447,
1447 n.2 (1982). The critics, who have received some support from the courts
recently, see Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S..
Ct. 1006 (1982); Branch & Rubright, supra, at 1468-76, argue that, based on the
legislative history and empirical studies of investor behavior, such disclosures
are not material, except perhaps where they involve self-dealing by insiders or
pending legal proceedings. See Branch & Rubright, supra, at 1479-85; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1246-47 (1977);
Kripke, supra note 158, at 188.
243. This is one possible basis for defending the Commission's rule 13e-3.
See infra note 245.
244. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977) (sale of stock by
subsidiary to parent on terms allegedly unfair to minority shareholders of the
subsidiary), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). The problem also arises when
minority shareholders are unable to block shareholder approval of a transaction because of the vote of an interested majority. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980) (freezeout merger of a single minority
shareholder). The author agrees with those who deny that this is a proper use
of disclosure. First, disclosure should facilitate investment or proxy decisions,
not litigation decisions. Id. at 651 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Moreover, although
plaintiffs argue that such disclosure supports state law, in practice it is much
more likely to interfere with state law. Id. See also R. JENN GS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALUS 952 (5th ed. 1982) (criticizing
Goldberg and Healey).
245. SEC Securities Act Release No. 16,075, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
82,166 (1979). The SEC abandoned an earlier proposal
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
that going private transactions be substantively fair. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 14,185, 13 S.E.C. Doc. 840 (1977). Broadly speaking, a going private
transaction is any transaction which causes a public company to lose any substantial attribute of a public company, such as the delisting of stock on a stock
exchange or the releasing from the statutory obligation to file periodic reports
under section 12(g) of the 1934 Act. See Note, Regulating Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Going Private].
Critics charge that, although the SEC has packaged rule 13e-3 as a disclosure requirement, its true purpose and effect are to require fairness in going
private transactions, and that this exceeds the Commission's powers. Id. at
795-97. Congress did not intend the statutory prohibition on fraud in section
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should not be used primarily to affect corporate governance, 246
13(e) to reach unfairness. See Sherrard, Federal Judicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 723-25
(1978); Note, Going Private,supra, at 790-92. The legislative history shows Congress revised the Williams Act to prohibit the SEC from getting involved in
questions of the fairness of tender offers, and there is no evidence of any exception to this prohibition for going private transactions. See Note, SEC
Rulemaking Authority and the Protection of Investors: A Comment on the Proposed "Going Private"Rules, 51 IND. L.J. 433, 443-46 (1976); Note, Rule 13e-3 and
the Going Private Dilemma: The SEC's Quest for a Substantive Fairness Doctrine, 58 WASH. U.L. Q. 883, 909-10 (1980); Comment, SEC Proposed "GoingPrivate" Rule, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 184, 206 (1978). Moreover, disclosures as to
fairness intrude into state law because they give a shareholder a federal claim
even if state law does not require fairness, and because a federal court may define fairness differently from a state court, in violation of the principles of federalism set forth in Santa Fe. See Note, Going Private, supra, at 797-98. One
court has held that Santa Fe applied to section 13(e). See Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp., 441 F. Supp. 299, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
A similar dispute arose over the Commission's 1978 proposals to require
the labeling of directors as management, affiliated non-management, or independent, and the disclosing of the extent to which the functions of any overview committee of the board differed from those listed by the SEC as usual for
such committees. Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications,
Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate
Governance Generally, Items 6(a), (b), & (d), SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 14,970, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,645
(July 18, 1978). The SEC ultimately withdrew these proposals after a storm of
protest that they, too, were intended primarily to regulate substantive behavior
by forcing corporations to adopt a particular mode of corporate governance, but
the Commission never abandoned its position that the proposals required only
disclosure and lay within its rule-making powers. The Commission insisted
that it was making no value judgments about whether outside directors are
preferable and that the proposals were not "designed primarily to influence
corporate conduct rather than to provide useful information to shareholders" or
to "prescribe or determine board composition or corporate governance mechanisms." SEC Securities Act Release No. 15,384, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,766, at 81,087-88 (December 6, 1978). The Commission
argued that any impact on corporate governance resulting from its proposals
would be only an indirect result of disclosure, as Congress contemplated. Id. at
81,088. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
246. In 1964 in In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 176 (1964), the Commission conceded its lack of power to "define Federal standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary operations of business enterprises." To impose
such standards, said Chairman Cary, "would be basically incompatible with the
philosophy and administration of the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Act" and "would stretch disclosure beyond the limitations contemplated by the
statutory scheme and necessitated by considerations of administrative practicality." Id. at 177-78. The Division of Corporation Finance argued that certain
1933 Act prospectuses, "by identifying the members of the board of directors,
impliedly represented that they would provide oversight and direction to registrants' officers." Id. at 175-76. Thus the staff's proposal technically charged
only a deficiency of disclosure. 'The Commission apparently felt that a decision with respect to the sufficiency of disclosure would necessarily have involved them in a substantive determination of matters that lay within the
province of state law." Sommer, supra note 24, at 123. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 1350 (1937) (SEC concedes it lacks power to pass on the fairness or
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and the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure
247
recently adopted a similar position.
The Commission's power to regulate proxy solicitations
goes beyond requiring disclosure, 248 but even this power extends only to assuring the "fair corporate suffrage" that Congress intended;249 it does not warrant further involvement in
corporate governance. Indeed, even commentators who have
noted the SEC's broader power to regulate proxies have conceded that this power does not extend to overruling other as2 50
pects of state corporation laws.
merits of any plan presented for shareholder vote); - L. Loss, supra note 57, at
868-69.
247. Summarizing the relationship between disclosure and corporate governance, the Committee stated: "The Commission should not adopt disclosure
requirements which have as their principal objective the regulation of corporate conduct .... If the Commission sees the need to directly regulate corporate conduct, it should request Congress to authorize it to do so .... " HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrrrEE ON CORPORATE DIScLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 318-19 (Comm. Print 1979). See also SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BAN=G, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFArIRs, 96th CONG. 2D SESS.,
SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE AcCOuNTABIrriTY 750 (Comm. Print 1980).

The SEC questioned whether the principle espoused by the Advisory Committee should be embodied in a statement of objectives by the Commission. It
feared it might lead to "[d] ebate as to what was the Commission's primary, as
distinct from secondary, objective in taking particular action." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5906 (Feb. 15, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,505, at 80,048. It is not clear whether the SEC rejected the principle
advanced by the Advisory Committee or merely the idea of announcing that
principle in a Commission statement of objectives. See also Weiss & Schwartz,
supra note 174, at 84 & n.93 ("The Commission would probably have to obtain
new legislative authority in order to enforce... substantive rules governing
the composition and organization of boards of directors.").
248. See SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILrTY, supra note
247, at A-42-A-44 and authorities cited therein. See also Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. I REV.
653, 684-85 (1951). The SEC has rarely used this broader power. It is difficult to
categorize many requirements of proxy rule 14a as disclosure requirements.
For example, although rule 14a-8, requiring the inclusion in management's
proxy statement of various types of shareholders' proposals, might not at first
glance seem to be a disclosure requirement one ground on which the SEC and
commentators have justified 14a-8 is that it is necessary in order to inform
shareholders of proposals that may be brought before the meeting. See
Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65
GEo. LJ. 635, 639 (1977). Some others, such as the requirement of rule 14a4(b) (1) that shareholders be given an opportunity to abstain on any question
to be voted upon, are more difficult to categorize as disclosure requirements,
but are still narrowly limited to the proxy area and do not otherwise affect corporate governance.
249. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
250. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 57, at 902-03 (SEC may not require inclusion
of shareholder proposals on matters that are not appropriate for action under
state law).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:865

Disclosure issues, although not directly in issue in most ancillary relief cases, are nonetheless relevant to ancillary relief
in several ways. First, in weighing the benefits of ancillary relief (in terms of deterring securities law violations by improving disclosure) against the detriments (such as interfering with
state law or with shareholder democracy), it must be
remembered that the scope of securities disclosure is not unlimited. Second, if the SEC cannot interfere with corporate
governance through rules the "principal objective" of which is
"the regulation of corporate conduct, ' '251 a fortiori the Commission cannot regulate corporate governance more directly by the
restructuring of corporate boards via ancillary relief.
Controversy has also raged over the SEC's use of its Rule
of Practice 2(e) 252 to discipline professionals, especially attorneys, who engage in activities the SEC deems illegal or unethical. Although the Commission has occasionally supported rule
2(e) as promoting the purposes of the securities laws, its principal arguments have concerned its power to protect the integrity of its processes. 253 Thus the rule 2(e) debate is of little
251. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
252. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1982).
253. Through rule 2(e), the Commission asserts the power to
deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission
. . . to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or... to have willfully violated,
or willfully aided and abetted the violation of the federal securities
laws or rules.
Id. See In re Carter & Johnson, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,149 (1981);
In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
15,982, 17 S.E.C. Doc. 1149, 1164 (Chairman Williams, concurring). Accord
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1979) (dealing with the
application of rule 2(e) to accountants, though in dictum the court also approved its application to attorneys). It is sometimes argued that rule 2(e) is
valid because it promotes the purposes of the securities laws by ensuring that
professionals, on whom so much of securities compliance depends, perform
with diligence and competence. Id. at 580-81. This argument seems generally
to be secondary, however.
The author tends to agree with critics who deny that the SEC can properly
apply rule 2(e) to lawyers. See, e.g., In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 S.E.C. Doc. 1149, 1157 (1979)
(Commissioner Karmel, dissenting) (SEC's program is in aid of its
prosecutorial function and thus rule 2(e) is an invalid exercise of its power);
Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAw. 987, 1005, 1010-15 (1980) (rule 2(e)
violates statutory grant to district courts of exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the securities laws and may violate the constitutional right to due process); Miller, The Distortionand Misuse of Rule 2(e), 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 54, 59 n.13
(1979) (where Congress intended agencies to have general rule-making and disciplinary authority, it has been explicit); Note, SEC DisciplinaryProceedings
Against Attorneys Under Rule 2(e), 79 MIcH. L REV. 1270, 1275-77, 1285 (1981)
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relevance to ancillary relief and the role of the SEC in corporate governance.
On occasion the Commission has considered regulating
corporate governance directly. In 1973 the SEC announced a
25 4
project to set standards for directors of public companies.
The project was abandoned the following year.25 5 In 1978 the
Commission commenced an inquiry on whether it could require public companies to have audit committees composed of
outside directors. The Commission never adopted such a rule,
however.25 6 Before the proceeding was abandoned, Harvey L.
Pitt, the SEC's General Counsel, issued an opinion supporting
the Commission's power to adopt an audit committee rule. He
found this authority in the SEC's powers to require certification of financial statements by an independent accountant, to
define certain accounting terms, and to implement the requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that public companies maintain adequate systems of internal accounting
controls. 25 7
(noting lack of express authority to regulate attorneys as compared with express authority to regulate many others). Most of these criticisms have little
bearing on corporate governance. Professor Kripke, however, has also argued
that rule 2(e) interferes improperly with corporate governance. Kripke, supra
note 158, at 201.
254. See Address by G. Bradford Cook, Southern Methodist University
School of Business Administration (April 6, 1973), reprinted in [1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 5 79,302 (discussing the responsibilities of the
corporate director under federal securities laws).
255. The project was abandoned, ostensibly because of the difficulty of defining standards, but also perhaps because of doubts about the Commission's
power to impose such standards. Compare Comments of Ray Garrett, Jr., Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, at 4-5 (Oct. 3, 1974), discussed in [1974] SEC.
REG. &L. REP. (BNA) No. 272, at A-11 (Oct. 9, 1974) (defending disclosure regulations), with Coffee, supra note 242, at 1248 (doubting Commission's
authority).
256. Under pressure from the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange adopted
a rule requiring listed companies to have audit committees, thereby diminishing the need for Commission action. See NEw YORK STocK EXCHANGE, CoMPANY MANuAL, at A-29; 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) T 24951.
Even public
companies not listed on the NYSE usually now have audit committees. An
SEC survey of companies subject to the proxy rules showed that nearly 80% of
companies not on the NYSE had audit committees. SEC Securities Act Release No. 17,518, 21 S.E.C. Doc. 1551, 1567 (Feb. 5, 1981). See Letter from SEC
Chairman Roderick M. Hills to Mr. William M. Batten, Chairman of the New
York Stock Exchange (May 11, 1976), reprinted in [1976] SEC. REG. & L REP.
(BNA) No. 353 (Special Supp.), at 44-45 (May 19, 1976) (encouraging NYSE to
require audit committees).
257. Opinion of SEC General Counsel on the Commission's Authority to Require Public Companies to EstablishIndependent Audit Committees, reprinted
in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) T 81,535, at 80,177-81 (March
2, 1978).
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Even if Mr. Pitt's arguments were accepted, 25 8 however,
they would not justify most ancillary relief affecting corporate
governance. The proposed audit committee rule would have intruded less into corporate governance than ancillary relief
often does. Through ancillary relief the Commission has often
required not only an audit committee of outsiders but also an
outside majority on the entire board, with the SEC in effect
picking those outsiders. More important, Mr. Pitt's justifications apply to accounting matters and not to other interference
in corporate governance. Even critics of the Commission's attempts to expand its regulation admit that it has broad untapped powers to regulate accounting and accountants, 259
powers that do not extend to corporate governance generally.
Because the courts have not resolved these many disputes
over disclosure and SEC involvement in corporate governance,
no firm conclusions can be drawn from them. Several points
are worth noting, however. On occasion, notably in Franchard,
the Commission has conceded its lack of authority to interfere
in corporate governance. 260 Whenever the SEC has suggested
direct regulation of, or disclosure rules affecting, corporate governance, commentators and the bar have questioned the Commission's authority. When faced with such criticism, the SEC
has often retreated from its proposals. The Commission has
also regularly disclaimed any intent to interfere in corporate
governance through its proposals. These points provide no dispositive arguments against ancillary relief affecting corporate
governance. They do, however, tend to support the conclusions
about the SEC and corporate governance reached in the above
analysis of the legislative history and of Santa Fe.
V. ANCILLARY RELIEF IN SECURITIES LAW
What conclusions can be drawn about ancillary relief in securities law? This Part considers general approaches to ancillary relief, the propriety of specific remedies in contested cases,
and finally, the significance of the defendant's consent.
258. In particular, if outside members of an audit committee must be members of the board, an audit committee rule would also require a minimum
number of outside directors, who would participate in all of the board's decisions. In light of Congress' emphasis on disclosure and opposition to direct
Commission involvement in corporate governance, see supra notes 173-99 and
accompanying text, it seems unlikely that Congress intended to sanction such a
rule.

259. See H. KRiPKE, supra note 140, at 141-43.
260. See supra note 246.
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A. A GENERAL APPROACH TO ANCILARY RELIEF
Although respectable arguments can be made for denying
virtually any relief not expressly authorized by the securities
laws, or for approving any relief subject only to trial court discretion, these arguments are ultimately unpersuasive. Instead,
this Article proposes an analysis that considers each type of
ancillary relief separately in light of relevant considerations.
1. A Blanket Prohibitionon Ancillary Relief.?
Should courts in securities cases deny all ancillary relief?
Supreme Court discussion of the issue is limited to Deckert,
but the facts there are distinguishable from most ancillary relief cases, and the Court's discussion of ancillary relief is dictum. 261 The legislative history of the securities laws reveals no
congressional intent to authorize ancillary relief,262 and the express provision for many ancillary remedies in other statutes,
including some securities legislation, further belies any such
intent.26 3 Statements of the broad inherent remedial powers of
equity are suspect as vague, subject to exceptions, and obsolete
because of recent cases restricting statutory interpretation and
federal common law.264 Most cases approving ancillary relief in
other areas of administrative law are distinguishable as involv2 65
ing differently worded statutes.
While the foregoing factors weaken the case for ancillary
relief, they establish no affirmative argument against it.
Neither do recent Supreme Court cases compel prohibition of
ancillary relief. Cases curtailing the securities laws and implied private actions involve issues quite different from ancillary relief.266 While these cases, the restriction of federal
common law, and the movement toward literalism in statutory
interpretation evince some hostility to governmental regulation
and judicial activism, they establish no complete bar on ancillary relief. The Court continues on occasion to interpret the securities laws broadly, to fashion federal common law, to go
beyond statutory language in statutory interpretation, and even
to approve implied private damage actions. 267 Lower courts
261. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 169-99 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 107-48, 205-40 and accompanying text.
267. See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (court
must look to the "whole law, and to its object and policy"); supra notes 148 (re-
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have approved a variety of ancillary remedies, 268 and the
Supreme Court has refused on occasion to reject implied reme269
dies long accepted by the lower courts.
The absence of any reference to ancillary relief in the legislative history should not be fatal; nothing in that history expressly forbids ancillary relief, and the traditions of equity and
precedents involving ancillary relief clearly support many ancillary remedies. Many members of Congress probably knew of
equity's tradition of granting ancillary relief and may have intended to authorize remedies traditionally granted by equity
which would further the purposes of the securities laws.
Prohibiting ancillary relief would require courts to disregard
the ability of many ancillary remedies to further these purposes. In sum, very little in law or public policy calls for a complete ban on ancillary relief.
2. A Blanket Approval Subject to JudicialDiscretion?
Antipodal to a blanket prohibition on ancillary relief would
be a blanket approval, subject only to the trial court's discretion to mold relief to the facts of each case. Under this approach the Supreme Court would at most list factors that the
trial court should consider, and any ancillary remedy would be
affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion. Although
commentators have expressed some qualms about ancillary relief, this is the approach which they have recommended 2 70 and
which the courts have followed. 2 71 The position is beguilinghow can ancillary relief be inappropriate in a given case if a
trial court has, after considering all relevant factors, approved
cent Supreme Court cases inferring private remedies), 227 (recent Supreme
Court decisions broadly interpreting the federal securities laws).
268. See cases cited supra notes 11-13, 16-22.
269. For example, the Court has explained its recognition of an implied
damage action under rule 10b-5 as a mere acquiescence in the long-standing
recognition of such an action by the lower federal courts. Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577-78 n.19 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979). See also id. at 692-93 n.13 (explaining recognition of
implied causes of action under various sections of the Railway Labor Act).
270. See Farrand, supra note 4, at 1807-14; Comment, Court Appointed Directors, supra note 4, at 766-67; and Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note
4, at 1214-16, all recommending that trial courts proceed cautiously in ancillary
relief cases and listing factors courts should consider in exercising their discretion in such cases. See also Treadway, supra note 4, at 679 (recognizing
problems with ancillary relief but making no recommendations to curb it except that the SEC should establish rules governing ancillary relief).
271. Although courts have occasionally rejected or counselled caution about
ancillary relief, see supra note 10, they have generally approved such relief, see
supra notes 11-49 and accompanying text
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the relief, which is not found on appeal to have been an abuse
of discretion? Though beguiling, this approach should be rejected because the courts cannot handle the problems of ancillary relief272 on a case-by-case basis. There are three principal
reasons for this.
First, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals cannot
effectively control the district courts' discretion in ancillary relief. Even critics of the Supreme Court's recent decisions restricting the federal securities laws concede that the lower
courts have often expanded these laws excessively. 273 The
Court's rulings recognize that in some areas hard and fast
rules, even if somewhat crude, are preferable to rules leaving
the district courts broad discretion, because the Court cannot
regularly monitor lower court rulings and prevent erosion of
basic principles.2 74 Effective appellate review is especially
problematic in ancillary relief cases. The SEC, the plaintiff in
most such cases, has considerable leverage over most defendants275 and can often extract consent decrees, thereby avoiding
appellate review. In addition, ancillary relief may harm persons, especially shareholders, who are not represented in court
and cannot appeal, even in a contested case. Finally, in a contested case ancillary relief, especially relief affecting corporate
governance, would have to be premised on a complicated trial
record, which further complicates appellate review. The difficulties of appellate review are borne out by the infrequency of
reversals of ancillary relief cases.2 7 6 In addition, the Supreme
Court can review such cases only rarely. To exercise any control at all, it must limit district court discretion.
One cannot meet these objections by assuming, in light of
past behavior, that the Commission will restrain itself. In ancil272. These problems include undue SEC interference in corporate governance, infringement of shareholder suffrage, state control of corporate governance, congressional control of enforcement activities of administrative agencies,
and the granting of remedies that do not further the purposes of the securities
laws. See infra notes 312-22, 339-43, 361-64 and accompanying text.
273. See Frankel, supra note 112, at 582-83 (although the Supreme Court has
gone too far in limiting implied private damage actions, some restrictions were
necessary). Some attribute the Court's restriction of implied damage actions to
the lower courts' having gotten "out of hand." Note, supra note 93, at 370.
274. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975)
(declining to leave the purchaser-seller rule of rule 10b-5 "open to endless caseby-case erosion").
275. See infra notes 372-76 and accompanying text.
276. The difficulty is compounded by the holding of some courts that appellants must meet a "heavy burden" of proving that the district court abused its
discretion. See SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
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lary relief, as in many other areas, the SEC has aggressively
pushed its powers as far as the courts have allowed. 277 Especially in the realm of corporate governance, the SEC has ignored the weakness of its claims of jurisdiction and has acted
so aggressively as to persuade some commentators that it
278
wants to preempt the state corporate laws.
A case-by-case approach also creates undue uncertainty
among defendants as to what relief can be extracted from
them. Where a trial court has vast, essentially unreviewable
discretion as to remedies, defendants feel even more than the
usual compulsion to settle rather than to risk the unknown.
Finally, and most important, respect for congressional intent may render certain ancillary remedies inappropriate either
in certain definable circumstances or under any circumstances.
Despite the flexibility of equity, it is hardly unprecedented to
limit the discretion of the chancellor. The Supreme Court has
not only demanded certain conditions on the grant of an injunction 279 but has also curbed the implication of statutory remedies, once thought to be limited only by the discretion of
equity.280
One could argue that Congress knew of equity's practice of
granting ancillary relief and therefore intended, by empowering
the courts to grant injunctions, to permit any remedy a court
277. See Freedman & Sporkin, The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Enforcement Program A Debate on The Enforcement Process, 38 WASH. & LEE
L REv. 781, 781 (1981) (comments of Professor Freedman) ("[T]he enforcement work of the Commission, at best, reflects an over-zealous insensitivity to
individual liberties and the values of a free society; and, at worst, a deliberate
pattern of serious and inexcusable violations of fundamental rights and elementary notions of fairness."). In particular, Professor Freedman attacks the
Commission for its use of rule 2(e) to force lawyers to enforce the securities
laws, for abusing "its power of obtaining publicity at pretrial stages to impose
very severe punishment without due process," and for abusing consent decrees. Id. at 782-85. See also IL KRiPKE, supra note 140, at 47-51 (SEC abuse of
injunctive proceedings). To some extent, abuse of enforcement proceedings
may flow from the unwillingness or inability of the Commission to control the
enforcement staff. See Coffee, supra note 242, at 1248 n.531. But the Commission itself has often pushed the securities laws to their limits and beyond. This
is reflected both in the large number of Supreme Court cases the Commission
has lost lately, see supra notes 207-40 and accompanying text, and in the many
current controversies in which the Commission has been criticized for exceeding its jurisdiction, see supra notes 242-60 and accompanying text.
278. Rosenfeld, Corporate Governance, 77 SEc. REG. L.J. 171, 172 (1979). See
Kripke, supra note 158, 172-73, 182.
279. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes
81-87 and accompanying text.
280. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
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deems appropriate. 281 There are several problems with this argument, however. First, there was no tradition of ancillary relief in administrative law in 1933-34 for the obvious reason that
federal administrative law did not exist to any significant degree at that time. Nor was there precedent anywhere in equity
for certain ancillary remedies, such as the restructuring of corporate boards. Second, if Congress was relying on an inherent
judicial power to fashion ancillary remedies, presumably it
would not have bothered to provide expressly, as it did in the
1934 Act and in later securities and other legislation, for certain
ancillary remedies. 282 At least Congress could have provided,
as it did elsewhere, 283 for the issuance of an injunction "or
other order." Third, even if Congress did intend to permit the
judiciary to fashion ancillary relief, there is no evidence that it
intended to leave ancillary relief solely to the discretion of the
district courts. It is entirely appropriate for appellate courts to
provide standards for ancillary relief. The results of the caseby-case approach, which now prevails, are that the district
courts are assuming the essentially legislative function of defining remedies for statutory violations, often disregarding the
purposes of the securities laws.
3.

Toward a GeneralApproach to Ancillary Relief

If neither a blanket prohibition nor a blanket approval of
ancillary relief is appropriate, what is the correct approach?
The answer lies in evaluating ancillary remedies in the light of
the purposes of the securities laws as revealed by their express
language and legislative history, the traditions of equity, and
the proper role of the federal courts in fashioning implied statutory remedies. Since these factors weigh differently on different remedies, the propriety of each type of ancillary relief must
be considered separately. Nonetheless, some general principles can be established.
In recent years the Supreme Court has fundamentally
redefined the roles of Congress and the federal courts in fashioning remedies under federal statutes. Formerly, the federal
281. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960)
("When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions
contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant
of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes."). Accord Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 390 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
282. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 62-63, 162 and accompanying text.
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courts readily implied such remedies as matters of federal com28 4
mon law whenever they thought it desirable public policy.
The Court now views the implication of remedies more as a
matter of statutory interpretation because it sees Congress as
the preferable body under our constitutional scheme to specify
statutory remedies. 285 Moreover, the Court now balks at deciding for itself what remedies will best serve public policy. In
particular, if a statute reveals conflicting purposes, the Court
will hesitate to choose between them; rather it will defer to the
literal statutory language. If in such a case Congress has not
286
specified a remedy, the Court will hesitate to create one.
One cannot be sure how these general trends will affect ancillary equitable relief in administrative law because the Court
has not recently addressed the issue. These trends have not
led to absolute rules in other areas, 28 7 however, and ancillary
relief differs from other areas where these trends have appeared. So the Court will probably not bar ancillary relief completely, but it will undoubtedly be more restrictive than it has
been in the past.
This restrictive attitude is supported by the lack of any reference to ancillary relief in the legislative history of the securities laws. Amendment of the securities laws has been held not
to constitute congressional approval of all prior judicial holdings and practices, 288 and should not be so held as to ancillary
relief.289 Courts may infer congressional approval of remedies
284. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 117-20, 129, 144-47 and accompanying text.
286. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
The Court described the competing arguments as to whether there should be a
right to contribution among antitrust defendants and then concluded that
"[t] he range of factors to be weighed... demonstrates the inappropriateness
of judicial resolution of this complex issue." Id. at 646. See also supra notes
117-20, 128 and accompanying text. Indeed, the SEC has agreed in principle
that where the intent of Congress is ambiguous, the SEC should seek clarification from Congress. See Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a FederalLaw of
Corporationsby Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U. L. Rav. 185, 189-90
(1964) (quoting a letter from J. Sinclair Armstrong, then chairman of the SEC,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3762, at 5 (1957)).
287. Thus, for example, the Court continues to weigh legislative purpose
when interpreting statutes, see supra note 102, and to create implied statutory
remedies in certain cases, see supra note 148.
288. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 235-36); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-22 (1978) (discussed
supra text accompanying notes 214-22).
289. There is no evidence of "general congressional awareness" of the practice of ancillary relief, see SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978), and Congress
has not "focused on issues ... directly related to" ancillary relief, id. at 120. As
to the more exotic remedies such as those affecting corporate governance,
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traditional to equity, but not of remedies that are unknown to
equity and have not been awarded in other areas of administrative law. The argument is strong in the latter case that Congress did not intend to authorize such remedies either when it
originally adopted the securities laws or when it amended
them. The absence of a remedy through the long history of equity, especially at the time the legislation was enacted, also
counsels caution against finding that remedy important to the
fulfillment of a statutory purpose. 290 For the same reasons,
courts should hesitate to abandon conditions equity has tradi291
tionally imposed on the grant of an ancillary remedy.
While the importance of each type of ancillary relief to the
securities laws may be relevant, the SEC's claim that certain
remedies are necessary is by no means conclusive. In SEC v.
Sloan 292 the Supreme Court deemed "unpersuasive" the SEC's
argument that effective enforcement required that it be able to
tack ten-day periods of suspension of trading in particular securities. Indeed, if the statutory scheme and legislative history
clearly negate a remedy, Sloan states that a court may not
fashion the remedy no matter how desirable: "the proper
293
source of that power is Congress."
Where the statutory language and legislative history do not
bar a remedy, as they did in Sloan, the importance of ancillary
relief to effective enforcement should be weighed. This importance depends in part on the potency of the express remedies
available. The SEC first sought ancillary relief because it felt
that an injunction against future violations was a mere slap on
the wrist, insufficient to deter the defendant or others from future violations. 294 In imposing stiff conditions on the granting
of injunctions, however, courts have recently noted that an inmoreover, there has not been established any judicially accepted position in
which Congress might acquiesce.
290. "[TIhe initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was enacted." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
102 S.Ct. 1825 (1982). "Itis always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law.... ." Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979). Accord Merrill Lynch, 102 S. Ct. at 1839.
The principle also applies to re-enactments of a statute. 1d. at 1841 n.66 and authorities cited therein.
291. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
292. 436 U.S. 103 (1978). See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text.
293. 436 U.S. at 115-17. Sloan is discussed in greater detail at supra notes
214-22 and accompanying text. See also Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411-13
(1962) (refusing to expand section 16(b) of the Exchange Act despite possibly
"persuasive policy arguments that the Act should be broadened").
294. See supra note 25.
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junction is strong medicine; it not only threatens criminal contempt for future violations but it also triggers many disabilities
under the securities laws. 295 The SEC has often argued that the
egregiousness of defendants' violations shows that they cannot
be trusted, even under the burden of an injunction, to obey the
law, but the SEC has never empirically demonstrated, or even
attempted to demonstrate, that securities law violators, even
296
It is
egregious violators, are likely to disobey an injunction.
one thing to violate the securities laws; it is quite another to violate them again after having been caught the first time and
subjected to an injunction. Although ancillary remedies may
be necessary for effective enforcement in some cases, the
courts should reject any general claim by the Commission that
an injunction is insufficient. The Commission should be required to prove the claim in each case separately.
B.

ANCILLARY RELIEF IN CONTESTED CASES

1. Remedies to Rectify Past Violations-Disgorgement,
Restitution, Rescission, Sterilizationof Voting
Rights, Etc.
The SEC has often stressed that it is not a collection
agency for defrauded investors. 297 Since the legislative history
expresses no support for disgorgement, restitution, or rescission, can these remedies be justified?
Disgorgement, restitution and rescission are long-estab295. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir1978); Note, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of JudicialDiscretion, 10 COLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 328, 340-42 (1974). The SEC rarely seeks
contempt. Coffee, supra note 77, at 453 n.185. Indeed, it has been suggested
that the disabilities imposed on persons subject to injunctions under SEC rules
violate the principle that injunctions should deter, not punish. Wax, The
Emerging SEC Injunction, 17 N.Y.L.F. 785, 785 (1971).
296. Although a few ancillary relief cases have involved violations of prior
decrees, the number is apparently small. See, e.g., SEC v. Beisinger Indus.
Corp., 552 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1977); SEC v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp. 744,
753 (D. Ariz. 1975). Cf. Posner, A StatisticalStudy of Antitrust Enforcemen 13
J. LAW & ECON. 365, 385-87 (1970) (successful prosecutions for contempt for violating antitrust decrees are so rare as to raise questions whether they serve
"much purpose, except in cases where the law is in doubt").
297. See 41 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 97-98 (1975) ('"The SEC's primary function is
... not to obtain damages for injured individuals."). See also Cary (former
SEC Chairman), Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REv. 857, 860-61 (1962) (noting the
need for efficient use of limited SEC manpower and monetary resources);
Speech of SEC Commissioner Richard B. Smith at the Program of Continuing
Legal Educ. of the California Bar, in Los Angeles (Jan. 12, 1968) (on file at the
SEC library, Washington, D.C.) ("The Commission attempts to avoid being a
collection agency for injured investors ....
).
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lished remedies of equity.298 They may also contribute significantly to effective enforcement of the securities laws. Many
ways of violating those laws, especially insider trading, can produce handsome profits with little risk of being caught.299 If the
SEC can only enjoin insider trading, potential offenders will
know that they can retain their unjust enrichment unless they
are sued privately. In general, restitution and disgorgement do
not intrude into any areas from which Congress intended to exclude the Commission.
Ancillary relief is unnecessary, however, to effective en300
forcement if relief can be obtained through a private action.
In many cases private relief will be available; the express provisions of the 1934 Act apparently permit an action for rescission
or restitution by a defrauded buyer.3 0' An SEC request for restitution or rescission implies that the identity of the persons
defrauded is known. These persons presumably could sue privately for such relief. An SEC action for rescission and restitution might be more efficient than multiple private suits and
might avoid the practical and procedural problems of a class action, but an SEC action hardly seems crucial to the enforcement of the securities laws. Such an action reduces the SEC to
little more than a collection agency, contrary to the intentions
of Congress. Accordingly, the SEC should be granted rescis298. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 223-27 (disgorgemerit of unjust enrichment), 229-40 (history of restitution), 254-56 (rescission)

(1973).
299. W. CARY &M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (5th
ed. 1980) 728-29. Inside traders are subject to private suits under rule 10b-5.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980). Although the Court has
recently hesitated to recognize new implied private rights of action, see supra
notes 115-25 and accompanying text, it has not questioned the continuing availability of such an action under rule lOb-5. But the odds of detection are small,
and some courts have impeded recovery even from one who is caught if, as is
usually the case, the trading occurred on an impersonal exchange. Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977)

(apparently demanding proof of some privity or causation by plaintiff, proof
that would be very difficult to show when defendant traded on an impersonal
exchange). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 75455 (1975) (requiring that the plaintiff in a lOb-5 action be a purchaser or seller).
Blue Chip generally prevents the issuer (or any of its shareholders by a derivative suit) from suing under 10b-5 for insider trading.
300. Ancillary relief in such a case also violates the maxim that equity
should act only where there is no adequate remedy at law. Ellsworth, supra
note 4, at 648. There is also some question whether an administrative agency is
authorized to sue in what is essentially a private dispute. See id. at 649.
301. Section 29(b) of the Act, which declares void any contract violative of
the Act, is very similar to section 215 of the Investment Advisors Act, which the
Court in Transamerica held to authorize an action for rescission or restitution.
See supra note 124.
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Sion or restitution only if a private action is impossible, perhaps because no private action is permitted for the violation in
question. Disgorgement stands on a different footing if rescission and restitution are unavailable because the defrauded victims are unknown. The SEC should be able to seek
disgorgement in such cases. 302 If private suits for restitution or
rescission are pending, an SEC suit for the same relief or for
disgorgement may be stayed until the private suits are
303
resolved.
Sterilization of voting rights for illegally acquired stock is
another appropriate ancillary remedy. An injunction against
future violations, without more, not only leaves defendants
their ill-gotten gains but also permits them to add to those
gains every time they vote their shares. Conceptually, an injunction against voting the shares therefore differs little from
an injunction against future violations; sterilization merely forbids voting which, though legal in itself, is made possible by
the illegal acquisition. In this respect sterilization resembles
30 4
many remedies granted in other areas of administrative law.
It does not interfere with corporate governance in a way contrary to the intent of Congress.
Although a court should stay the SEC's suit for sterilization if a private suit for the same relief is pending and being
competently pursued, 05 a court should be more reluctant to
302. Where the SEC may pursue disgorgement, rescission, or restitution, it
should also be able to obtain appointment of a trustee for the limited purpose
of receiving funds from the defendants, evaluating claims by members of the
injured class, and paying legitimate claims. This does seem to reduce the Commission to a collection agency. But if private actions are unavailable and the
SEC obtains a monetary recovery from the defendant, it seems an insignificant
extension of the Commission's powers and consistent with the purposes of the
securities laws to arrange for the money recovered to be paid to the actual
victims.
303. In 1975 Congress adopted section 21(g) of the Exchange Act, prohibiting the consolidation of SEC and private actions without the SEC's consent,
because cases ordering such consolidation were deemed to have hindered SEC
enforcement activities. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29,
§ 17(3), 89 Stat. 155 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
Neither the language nor the purpose of the amendment should bar a stay,
however, if the reason for the stay is that effective relief may be procured in
private suits. As to procedures in such cases, see infra note 305.
304. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies
of divestiture after an illegal merger and of corrective advertising).
305. When a private suit is pending, the court may handle a suit by the SEC
somewhat as it would treat a second shareholder's derivative suit, deciding
whether to stay or dismiss the SEC's suit or to permit it to proceed. See W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 299, at 970-72. Of course, a court cannot order
that the SEC's suit be consolidated with a private suit. Securities Exchange
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await a private suit here than in a restitution case. Sterilization
of voting rights may affect all shareholders and not just the private plaintiffs. As such, the need for SEC involvement may be
greater.
2. Relief Pendente Lite
Equity has long approved remedies pendente lite to preserve the jurisdiction of a court by maintaining the status quo
or preventing the removal or dissipation of assets. 306 These
remedies generally promote the purposes of the securities laws
and should be permitted. The only such remedy that is problematic is the appointment of a receiver, which is discussed
3 07
below.
3. Remedies to Prevent Future Violations-Removal and
Appointment of Directors,Appointment of Special
Agents and Special Counsel, Etc.
The history of equity contains very little precedent for the
appointment or removal of directors. Although a few state
courts have suggested in dictum that they can remove a director,308 actual cases of removal are extremely rare.3 09 Cases of
Act of 1934, § 21(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See supra note

303.
306. FED. R. Crv. P. 64 provides for provisional remedies "for the purpose of
securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action...
under the circumstances and in the manner provided by" state law. These
remedies "include arrest, attachment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration,
and other corresponding or equivalent remedies .... ." Rule 64 codified longstanding federal practice. 7 J. MOORE, supra note 59, 1 64.03. FED. M. Cirv. P. 65
provides for injunctive relief, including the provisional remedies of preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders. FED. IL C v. P. 66 provides for receiverships. Provisional remedies may be used to maintain the status quo, as
is apparent from the nature of these remedies, although maintenance of the
status quo is not their sole purpose. D. DOBBS, supra note 298, at 109-10. See
supra note 20 (securities cases granting injunctions pendente lite).
307. See infra notes 343-65 and accompanying text.
308. See Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D. Del. 1945),
a.ffd, 155 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947) (diversity case;
no removal unless directors guilty of fraud); Gettinger v. Heaney, 220 Ala. 613,
617, 127 So. 195, 198 (1930) (no removal unless other remedies inadequate);
DeGarmo v. Goldman, 19 Cal. 2d 755, 760-61, 123 P.2d 1, 4 (1942) (respondent
seeking removal of directors must come to court of equity with clean hands);
Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128, 135, 251 N.W. 421, 424 (1933) (no removal
unless directors guilty of fraud). See generally Brudney, FiduciaryIdeology in
TransactionsAffecting Corporate Control 65 MIC. L REV. 259, 281 (1966); Annot., 124 A.L.R. 364 (1940).
309. Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 232, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 571 (1963), is the only case the author's research has disclosed. Even
in that case not only did the court rely in part on a statute, but it also seemed
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removal absent common law fraud and of judicial appointment
of new directors are virtually nonexistent.3 10 Many state courts
have denied that equity empowers them to remove directors. 31 '
There is no precedent for such relief in other areas of administrative law, and no support for it in the legislative history of the
securities laws.
Restructuring corporate boards also contravenes the intention of Congress in several important respects. First, such relief intrudes improperly into corporate governance. Although
Congress intended the securities laws to affect corporate governance, it intended their influence to be indirect-a result of
disclosure and shareholder suffrage rather than of direct Commission regulation. 312 Directors participate in all major corporate business decisions; securities compliance occupies little of
their time. Restructuring corporate boards therefore necessarily involves both the SEC and the courts in the business policies of the affected corporation.
Second, restructuring corporate boards denies shareholder
suffrage, which was a key principle of the Exchange Act.313 Indeed, that is not only the effect of the Commission's activities
but also its purpose. The Commission appoints its own candidates to the board without a shareholder election, and sometimes even prevents shareholders by court decree from
removing or failing to reelect the SEC's board candidates for
several years. 31 4 Moreover, the shareholders' franchise is usually eliminated without any meaningful representation of
shareholders in the judicial proceeding. In theory, corporate
management represents shareholder interests. In practice, the
managers lose little by surrendering the shareholders'
franchise, and in so doing they may placate the SEC and avoid
that the plaintiff was enjoined from acting as a director because he had not
been duly elected, rather than being removed from a directorship. Id. at 231-32,
30 Cal. Rptr. at 570. There have been a few cases (though even these are rare)
removing a director pursuant to statute, but of course these cases provide no
authority for a general equitable power to remove directors. See, e.g., People v.
Lyon, 119 A.D. 361, 362, 104 N.Y.S. 319, 320 (1907) (proceeding by attorney general pursuant to statute); Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 148-49, 8 A.2d 46,
48 (1939) (director removed pursuant to statute; court stated that prior to statute it could not remove directors).
310. While the author's research has disclosed no such case, he is not prepared to state flatly that none exists.
311. See, e.g., Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 146, 149 (1860); In re Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570,
573-74, 136 N.E.2d 862, 865, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901-02 (1956).
312. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text; Comment, Tailor the Director,supra note 4, at 527-29.
314. See supra note 39, infra note 320 and accompanying text.
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litigation that might do the managers greater personal harm. 315
In theory, the SEC also represents shareholder interests. Its
approval of, and indeed its fond wish for, decrees eliminating
shareholder rights belies the theory. Although many commentators concede that the ideal of shareholder democracy is unattainable,3 16 the SEC cannot ignore shareholder suffrage to
pursue its own theories of corporate governance. Congress established the principle of shareholder suffrage, and if that principle is to be abandoned, Congress must do so.

Finally, as a corollary to the first two points, restructuring
corporate boards violates the intent of Congress that corporations, especially in their internal affairs, be governed by state
law except where clearly preempted by the federal securities
laws.3 17 State corporation laws provide that a corporation shall
be managed by a board of directors elected and subject to removal by the shareholders. 318 Directors owe shareholders
fiduciary duties which may be enforced by shareholder derivative suits or class actions. 31 9 Selection and removal of directors
by the SEC320 thus violates the principle of state control as
315. Farrand, supra note 4, at 1806 n.143, notes that the interests of the SEC
enforcement staff and of corporate insiders may coincide in favor of ancillary
relief, to the detriment of shareholders. The staff often prefers a quick consent
decree to protracted litigation because it saves time and can be categorized as a
victory. Corporate management may also prefer a quick settlement that minimizes adverse publicity and disruption and, more important, reduces or eliminates the danger that further investigation will result in a criminal indictment
against insiders. "Moreover, depending on their stock holdings and other factors, such insiders may feel little hesitation in giving away shareholder powers
and authorizing corporate expenditures of funds when negotiating with the
SEC on possible ancillary remedies." Id.
316. See, e.g., Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform 41
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 3, 14 (Summer 1977) (shareholders are economically
motivated and consequently are more likely to sell their shares if they become
disenchanted, rather than vote them). Some find this not only inevitable but
desirable. See Chayes, The Modern Corporationand the Rule of Law, in THE

CORPORATION IN MODERN SociETY 41 (Mason ed. 1959) (shareholders "deserve
the voiceless position in which the modern development left them").
317. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
has recognized this in Santa Fe and elsewhere. See supra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
318. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 299, at 140; H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 192, at 376 (2d ed. 1970).

319. H. HENN, supra note 318, §§ 231-42, at 450-83, §§ 358-76, at 749-94.
320. When directors are appointed by a court, shareholders lose their power
to elect directors. See supra notes 29, 36. Decrees also bar the shareholders
from removing court-appointed directors and, sometimes, from electing any additional directors. See Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 4, at 1205-06
(quoting final judgment in SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1973);
supra note 39. This disenfranchisement may last well beyond the usual one
year term for elected directors. In SEC v. Matte, Inc., the court appointed directors for five years. See supra text accompanying note 36. To accomplish its
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well as shareholder suffrage. Many decrees also violate the
principle of board management 32 1 and immunize the court-appointed directors from certain liabilities to shareholders under
state law. 322 In short, such relief violently displaces state law
in an area where Congress intended state law to prevail.
To permit the SEC and the district courts to restructure
corporate boards would set a precedent difficult to contain in
other important areas. First, if the SEC can restructure corporate boards through ancillary relief, why could it not do the
same by rule? The SEC has justified restructuring through ancillary relief by findings that such relief is necessary to ensure
compliance with the securities laws by a corporation that has
violated them. Suppose the SEC concluded that, in order to
raise securities compliance to an acceptable level, it should by
rule require that each public corporation have several overview
committees composed solely of outside directors and a board
with no insiders except the chief executive officer, who would
not be the board chairman. 323 Given the great deference courts
afford the factual underpinnings of agency rules, 324 such a rule
could not be attacked for lacking factual support. The only
other possible objections to such a rule would be that it intrudes improperly into corporate governance, denies shareholder suffrage, and interferes with state corporation laws-the
objectives the Commission may also have a corporation's by-laws amended
without the usual requisite vote of shareholders or directors. See supra note
32. This disenfranchisement could reduce the value of the corporation's shares.
See DeMott, Reweaving the Corporate Veil: Management Structure and the
Control of Corporate Information, 41 LAw & CoN'rEm. PROBS. 182, 190 n.44
(Summer 1977).
321. Ancillary relief decrees often divest the board of certain managerial
powers and vest those powers instead in a special counsel or special agent. See
supra notes 27, 28, 36. Many decrees have also limited the board's managerial
discretion by requiring the adoption of special procedures or forbidding the
corporation to act in ways not otherwise illegal, such as forbidding it to enter
new lines of business. See supra note 22.
322. See Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Appointment of Special Counsel and Directors [ 4(ii), SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y. March
16, 1973) (providing that court-appointed directors not be liable for errors of
judgment unless they were "grossly negligent").
323. Former SEC Chairman Harold Williams often advocated this board
structure. See Williams, Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power (Oct.
24, 1979) (speech in the Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Pa.).
324. Although a reviewing court may generally substitute its own judgment
for that of an administrative agency as to questions of law, as to questions of
fact a court may set aside agency action only if it is "arbitrary [or] capricious"
or "unsupported by substantial evidence." Administrative Procedure Act
§ 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
487-88 (1951); 4 K. DAviS, AmmiNSTm TrvE LAw TREATISE § 29.01, at 116-17 (1958).
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same arguments made against restructuring corporate boards
through ancillary relief. Indeed, the hypothetical rule is less
objectionable than restructuring through ancillary relief because the latter, unlike the former, often involves the SEC in
the actual selection of individual directors to the exclusion of
the shareholders. It probably would be generally conceded that
the SEC could not adopt such a rule. It follows that restructuring corporate boards through ancillary relief is also
inappropriate.
Second, if the SEC can restructure corporate boards so as
to obtain compliance with the securities laws, it is difficult to
see why many other federal administrative agencies cannot obtain similar relief to ensure compliance with the statutes they
oversee. Indeed, many have a stronger claim than the SEC
that Congress did intend them to regulate the internal governance of regulated companies. Yet, to grant such relief regularly
to other agencies would depart radically from tradition in administrative law.325 Although this tradition might be ascribed
to agency timidity, the more plausible explanation is that other
agencies recognize that if Congress had intended them to have
such power, it would have said so explicitly.
A final reason for rejecting the restructuring of corporate
boards as ancillary relief is that other remedies can equally or
more effectively ensure compliance with the securities laws.
For purposes of deterring future violations, the impact of an injunction is substantial. 32 6 An injunction against a corporate defendant also binds its directors and officers. 327 If an injunction
is not enough, the Commission may resort to its many other express remedies, such as suspending trading, suspending a 1934
Act registration statement, issuing public statements, or referring the case for criminal prosecution.3 28 It is doubtful whether
removing directors, appointing Commission-approved directors,
requiring board majorities of outside directors, or imposing various overview committees dominated by outside directors no325. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
327. 10 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 4875, at 339 (rev. perm. ed. 1978). FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) makes an injunction
binding "upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys .

. . ."

See generally 7-2 J. MOORE, supra note 59,

65.13

(discussing persons bound by injunctions and restraining orders under rule
65(d)).
328. See supra notes 150, 156-60 and accompanying text. Against securities
professionals the SEC has further remedies. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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ticeably will improve a corporation's compliance with the
securities laws. There is little empirical evidence that outside
directors or overview committees improve board performance
generally, and no evidence that they improve compliance with
securities laws.3 29
Even theoretical discussions question
3 30
whether these conditions can improve corporate governance.
Indeed, some believe that inside boards perform better than
outside boards.331 Corporate boards often lack effective control
over corporate disclosure, 332 so it is questionable whether restructuring the board improves disclosure. In sum, the Commission has potent express remedies for compelling corporate
securities compliance, and there is little inductive or empirical
basis for believing that restructuring corporate boards improves compliance with securities laws or corporate governance generally.
If ancillary remedies are necessary to ensure future compliance, remedies short of restructuring the board may be appropriate. For example, in many cases the SEC has obtained
the appointment of a corporate officer with special duties and
powers relating to disclosure or the imposition of special procedures that, while not otherwise required by law, will help promote full disclosure. 333 Because the special agent or special
329. See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 616-22 (there is little evidence that outside directors improve management integrity), 635 (there is little evidence that outside
directors improve management efficiency) (1982); DeMott, supra note 320, at
220-21; Solomon, Restructuringthe Corporate Board of Directors: Fond HopeFaintPromise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581, 588-89, 610 (1978).
330. See Brudney, supra note 329, at 607-16, 632-34; Dent, The Revolution in
Corporate Governance, The Monitoring Board,and the Director'sDuty of Care,
61 B.U.L. REv. 623, 663-81 (1981). It has also been questioned whether directors
appointed by the courts and the SEC will have the necessary profit motive. See
Wolfson, Needed: Statutory Reform to Improve Consent Decree Process, 57
HARv. Bus. REV. (Mar.-Apr. 1979).
331. See S. VANCE, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR 5 (1968); S. VANCE, BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 5 (1964); Schmidt, Does Board Composition Really Make a Difference?, 12 CoNF. BD. REC. 38 (Oct. 1975). But see I.
KooNTz, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFEcTIvE MANAGEMENT 129-32 (1967)
(identifying advantages of outside directors).
332. Since outside directors do not conduct corporate operations and lack
the staff to monitor operations, they have only the information management
gives them. The outsiders cannot disclose what they do not know, and the recent series of improper payments scandals demonstrated that often outsiders
were kept ignorant of the payments. See Coffee, supra note 242, at 1127-29,
1264-65. Moreover, even where the board does have information, disclosure
documents are drafted under the direction of management, and the outside directors usually see the documents only after they have been released. Thus,
management controls not only the substance but also the form of disclosure.
333. See cases cited supra note 28.
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procedure deals specifically with disclosure, it can be more effective than placing SEC nominees or other outside directors
on the board.334 Often, disclosure violations cannot be traced
to specific corporate officers, so that only the corporation itself
can be punished. This remains true even if the corporation is
subject to an injunction or has a board restructured through
ancillary relief. But a court may reasonably refuse to impose
on a corporation a heavy fine that will ultimately injure the
shareholders-the very persons the securities laws were intended to protect. By focusing the obligation of disclosure on
certain persons, special agents or procedures can make an injunction more effective.
Is the imposition of special agents and procedures an appropriate remedy under the federal securities laws? There is
very little precedent for such remedies in the history of equity
or in other areas of administrative law3 3 5 and no direct support
for them in the legislative history. As just noted, however, they
do promote the purposes of the federal securities laws. Moreover, they do not interfere with corporate governance, with
shareholder suffrage, or with state law to the same extent as
the restructuring of corporate boards. Although imposition of
special agents or procedures does usurp the board's managerial
prerogatives, the usurpation is slight and is limited to the legitimate scope of the securities laws. Moreover, it does not violate
shareholder suffrage and the fiduciary duties and liabilities of
directors to shareholders. Accordingly, these ancillary remedies should be permitted. Nevertheless, because they do intrude somewhat into corporate governance, impose on the
corporation burdens heavier than the law otherwise demands,
and have not traditionally been granted, a court should award
these remedies only in unusual cases where it is persuaded
that an injunction alone will not assure compliance. If additional disclosure burdens are to be imposed routinely on issuers, they should be imposed by statute or by SEC rules
promulgated pursuant to statutory authority.
A last ancillary remedy affecting future corporate behavior
is the appointment of special counsel to investigate past securities law offenses and to sue thereon on behalf of the corporaArguably, this practice is necessary to effective
tion.
334. The latter approach is unlikely to be effective because directors, especially outside directors, usually do not control corporate disclosure. See supra
note 332.
335. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of the securities laws because the Commission is
understaffed. 336 Although there is almost no precedent for
such relief in equity or other areas of administrative law33 7 and
no support for it in the legislative history, it does promote enforcement of the securities laws.338 One might argue either
that in setting the Commission's budget Congress has deliberately limited its enforcement activities or that the SEC has not
efficiently deployed its enforcement resources. 339 There are
many reasons for limiting an agency's budget, however, and it
seems unlikely that Congress intends by its budgets to permit
many securities law violations to go unpunished. Further, the
Commission's resources, even if more efficiently utilized, would
not suffice to pursue all serious securities law violations.
Appointment of special counsel raises two problems, however. First, a corporate decision whether to sue involves the
exercise of business judgment not only as to the prospects of
success but also as to the impact of the suit on the corporation.
Often a corporation reasonably decides that it does not serve
its interests to press a claim that is probably meritorious. 340
When a court appoints a special counsel, usually with instructions not to abandon or to compromise any claim without the
SEC's consent, the board loses its power under state law to decide whether to sue.
336. The SEC often complains that it is understaffed. See S.E.C. Warns on
Budget Cu4 N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1981, at Dl, col. 6 (in response to proposed
budget cuts, Chairman Shad "complained that the agency was already thinly
staffed' ..... "). Commentators have often cited staff limitations as a reason
the Commission settles so many cases. See Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions-Il, 5 REV. SEc. REG. 949, 955 (1972); Wolfson, supra note 330, at 19; Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 4, at 1192. Appointment of special
counsel is especially attractive to the SEC in this regard because it permits investigation and perhaps litigation to continue without using staff resources.
Note, however, that the Commission's staff shortage is not reason enough to
justify an implied remedy. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977).
337. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
338. A priori, any additional amount of enforcement should help deter future violations. Given that the SEC staff is fully occupied, private suits provide
additional enforcement. Given the general behavior of insiders when fellow insiders are accused of wrongdoing, see Brudney, supra note 329, at 611-13, 616-22,
private suits prosecuted by disinterested outside counsel approved by the SEC
are probably more effective than suits brought by regular corporate counsel
controlled by the board and management. See Coffee, supra note 77, at 455.
339. It has been suggested that the SEC makes poor use of its resources.
See H. Karatx, supra note 140, at 51.
340. Courts have upheld the refusal of corporate boards to sue and their decision to oppose derivative suits on the corporation's behalf for reasons other
than the merits. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Falkenberg v.
Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
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Second, court appointment of special counsel to pursue securities law violations involves a questionable delegation or, as
Professor Kripke has phrased it, "franchising" 341 of the Commission's enforcement powers. That no other federal agency or
department engages in this practice in itself counsels caution.
More fundamentally, powers conferred by Congress on a government agency are subject to democratic control, including
presidential veto and the congressional budgetary process. Appointment of special counsel to be paid by a corporation evades
these controls. Not only does the SEC delegate its own authority but the judiciary arrogates legislative prerogatives by cooperating in this delegation. 3 42 Even if the constitutional
principle of the separation of powers does not absolutely forbid
such appointments, certainly courts should not impose such
appointments on an unwilling corporation absent clear congressional authorization.3 43
4. Receiverships
The Commission has argued that, because it can obtain a
receiver, a fortiori it can obtain the less drastic remedy of the
removal or appointment of directors. 344 Although this Article
has rejected the court-imposed restructuring of corporate
boards, it does not necessarily follow that a court may not appoint receivers. A receivership is traditionally granted only in
extreme circumstances and is not a more drastic remedy than
the restructuring of a corporate board because of the limited
functions of a receiver.
Although the receivership is a traditional equitable remedy, equity has strictly limited the conditions in which a receiver would be appointed. First, the plaintiff must show
341. This term has been used by Professor Kripke in his seminar on securities law at New York University School of Law. Such delegation is probably
not unconstitutional, but it does run counter to the spirit of the constitutional
doctrine of the separation of powers. See infra notes 400-01.
342. Court approval is crucial. Without it the SEC would have only an
agreement of the corporation. The SEC's only remedy for breach of this agreement might be reinstitution of the original suit, which may already have grown

stale.
343. The corporation's consent may necessitate different conclusions. See
infra note 379 and accompanying text.
344. See Sporkin, supra note 4, at 123; Comment, Court Appointed Directors,
supra note 4, at 741. Cf. Brief for the Appellee at 23, SEC v. Beisinger Indus.
Corp., 552 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1977) ("the circumstances warranting the appointment of [a special] agent need not be as serious as might be required for the
appointment of a receiver"). But see Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra
note 4, at 1210-12. For securities cases granting receivers, see supra note 21.
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preliminarily some existing legal right "amounting to more
than a mere claim" to assets held by the defendant.3 4 , Second,
there must be serious danger of waste or dissipation of these
assets before final disposition of the case. 34 6 Third, there must
34 7
be no lesser remedy adequate to protect the plaintiff's claim.
In general, a receivership is to be granted only in extreme circumstances because a receivership deprives the defendant of
48
property before a final judgment.
Even more important than the conditions to the appointment of a receiver are the traditional limitations on the functions of a receiver that flow from two principles. First,
receivership is only a provisional, subsidiary remedy to prevent
the dissipation of assets before a final judgment can be entered,
34 9
a final remedy granted, and assets distributed accordingly.
Second, a receiver is an officer of the court.3 50 The court in ef345. Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 825 (3d Cir. 1959). See
Kelleam v. Maryland Cas. Co., 312 U.S. 377, 380-82 (1941); 1 R. CLARK, THE LAW
OF RECEIVERS §§ 49, 190 (3d ed. 1959); 3 id., §§ 732.2, 732.3; 16 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 7687, at 78 (rev. perm. ed. 1979); 7-2
J. MOORE, supra note 59, 66.05[1], at 1920.1. Indeed, some older cases suggest
that those claiming property as creditors must first show that they have no adequate remedy at law by obtaining a judgment, securing a writ of execution, and
perhaps even having the writ returned unsatisfied. Id. at 1920.4 -.26. The existence of fraud is not by itself sufficient. 1 R. CLARK,supra, § 181.
346. See 3 R. CLARK,supra note 345, §§ 732.2, 732.3; 7-2 J.MOORE, supra note
59, 66.05[1], at 1920.1. Although the older cases often insisted on the defendant's insolvency as a condition to a receivership, most securities cases have
dropped this requirement. See SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 1970);
SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Heritage Trust Co.,
402 F. Supp. 744, 753 (D. Ariz. 1975). But see Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1959) (appointment of receiver
reversed in part for want of proof of insolvency). Insolvency may be relevant to
whether a receiver is needed. 1 R. CLARY, supra note 345, § 182, at 265.
347. See 1 R. CLARK, supra note 345, § 59; 3 id., §§ 744, 784- 16 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 345, §§ 7708, 7727, 7729.
348. See SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 1970); 1 R. CLARK, supra
note 345, §§ 49, 54; 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 345, § 7697; 7-2 J. MOORE, supra
note 59, 66.05[1] at 1920.2; 12 C. WRIGHT & J.MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2983 (1973). In several reported securities cases courts have denied requests for a receiver. See SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F.
Supp. 1288, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 378 F.
Supp. 430, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In general, corporate mismanagement is not a
ground for appointment of a receiver. 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 345, § 7714, at
161.
349. See Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 37 (1935); 1 R. CLARK, supra
note 345, §§ 12-14, 17, 46, 51; 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 345, § 7683; 7-2 J. MOORE,
supra note 59, 66.03, at 1907-08. Similarly, a receivership is never an end in
itself, but only a means to reach some legitimate end of equity: "a federal court
of equity should not appoint a receiver where the appointment is not a remedy
auxiliary to some primary relief which is sought and which equity may appropriately grant." Kelleam v. Maryland Cas. Co., 312 U.S. 377, 381 (1941).
350. See SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass'n, 557 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1977); 4 J. POME-
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fect impounds assets subjected to a receivership, and since the
judge (or chancellor) cannot personally manage these assets
the court appoints someone-the receiver-to do so. Accordingly, the receiver is customarily limited to preserving the sta35 2
tus quo pendente lite,35 ' preventing the dissipation of assets,
353
conducting investigations,
collecting assets and paying
claims, 354 and winding up the business.3 55 To preserve the defendant's property, the receiver may be required to continue
the defendant's business temporarily, 35 6 but a receivership is
never a final remedy and should not continue longer than necessary to decide the case and distribute the defendant's prop35 7
erty as ordered by the court.
The SEC never satisfies the traditional conditions for a receivership because it never has an interest in or even a claim to
property of a defendant. Even if the Commission can be
viewed as standing in the shoes of investors, rarely would it be
ROY, supra note 5, § 1330, at 923 (a receiver is "a quasi officer or representative
of the court").
351. See Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181
(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); 1 R. CLARK, supra note 345,
§§ 12-14; 7-2 J. MOORE, supra note 59, 66.03, at 1907.
352. See SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v.
Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1970); SEC v. M1S. Simmons & Co., 190 F.
Supp. 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 1 R. CLARK, supra note 345, § 48; 16 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 345, §§ 7665, 7725, 7813. The purpose of preserving assets is to prevent the defeating of the jurisdiction of the court. 1 I. CLARY, supra note 345,

§ 51.

353. See SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
354. SEC v. Western Pacific Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 95,064, at 97,734-36 (D. Nev. 1975). See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 285, 287-88 (1940); 1 R. CLARK,
supra note 345, § 27.
355. See Esbitt v. Dutch-American Merc. Corp., 335 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir.
1964) (receivership should not continue longer than necessary to get estate into
bankruptcy); 2 R. CLARK, supra note 345, § 396 (receivership should not continue longer than necessary to wind up business or return it to original owner).
356. See, e.g., SEC v. RJ. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 878-79 (S.D.
Fla. 1974) (setting forth duties of receiver). See 7-2 J. MOORE, supra note 59,
66.03, at 1908; 2 R. CLARK, upra note 345, § 396, at 672 ("the only justification
for a court making an order to a receiver to continue the business of a private
corporation is to preserve ... money, funds or property by so doing").
357. "The court should not use a receivership to continue indefinitely an enterprise that does not show evident signs of working out for the benefit of creditors." 7-2 J. MOORE, supra note 59, 66.04[71 (citing Jones v. Village of
Proctorville, 332 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1964)). See 1 R. CLARK, supra note 345, §§ 26,
54, 166; id., § 51, at 55 ('The purpose of the appointment of a receiver after judgment is to satisfy the judgment in one way or another."); 2 id., § 396, at 673
("Ordinarily a business should not be continued any longer than is necessary
to properly advertise and dispose of it as a going concern, or restore it to the
original owner."); 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 345, § 7705.
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entitled to a receiver. 358 Nonetheless, courts have occasionally
granted the SEC a receiver without discussing whether the
traditional conditions have been met, 359 and it is not always
clear that they have restricted receivers to their traditional
360
functions.
Should the courts ever appoint a receiver in a federal securities case? Although a receiver, by taking complete control
of a corporation, necessarily supplants corporate management
and eliminates shareholder suffrage, the remedy is justified
when the traditions of equity are observed. Since the receivership is only temporary, the interference with corporate governance and shareholder suffrage is limited. Because the
traditions of equity are generally consistent with state law, appointment of a receiver should not interfere unduly with state
law. Since the receivership is a traditional equitable remedy,
Congress may have contemplated that it would be used in securities law. Most important, the receivership, if granted only
in compelling circumstances, promotes the purposes of the securities laws. Those statutes were enacted to protect investors,
and a receivership protects investors when there is danger of
dissipation of assets to which they have a right and no lesser
remedy will suffice.
Should a court ever appoint a receiver where the customary conditions are not met? If a receiver is unnecessary to prevent dissipation of assets to which investors have a right or if a
lesser remedy will suffice, then the remedy should be unnecessary to promote the purposes of the securities laws. It is diffi358. For example, rarely would an investor have an existing right "amounting to more than a mere claim" in assets held by the defendant. See supra note
345 and accompanying text. See also Farrand, supra note 4, at 1788 (SEC often
fails to meet traditional criteria for receivership).
359. In SEC v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp. 744 (D. Ariz. 1975), the court
granted an injunction but denied a receiver, in part because the corporation
was solvent and meeting its obligations. Id. at 751. On the SEC's motion for
clarification, a receiver was appointed. Id. at 752-54. The SEC showed further
false and misleading statements, but the court made no findings as to, and did
not even refer to, any new evidence of waste or dissipation of assets.
360. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1340 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (interim board appointed in lieu of receiver
given full power to conduct corporate business). In SEC v. Heritage Trust Co.,
402 F. Supp. 744, 754 (D. Ariz. 1975), the court ordered the SEC to "submit... a
proposed form of order for appointment of a receiver." This seems a bit
strange because a receivership is only ancillary to some other primary remedy,
see supra text accompanying note 349. That the court asked the plaintiff to propose a "form of order for appointment of a receiver" suggests that it may not
have understood the purpose for and nature of the receivership. See Farrand,
supra note 4, at 1787 & n. 53.
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cult to imagine a threat short of dissipation of assets claimed
by investors for which a receiver would be necessary. Congress cannot have contemplated such use of the receivership.
Absent the customary conditions to and limitations on a receivership, all the objections to the restructuring of corporate
boards would apply even more strongly to the receivership.
Since restructuring is inappropriate, it follows a fortiori that,
absent the customary conditions and limitations, a receivership
would be inappropriate as well.
On occasion the receivership has been used to bring a corporation into compliance with the law.36 ' This practice could
invite abuse not only by enabling a court to displace corporate
management with a receiver but also by providing the court a
lever with which to extract corporate governance changes. For
example, a court might be tempted to appoint (or to threaten to
appoint) a receiver unless or until the corporation could show
it would obey the securities laws. If the corporation knew or
assumed that restructuring the corporate board was a condition
to such a showing, the net result would be a restructuring of
the board which the court could not order directly. Even assuming equity permits using a receivership to induce compliance, other less intrusive remedies should almost invariably
suffice. Thus, if a corporation has failed to file certain financial
reports properly, a special officer could be appointed with powers to compile and to file the reports without the managerial
displacement that a receivership entails. This also comports
with equity's command that a receiver not be appointed if a
lesser remedy will suffice.
Can the restructuring of a corporate board also be such a
lesser remedy? Since a receivership is a provisional remedy,
any change would have to be temporary. Officers or directors
appointed would be officers of the court who would need periodic court approval of past and future actions. Although they
might continue the business, they could not, as court officers,
substantially revise the business or undertake new ventures.
Nonetheless, the drawbacks of a receivership to the sharehold361. See SEC v. S & P Nat'1 Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 750-51 (2d Cir. 1966) (Investment Company Act case; one purpose of receiver was to bring defendant into
compliance with the law). See also SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972)
(limited receiver appointed to take certain actions necessary under the securities laws); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181
(9th Cir. 1960), cert denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961) (receiver appointed "until such

time as the appellants can comply with the law").
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ers,362

the intended benefactors, spur the search for alternatives when the incumbent board threatens to injure investors
and appointment of a special disclosure officer or the like will
not avert the danger. To tolerate board restructuring in such
cases might create a loophole that could be abused if courts did
not adhere carefully to the conditions and limitations of the receivership. If the court observes these conditions and limitations, however, and makes the findings necessary for the
appointment of a receiver and clearly states that restructuring
is being ordered as a more palatable substitute for a receivership, restructuring should be permitted, at least until experience shows that this option is being abused. The law does not
bar the SEC or the courts from calling a receiver by another
name so long as they do not violate the conditions and limitations of the receivership. 363
Another issue is whether a court should vest a receiver
with functions broader than those customary in equity. The
traditional role of the receiver was tailored to the purpose of
the receivership-to preserve assets pending litigation. To expand this role would require some new justification sufficiently
compelling to overcome both the history of equity and congressional opposition to SEC interference with corporate governance and state corporation laws 364 and to denial of shareholder

suffrage. No such justification exists, however.
In sum, when the SEC satisfies the customary requirements,365 it should be able to obtain a receiver (however
named) with the customary limited functions, and not
otherwise.
C.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSENT

The vast majority of court orders granting ancillary relief in
securities law, especially those affecting internal corporate af362. Appointment of a receiver may trigger the acceleration of the obligation to pay corporate debt, thereby precipitating a financial crisis, possibly insolvency, for the corporation. See Sporkin, supra note 4, at 123.
363. See Braasch v. Muscat, [1967-69 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 92,148, at 96,677 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 398 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1968)
(court appointed "special fiscal agent" to preserve assets).
364. So long as federal courts observe the traditional limitations of receivers, they are not unduly interfering with state law, which also generally observes these limitations. To expand these functions, however, involves
supplanting a management selected under state law in a way inconsistent with
state law.
365. Of course, investors rather than the SEC itself would have to have a
claim to the defendant's assets. See supra text accompanying notes 345, 358.
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fairs, have resulted not from contested proceedings but from
consent decrees. 366 Even if the preceding analysis is correct in
concluding that the securities laws do not authorize certain ancillary remedies, especially those intruding on corporate governance, one might argue that the defendant's consent
constitutes a knowing waiver that cures the defect. A few cases
have adopted this rationale when the defendant or a third party
367
has attacked a consent decree.
A consent decree is not merely a settlement between the
defendant and the plaintiff; rather it is a court order with all the
ramifications of an order issued after a contested proceeding. 368
Accordingly, before entering a consent decree, a court should
exercise no less care than in a contested proceeding to ensure
that the decree precisely fits the needs of the specific case.3 69 A
court is ill-equipped, though, to scrutinize a proposed consent
366. Although the portion of ancillary relief cases that are settled has not
been calculated, there is no reason to think that it is any less than the portion
of all SEC cases that are settled. The latter has been estimated at about 90%.
Interview with SEC Commissioner Irving Pollack, 484 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) AA-1, AA-4 (Jan. 3, 1979). See also 41 S.E.C. ANN.REP. 95, 98 (1975) (settlement as disposition of a case). No court has restructured a corporate board
in a contested case. See supra note 29.
367. See Handier v. SEC, 610 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1979); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1351-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932
(1974). Outside the securities field, too, third-party attacks on consent decrees
have been unsuccessful. See McAleer v. American Tel. & TeL Co., 416 F. Supp.
435, 438 (D.D.C. 1976); Construction Indus. Combined Comm. v. International
Union of Operat. Eng'rs, 67 F.R.D. 664, 665 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
368. See SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 (D. Colo.
1970), aff'd, 464 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973). Granting a consent decree is a judicial function. SEC v. Dennett, 429 F.2d 1303, 1304
(10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
369. In considering a proposed consent decree the court should not be a
"rubber stamp," United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.RD. 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
but must determine whether the proposed decree is consistent with law and
equity, United States v. International TeL & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 25 n.2
(D. Conn. 1972), affd sub no=. Nader v. United States, 410 U.S. 919 (1973); Boyd
v. United States 345 F. Supp. 790, 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (C.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Carter
Prods., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), and consistent with the public
interest and the interests of third parties, United States v. Carrols Dev. Corp.,
454 F. Supp. 1215, 1222 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. at
792-93; United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. at 621, United
States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 211 F. Supp. at 147-48. Indeed, in some cases courts
have refused to enter consent decrees without first modifying them. Orth v.
Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938, 945 (3d Cir. 1942) (court refused to appoint receiver provided in consent decree); United States v. American Tel.& TeL Corp.,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (court substantially revised terms of consent decree in antitrust case); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp.
1301, 1308-10 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (consent decree adopted on condition of undertaking by parties to protect employee benefit and pension funds).
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decree and to discover and weigh objections to the relief it provides. 370 Once the parties have closed ranks, the judge in an
adversarial system cannot independently investigate the facts
and probe any weaknesses in the parties' arguments.
The judge's difficulty in regulating consent decrees prior to
entry magnifies the importance of determining when a consent
decree can later be modified or terminated. The defendant or a
third party may attack a consent decree because the decree
either was improper when issued or has become improper
through changed circumstances. Most courts balk at modifying
or terminating consent decrees, especially for claims of initial
impropriety. To obtain relief in the latter case one must show
that the original decree was procured by fraud or without actual consent, or that the court lacked subject matter
371
jurisdiction.
There are good reasons to reconsider this position, at least
as to consent decrees granting ancillary relief in securities
cases. First, not too much should be made of the defendant's
consent. Although wealthy defendants may even enjoy an advantage over the SEC's understaffed and sometimes inexperienced enforcement division, the SEC usually possesses
370. See United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (recognizing that "the court's time, talents and resources for intensive scrutiny are
severely limited"). A similar situation is presented in the settlement of shareholder's derivative suits, which must be approved by the court under the Federal Rules and the rules of most states. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra
note 299, at 975. The problems were noted in Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d
327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting) ("Once a settlement is agreed,
the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms with their former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork ....
The stockholders' true representative
was the court, which was allowed to proceed in ignorance of vital information."), affd en banc by an equally divided cour 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 381 U.S. 933 (1965), dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
371. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 325-32 (1928) (lack of factual support and errors of law held not grounds for overturning consent decree,
but "want of power to decide" and perhaps vagueness would be); V.T., Inc. v.
Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 226 (10th Cir. 1979) (private proceeding); Walling v.
Miller, 138 F.2d 629, 632-33 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 784 (1944) (district court's lack of power to grant restitution in suit by federal agency (as opposed to suit by employees) did not support collateral attack on consent
decree). Cf. NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 323 (1961) (court
could not modify decree as consented to when statute expressly prohibited
such modification).
Under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) a court may modify or vacate a final judgment
on several grounds, including when "the judgment is void;" "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;" or "any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." As suggested by
the cases cited above, provision for relief that could not be awarded in a contested proceeding is not generally considered an adequate ground for relief
under rule 60(b).
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substantial leverage-some have said "overwhelming leverage" 372-- because of the great time, cost, and effort required of
defendants to contest such proceedings, the damage from publicity over lengthy enforcement proceedings, 373 the possible col374
and
lateral estoppel effect of an adverse contested judgment,
fear that the Commission will argue that failure to consent signifies incorrigibility.3 7 5 Defendants may accede to a quick consent decree, often filed with the SEC's complaint, even though
they genuinely believe either that they have not violated the
law or that the SEC is not entitled to the relief to which they
pressures
have consented. Some believe that the Commission
376
attorneys to persuade their clients to consent.
Second, and more important, SEC enforcement proceedings, like the entire operation of the federal securities laws, affect the public interest. A consent decree may affect many
persons other than the parties, especially corporate sharehold377
In
ers, whom the securities laws were intended to protect.
negotiating a consent decree with the SEC, corporate management, which may have caused the securities law violation, may
willingly sacrifice the corporation's and the shareholders' interests to the SEC's desires to regulate corporate governance so
as to avoid more serious personal liability.37 8 Thus the courts.
must protect others against inappropriate relief, perhaps assisted occasionally by a disgruntled shareholder. In most
cases, however, the court will be on its own, and in light of the
difficulties of judicial scrutiny of consent decrees, courts should
rely on rather broad, bright-line rules in choosing ancillary
remedies. Accordingly, courts simply should not grant relief
they could not grant in a contested case, despite the defend372. Coffee, supra note 242, at 1252; Kripke, supra note 158, at 194.
373. Freedman & Sporkin, supra note 277, at 784-85 (comments of Professor
Freedman). See also Kripke, supra note 158, at 189-90, 194-98, and authorities
cited at 194 n.95.
374. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (defend-

ant in a civil damage action is collaterally estopped to relitigate issues of fact
previously decided adversely to it in an SEC injunctive action).

375. The Commission often argues that by denying wrongdoing a defendant
demonstrates a likelihood of future violations. See H. KRnpKE, supra note 140,
at 50.
376. See id. at 22-23.
377. Corporate shareholders are most obviously affected by the removal and
appointment of directors or the appointment of a receiver without their consent, but they are also affected, as owners of the corporation, by remedies that
affect the corporation only financially, such as rescission, disgorgement, and

restitution. As to the purpose of the securities laws to protect investors, see
supra notes 173, 181 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 315.
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ant's consent. For the same reasons, a court should be willing
to rescind a prior consent decree containing relief that the SEC
was not entitled to obtain.
The reluctance to grant relief based on the defendant's consent should not apply equally to the appointment of special
counsel to investigate and to sue on behalf of the corporation
for violations of the securities laws. 379 The objections to granting this relief in contested cases differ from the objections to
other remedies. Most objections to the special counsel remedy
do not apply when the defendant consents to it. The decision
to consent to the appointment of the special counsel is itself a
business judgment. Corporations are generally free to litigate
wrongs committed against them, and when a corporation
agrees to do so in a consent decree there is no substantial usurpation of congressional authority to confer enforcement powers
on governmental agencies.
VI. THE ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND A
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
Both because of the confusion that currently surrounds the
issue of the propriety of ancillary relief in federal securities law
and because Congress may soon reexamine the federal securities laws in connection with the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code, it is appropriate to examine the Code's
treatment of ancillary relief.
Section 1819(l) of the proposed Code provides:
ANCInLARY RELIEF-In a civil action created by or based on a violation
of this Code, whether or not brought by the Commission, the court has
the authority of a court of equity to grant appropriate ancillary or other
relief, including an injunction, an accounting, a receivership of the defendant or the defendant's assets, disgorgement of profits, and
380
restitution.

Comment (1) to this section states that "[e]xcept for.., the
extension of the ancillary relief concept to actions traditionally
at law, this codifies the case law."3 81
The drafters of the Code, particularly its reporter, Professor Louis Loss, deserve praise for addressing ancillary relief directly in the statute rather than leaving the courts to handle
the issue on the basis of a mass of complex and often conflicting considerations. The Code leaves open many questions,
379. See supra notes 336-43 and accompanying text.
380. 2 ALI FED. SECS. CODE 929 (1980).
381. Id.
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however, primarily because of ambiguities in section 1819(l)
and its comments.
A principal question is whether the Code approves such
ancillary remedies as the removal or appointment of directors
and the appointment of special counsel. These remedies are
not specifically listed in section 1819(l). Comment (1) states
that this section "codifies the case law," but as this Article has
pointed out the case law is now unclear on many remedies, especially in contested cases. The provision confers on federal
courts "the authority of a court of equity" to grant ancillary relief. This might be deemed to reject remedies not traditionally
granted by equity, such as the restructuring of a corporate
board. Section 1819(l) authorizes "appropriate ancillary or
other relief," however, without excluding remedies that affect
corporate governance. Comment (2) states not only that the
"enumerated types of relief are not exclusive" but also that
there is precedent for, inter alia, appointing a special counsel.382 Moreover, prior commentators have usually concluded
that courts may grant such relief. Accordingly, this section
could also be deemed to authorize such remedies if the court
believes them "appropriate" in a given case.
Section 1819(1) also leaves open a host of related questions.
Does the Code limit remedies to those narrowly constructed to
ensure full disclosure, or may broader remedies be granted?
To what extent must a court,, when shaping remedies, avoid interference with shareholder suffrage or state corporation laws?
Of what significance is the defendant's consent? Must the SEC
or a private plaintiff establish the traditional requirements of
equity for the appointment of a receiver?
Although section 1819(l) and its comments do not resolve
these questions, other provisions and comments do suggest
some answers. The Code retains the disclosure orientation of
the current law. In general, the purposes of the Code are to
simplify, to eliminate duplicative regulation and to improve the
scheme of investor protection "with the least possible interference to honest business." 383 Substantive changes have been
382.

Id. at 929-30.

383. 1 id. at xix, Reporter's Introduction (quoting President Roosevelt's
message to Congress proposing the Securities Act of 1933, see supra note 181
and accompanying text). See also 1 ALI FED. SECS. CODE §§ 101 (setting forth
the legislative findings of the need for the Code), 101(7) (stating that 'this
Code is essential ... (B) to further the public interest and the protection of
investors... without unnecessary regulation or undue interference with honest business . .

").

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:865

limited to technical matters. 384
Accordingly, nothing in the Code authorizes the SEC to
regulate corporate governance directly. Certain provisions
dealing with fraud are unnecessarily vague on this point. The
Code's definition of "fraudulent act" is tautological, 385 but does
state that "[t]he existence of a fraudulent act is not precluded
by the fact that it constitutes company mismanagement." 38 6
The comments to the Code as adopted by the ALI state cryptically that "[t]he words 'deceptive' and 'deceit' are deleted be387
cause they add nothing to 'fraudulent' and 'fraud'."
Apparently the drafters understood that deception is a necessary element of fraud, as it was traditionally, although some
courts seemed to abandon that requirement under the securities laws prior to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.388 The
Code's comments to both the definition of "fraudulent act" and
the provision for civil liability for fraud state that they follow
Santa Fe, which holds that mere unfairness in corporate management or even in securities transactions is not actionable
9
under the Code.38
After discussions with the SEC, the Code's Reporter and a
task force agreed to several changes, including an amendment
of the definition of "fraudulent act" to cover deceit as well as
fraud.390 The amendment only makes clear that the Code is no
narrower than existing law, however, and does not extend the
Code's coverage to mere mismanagement or unfairness not involving deception. 391 Section 1819(a) (3) of the Code provides
that in enforcement actions by the Commission, "fraudulent
384. The Reporter stated that "[s]o far as substantive change is concerned,
[the Code is limited] to what might loosely be called 'lawyer's law,"' such as
burdens of proof and measures of damages, and has avoided larger issues,
which are '"political questions." 1 ALI FED. SECS. CODE at xxiv-xxv, Reporter's
Introduction.
385. The Code provides that "'[fjraudulent act' includes an act, device,
scheme, practice, or course of conduct that (i) is fraudulent or deceptive, or
(ii) operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit." Id. § 202(61) (A) (Supp. I
at 8).
386. Id. § 202(61)(E).
387. Id. § 202(61), comment 1(c).
388. Santa Fe held that a rule lOb-5 action requires an allegation of manipulation or deception. 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). See supra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
389. 1 ALI FED. SEcS. CODE § 202(61), comment 1(d) (1980); 2 id. § 1603,
comments 2(y), 3(b).
390. 1 Id. § 202(61) (A) (Supp. I at 8).
391. The comment to the amendment states that it is intended "in order to
avoid any argument of loss of coverage as compared with provisions like," inter
alia, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id. § 202(61) (A) (Supp. I at 9), comment.
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act" includes an act "that is likely to defraud or deceive. ' 392
The purpose here seems to be the same as that of the amendment of the definition of fraudulent act. Thus the Code retains
the securities laws' present insistence on deception as an element of fraud. The Code also imposes certain liabilities on
fiduciaries, expressly including directors, but only for fraud,
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. 3 93 Breach of fiduciary duty alone
does not violate the Code.
The Code codifies the holding of Santa Fe with respect to
the residual power of state law. It provides that, with certain
exceptions not here relevant, nothing in the Code "affects the

application of State law

.

.

...394

This provision, combined

with the limitation of the Code to regulation of disclosure,
should keep courts wary of interpreting the Code, including the
provision for ancillary relief, to interfere with state law.
The Code confers broad rulemaking powers on the Commission, but these powers must be exercised consistently with
the purposes, conditions and restrictions of the Code. 395 It expressly denies the SEC power to "prescribe the qualifications
of directors." 396 Because of the restrictions on the scope of the
Code prescribed above, the SEC's rulemaking powers do not
enable it to intrude directly on corporate governance.
The Code's express remedies demonstrate further that section 1819(l) does not authorize the restructuring of corporate
boards as ancillary relief. In addition to retaining the Commission's power to seek injunctions, compliance orders and stop
orders, to suspend trading, and to refer matters for criminal
392. 2 id. § 1819(a) (3) (B).
393. Id. § 1709(a). Comment (6) (b) states that "1709(a) is entirely consistent with the decision not to overrule Santa Fe ... . That is to say, the Code
does not cross the line from fraud' to 'unfairness'. ..."
394. Id. § 1904(j)(1). Comment 16(b) to this section states that "Whether
there is a 'conflict' will be decided by the courts" (emphasis in original), not by
the Commission. Id at 979, comment 16. Thus the SEC cannot by itself preempt state laws that would prevent the SEC from appointing or removing directors without shareholder action.
395. Id. §§ 1614; 1804(b).
396. Id. § 1805(g). This section negates any power of the Commission to
"require every registrant to have a certain number of 'outside' directors ......
Id. § 1805(g), comment. The comment also notes that this "clause, however,
has no bearing on the Commission's view that it has the authority to mandate
audit committees of 'independent' directors in appropriate circumstances." Id.
A comment in the first supplement to the Code further states that the clause
also "carries no implication either way with respect to such matters as the
Commission's authority... to take similar director-oriented action in the corporate governance area." Id. § 1805(g) (Supp. I at 44), comment.
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prosecution, 397 the Code empowers the Commission to regulate
the internal governance of certain corporations, but the types
of corporations are specifically identified and are invariably
part of the securities industry. Thus the Commission may in
some cases obtain a trustee to conduct an ongoing business,
the liquidation of a company, or the removal of an officer or
trustee. 398 That the Code authorizes these remedies only as to
the securities industry suggests that they were not intended to
apply to general issuers.
All these factors tend to negate the availability of ancillary
remedies that interfere with corporate governance. Nonetheless, the vague language of section 1819(l) and its comments
might be read to justify such remedies. Accordingly, this provision should be amended so as to clarify its meaning and to
avoid undesirable results. The factors to be considered in redrafting section 1819(l) generally accord with those weighed in
determining what the law of ancillary relief now is or should
be. In the preceding Part of this Article, conclusions about
what the law of ancillary relief is or should be were based
largely on the purposes of the securities law-promoting full
disclosure, preventing or remedying deception and manipulation in securities transactions, and assuring shareholder suffrage. Since the Code retains these purposes, 399 the current
objection to judicial restructuring of corporate boards also compels amending the Code to prohibit these remedies: such restructuring is unnecessary to effective enforcement of the
securities laws and intrudes improperly on shareholder suffrage and state control.
The Code should also bar appointment of special counsel
without the corporation's consent. Although it would probably
397. Id. §§ 1808(c) (order to file a required report or a corrected report),
1808(d) (stop orders), 1808(g) (suspend or terminate a stock exchange or overthe-counter listing), 1819(a) (actions for injunctions or to enforce compliance),
1821(h) (referrals to Attorney General for possible criminal prosecution). The
Code also gives the Commission some new enforcement powers based on new
substantive provisions of the Code. See, e.g., id. § 1808(a) (suspension of privilege of using summary prospectus).
398. Id. §§ 1809(a) (SEC may suspend or revoke registration of or place limitations on a securities professional), 1810-16 (administrative proceedings
against self-regulatory organizations and their members, transfer agents, securities information processors, banks, affiliates of investment companies, and
service companies), 1819(b) (appointment of trustee of clearing agency),
1819(f) (removal of officer of investment company for breach of fiduciary duty),
1819(g) (appointment of trustee of investment company), 1819(i) (liquidation
of unit investment trust).
399. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
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not violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine for
Congress to authorize such appointments, 4 00 the salutary purpose of that doctrine is slighted when the legislative function of
granting enforcement powers is delegated to the courts and the
SEC and the executive function of enforcing the law is delegated by the courts and the SEC to private citizens. 40 1 A corollary to the separation of powers principle is democratic control

over the legislative and executive branches of government.
This, too, is lost when the judiciary and the SEC can set the
budget for securities enforcement through appointments of
special counsel and when private citizens rather than by government employees in the executive branch conduct enforcement. To some extent these objections remain even when the
corporation consents to the appointment, but it does not on balance seem objectionable that a corporation, pursuant to such a
402
decree, should agree to such redress.
Accordingly, section 1819(1) (1) should be amended by adding to the first sentence thereof the following proviso:
provided, the court shall not pursuant to this sentence order the appointment or removal of any director or officer of an issuer, nor require
the revision of the board of directors or similar body of any issuer, nor,
without the consent of the issuer, appoint counsel to investigate possible violations of this Code or to bring suit thereon on behalf of such
issuer.

The Commission should be able to seek a receiver for an
issuer in extreme circumstances, but to define these circumstances precisely by statute would require an exceedingly long
provision, approaching a memorandum of law, and might still
400. Although one purpose of such an appointment is to relieve the SEC of
part of its enforcement burden, technically special counsel are empowered to
sue on behalf of the corporation only, not the SEC. See supra text accompanying note 336. See generally supra notes 27, 336-43. Thus special counsel is not,
strictly speaking, performing a governmental function. Although delegation of
law-maling power to private parties may create constitutional problems, see L.
JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINsTRATIvE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 67-70 (4th
ed. 1976), appointment of special counsel raises no such problems because,
technically, no governmental powers are delegated. But see infra note 401 (appointment of special counsel goes beyond function of SEC).
401. "[T]he fundamental assumption behind the separation of powers is
that because no branch of government can be trusted in its use of power, the
power of each branch must be limited by some degree of functional specialization." Nagel, supra note 1, at 662-63 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J.
Madison)). Even though appointment of special counsel does not technically
violate this principle, see supra note 400, it does permit the SEC and the courts
to engage in activities which in spirit are beyond their "functional
specialization."
402. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
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deprive the courts of necessary flexibility. 403 Perhaps the best

approach is to refer briefly in the statute to the conditions for a
receivership, but to leave the courts some flexibility and to expand on these conditions in a comment. Accordingly, the following should be added after the first sentence of section
1819(l) (1):
The court shall appoint a receiver pursuant to the preceding sentence
only as permitted by the practice of equity, and only pending conclusion of the action and so long as necessary to preserve assets of the defendant to which investors may be entitled by reason of violations of
this Code.

This provision loosens the traditional requirement of equity by extending the remedy to a plaintiff who has no legal interest in the defendants' property, since the SEC will always
lack even a claim against this property while the investors on
whose behalf the SEC is suing may have such a claim but will
often lack the kind of existing legal interest which equity traditionally required.40 4 It is hoped that, by referring to both the
rules of equity and some specific conditions for receiverships,
this formulation can leave courts sufficient flexibility without
allowing them to abandon the traditional functions of
receiverships.
The Code must also be changed to subordinate SEC actions to private suits when the SEC seeks recovery on behalf of
investors. This modification stresses that the SEC is not a collection agency. If the Commission seeks to enjoin or otherwise
to prevent future violations of the securities laws, it need not
defer to private suits. Even when the objective is recovery for
investors, the law may forbid private actions, or no private suit
may have been brought or competently prosecuted. But if, for
example, the SEC seeks restitution or rescission while a private suit for similar relief is being competently pursued, there
is no reason not to stay the SEC's suit. If the private suit fails
40 5
to procure adequate relief, the SEC can revive its action.
The Commission should welcome such stays because they help
conserve its scarce enforcement resources. To provide for such
stays, 1819(1) (1) should be amended by adding the following
sentence:
An action by the Commission to recover money or property for inves403. See generally supra notes 345-57 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 358.
405. In general, a suit by the SEC may be treated like a second shareholder's derivative suit. See supra note 305. Of course, the Commission may

also appear as amicus curiae in a private suit. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 57, at
1935-36.
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tors shall be stayed during the pendency of a private suit which in the
opinion of the court will probably be adequate to obtain any such recovery to which investors are entitled.

The foregoing changes would improve the Code by clarifying the role of ancillary relief and retaining the remedies the
Commission needs to discharge its duties while excluding it
from areas not within its province and establishing proper priorities between SEC enforcement actions and private suits.
Except for the limitations just suggested, the SEC should be
able to pursue, and the courts to grant, any ancillary remedy
appropriate in a given case.
The foregoing guidelines contradict much recent commentary advocating greater government involvement in corporate
governance. Professor Christopher Stone, in particular, has argued that corporations are less susceptible than individuals to
traditional legal sanctions. Neither fines nor individual liability
of officers, he believes, adequately deters illegal behavior. 4 6
Accordingly, he advocates greater governmental regulation of
corporate governance by means of a Federal Corporations
Commission, especially when a corporation has seriously broken the law. Under Stone's doctrine, it might be wise to permit
the SEC and the courts to restructure corporate boards as ancillary relief.
A short answer to Stone's thesis is that the Code's drafters
have expressly eschewed major substantive changes in the securities laws and that it would therefore be inappropriate to
use the Code to extend government regulation of corporate
governance. 407 Perhaps the drafters' claim should not be taken
at face value. They may have made that claim not only to
406. In Stone's view, traditional legal sanctions tend to be ineffective when
imposed on corporations because a corporation cannot be imprisoned and fines
tend to be fairly small, they do not embarass corporate managers as much as
other financial losses (because fines can be ascribed to hazy laws and disobedient subordinates), they do not deter (because of uncertainty that a violation
will be detected and punished), and they harm stockholders, who rarely deserve the harm. Both legislatures and courts tend to resist imposing large
fines. Punishing individuals is also inadequate to alter corporate behavior because many offenses are committed by lower level employees who do not control the corporation; many offenses cannot be ascribed to specific individuals;
higher officers cannot know everything lower employees do and are often deliberately screened from bad news; judges and juries hesitate to convict or punish
individual officers; fines may be made up by indemnification or insurance; and
criminal sanctions often lack accompanying peer group disapproval because
corporate norms differ from legal norms. See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDs
39-69 (1975); Stone, The Place of EnterpriseLiability in the Controlof Corporate
Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 14-35 (1980).
407. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
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dampen potential opposition to the Code but also to avert demands from all quarters for other major changes.
Although this is not an appropriate place for a sustained
critique of Stone's arguments, it is fitting to note that Stone's
premise that corporations are less susceptible than individuals
to traditional legal sanctions is neither intuitively compelling
nor empirically proved.408 Even if one accepts Stone's premises about corporations and legal sanctions, it does not necessarily follow that greater government intrusion through an
administrative agency is the best solution, especially with re-

spect to SEC regulation of corporate governance. 4

9

There is

408. Professor Galbraith and others have argued that corporate managers
primarily look out for their own interests, not those of the corporation. J. GALBRArrH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 171 (2d ed. 1971). See Donaldson, Financial
Goals: Management v. Stockholders, 41 HARv. Bus. REv. 116 (May-June 1963).
One would assume, therefore, that corporate managers would be especially
careful not to break the law since most profits from violations benefit the many
anonymous and ungrateful shareholders, while penalties for violations might
well be imposed on the managers themselves. See J. GALBRUrrB, supra, at 171
("profit maximization as a goal requires that the individual member of the
technostructure subordinate his personal pecuniary interest to that of the remote, and unknown stockholder"). But see Werner, Managemen Stock Market
and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLuM. L REv. 388,
388-89 (1977) (market pressures are so great that managers often feel compelled to break the law to increase profits). Stone's empirical support for his
thesis does not rise above the anecdotal. Where the Law Ends is based on research of six case studies involving flagrant fraud, spectacular financial collapse
or product defect, or questionable corporate political activity. C. STONE, supra
note 406, at ix. It is highly doubtful that focusing on such aberrant cases can
produce an analytical framework suitable to average public corporations. See
Cohen, Book Review, 62 VA. L. REv. 259, 269 (1976) (review of Where the Law
Ends).
409. While government regulation may prevent some undesirable corporate
behavior, this benefit is not achieved without substantial cost. In particular,
government regulation may discourage competition, innovation, and reasonable
risk-taking, even when regulation is performed by an agency regulating a single
industry so that the agency acquires considerable expertise with respect to that
industry. This criticism has been leveled at many federal agencies, including
the SEC. See R. KARmEL, supra note 140, passim; H. KaKE, supra note 140,
passim. Although Stone's proposals differ radically from past and present regulatory schemes, so that Stone cannot be charged with most shortcomings of
these schemes, the past failures of regulation counsel a cautious attitude toward proposals for more regulation. Some of Stone's proposals that have been
tried have not been spectacularly successful. In particular, government appointed directors have been ineffective in recent cases and in the last century.
See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 167-69 (1976); DeMott,
supra note 320, passim.
Although the SEC may possess expertise with respect to securities professionals, such as broker-dealers, investment companies and advisers, and securities exchanges, and although it may also be expert as to the corporate finance
aspects of other businesses, such as financial reporting and accounting, it possesses no special expertise with respect to the general management of business
outside the securities industry. Yet when the SEC and the courts bar individu-

1983]

ANCILLARY RELIEF

no consensus as to any method of improving corporate governance substantially, nor even as to the goals of corporate govern410
ance other than the traditional goal of maximizing profits.
Is the restructuring of corporate boards through ancillary
relief more defensible than broader regulation of corporate governance by the SEC? Defenders of the SEC can argue that ancillary relief is granted only when a corporation has already
violated the securities laws, thereby showing that the board
has not been effective, and that in appropriate cases the SEC
and the courts can improve compliance with the law and corporate governance generally by restructuring the board. A corporation's governance remains unregulated until its behavior
demonstrates a need for regulation. This argument falters on
the same objections that can be leveled against broader SEC
regulation of corporate governance. The SEC has articulated
no general goals of corporate governance that it seeks to
achieve through ancillary relief, and it has no mandate from
Congress to fashion such goals. The managerialist view voiced
by some SEC officials is not only theoretically flawed but also
has not commanded and could not now command the approval
of Congress. This lack of any standards for corporate governance is fatal; without it there is no basis for measuring the effectiveness of the Commission's efforts.
If there lurks below the surface some unarticulated vision,
or hidden agenda, for corporate governance, there is no evidence that the restructuring of corporate boards has furthered
that vision. Even statistical evidence that corporations with
boards restructured by the SEC had by some standard performed better than they had previously would not be terribly
meaningful without comparison to some control group of corpoals from serving as corporate managers, and suspend the shareholders' traditional right to elect directors, they necessarily regulate not only the
corporation's financial disclosures but the conduct of its entire business. See
supra text following note 312.
410. Although all but Marxists concede need for some devotion to profit,
commentators disagree whether this should be the only goal of corporate activity, or whether corporations should also pursue social goals. See W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, supra note 299, at 219-23. Needless to say, commentators also disagree on what changes, if any, should be made in corporate governance. See id.
at 223-26. Professor Kripke has written of the dangers to American business if
the vision of managerialism embraced by some SEC officials were imposed on
American corporations. Kripke, supra note 158, at 180-86. Even without accepting Professor Kripke's views entirely, however, one can well imagine the
adverse consequences of replacing corporate managers responsible to shareholders and to market forces with managers responsible in some vaguely defined way to the SEC and to the courts.
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rations that had been subjected to relief other than such restructuring. Moreover, if the object of ancillary relief is not
improved corporate governance but only improved compliance
with the securities laws, there is no evidence that restructuring
corporate boards is more effective than other remedies. Indeed, logic suggests that other remedies might be more effec41
tive for that purpose. 1
In sum, the assumptions that unsocial corporate behavior
is a major problem and that increased government regulation
of corporate governance is the solution are questionable. Even
if such regulation were desirable, the SEC lacks the congressional mandate and the expertise to perform it. These
problems apply equally to the regulation of corporate governance through ancillary relief. Accordingly, even if Congress
considers substantive changes in connection with the ALI Federal Securities Code, policy considerations dictate that it forbid
the SEC and the courts to restructure corporate boards as ancillary relief.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court and, as to some remedies, the
federal courts generally have not yet grappled with the legal issues raised by ancillary relief in securities law, the Supreme
Court's movement in recent years toward a narrower reading of
the securities laws and a greater reluctance to infer statutory
remedies suggests that the Court might well disapprove of at
least some ancillary remedies that the SEC has obtained. As a
result, there is now considerable uncertainty about the propriety of much ancillary relief in securities law. This Article has
set forth the framework within which the problems of ancillary
relief in securities law must be analyzed and has proposed
some answers to these problems.
Similar problems have not arisen in other areas of administrative law because other administrative agencies generally
have not sought such broad ancillary remedies as has the SEC.
If the SEC continues to obtain such remedies, it would seem
only a matter of time before other agencies try to do likewise.
How should the courts handle such a development? To some
extent the propriety of ancillary relief depends on the purposes
of the legislation under which it is sought, and therefore the
rules of ancillary relief must to some degree be specific to each
411.

See supra text accompanying notes 333-34.
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administrative agency. Still, some general propositions may be
stated. The availability of ancillary relief should depend in part
on the statutory provisions for express remedies. An elaborate
array of express remedies suggests that Congress thought
through the question of remedies, granting those it wanted and
withholding those it did not want. The traditions of equity are
also relevant. It is likely that Congress intended the courts to
grant remedies traditional to equity, but not remedies unknown
to equity. Finally, defining what remedies are available for violations of federal statutes, especially remedies available to an
administrative agency created by Congress, should be primarily a congressional function. Accordingly, the burden of proof
should be on those advocating implied ancillary relief. For the
same reason, solution of the problem of ancillary relief should
come not from the courts, but from Congress. The best approach is for Congress to specify clearly the remedies available
under federal legislation. Courts then would not grant remedies unless expressly provided for or contemplated by Congress. This approach would be the most consistent with the
separation of powers and with democratic control of the lawmaking process.

